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INTRODUCTIC)N 
A. Context of the Project 
The past decade has been a tumultuous and energized period in the 
study of administrative law and regulatory regimes.' Debate continues 
over both positive and normative theories of the administrative state, as 
well as over the appropriate directions of innovation and "reinvention.,,2 
Among legislators and the public, the tax system and the Internal 
Revenue Service have been targets for criticism.3 
I. See Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32 
TULSA L. J. 325 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance. 1991 DUKE L. J. 607 
(1991); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. I (1998); see also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Ad-
ministrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. I (1997) (describing the numerous administrative law 
critiques, debates and proposals). 
2. See Freeman, supra note I, at 3-4 n.3 (citing a range of regulatory literature focusing 
on "reinvention"). 
3. In 1996 Congress established the "National Commission on Restructuring the 
Internal Revenue Service," which gathered facts and made numerous reform 
recommendations to Congress. In July 1998; President Clinton signed into law the Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. Pub L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 689 
(codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 781 (1999)). 
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This paper outlines a receQt procedural innovation in the tax area, 
the Advance Pricing Agreement Program ("APA" program)4, and 
evaluates its success. Such a case study can play a significant role in 
linking procedural innovation to the broader issues of administrative law 
theory and regulatory reform. For example, a working model such as the 
APA program, built on flexibility and creativity, may support 
administrative theories advocating discretion, flexibility, and 
experimentation.5 Conversely, some interest group theories of regulation 
(e.g., public choice theory), can prompt critical examination of reforms 
like APAs that exhibit limited openness to scrutiny.6 The APA program 
is an ideal candidate for such analysis because it incorporates multiple 
factors germane to other fields including cross border transactions, 
intergovernmental relations, high information costs for regulation, and 
serious risks to all parties from' uncertainty. Ultimately, detailed 
understandings of innovations in administrative systems are essential to 
developing and challenging positive and normative theories of 
administrative law-and to designing concrete applications of 
administrative law policy. 
B. Specific Project 
In the field of international tax, there has developed a national, and 
even international consensus that traditional mechanisms for 
administering the law and resolving disputes have virtually collapsed in 
the area of transfer pricing (which plays an important role in allocating a 
taxpayer's income among taxing jurisdictions).7 The tax system no 
4. Given the administrative aspects of this paper, it is unfortunate that the acronym for 
the tax program in question is the same as that for the Administrative Procedures Act. 
However, because the tax program is known exclusively as the "APA program," this paper 
retains that terminology throughout. Thus, any reference to "APA" in this paper applies only 
to the tax program and its products. 
5. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note I, at 22, 82-83, 97 (arguing that discretion 
constraining approaches to regulatory reform may fail to address the most important 
administrative issues; and outlining a collaborative governance model that involves agency 
flexibility and provisional regulatory solutions to maintain receptiveness to change). For a 
discussion of the origins of the APA program, see infra text accompanying notes 46-70. 
6. See, e.g., Croley, supra note I, at 39-41 (noting in a comparison and critique of 
major theories of administrative law, that "public choice" theorists consider the regulatory 
system to favor organized, narrow interest groups and thus such theorists advocate less 
reliance on government and regulation). 
7. In the most general sense, transfer pricing is a technical term that refers to the 
amounts related parties charge each other in transactions. However, in tax analysis the term 
has a more negative connotation because it also encompasses how parties might benefit from 
these pricing decisions. See, e.g., GENERAL Gov'T DIV., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
INTERN A TIONAL TAXATION: TRANSFER PRICING AND INFORMATION ON NONPAYMENT OF TAX 
(1995) [hereinafter "NONPAYMENT OF TAX"]. 
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longer effectively administers these rules. 8 The significance of 
administrative failure here is tremendous. As described in greater detail 
in Part I, transfer pricing essentially refers to the prices related parties 
charge each other in transactions. If the parties agree to an artificially 
high or low price for the goods, services, intangibles or borrowing, they 
can strategically place their total profits in the "best" (i.e. lowest tax) 
country. Such off-market pricing is possible because the parties' 
common control or ownership means they share a common economic 
interest. 
Given the volume of cross border business between and among the 
United States and other countries, much of which involves related party 
transactions, the opportunity for transfer pricing abuse by taxpayers and 
the resulting loss of tax revenue continues to be staggering. Successful 
application and enforcement of U.S. tax rules designed to prevent 
transfer pricing abuse typically require a very fact intensive review with 
economic analysis, detailed regulations, and third party comparative 
data. Often, necessary information is outside the United States, does not 
exist in relevant forms, or does not exist at all. The situation is 
compounded by the fact that other taxing jurisdictions, which may 
consider their own revenue at stake, can take a different view of the 
proper price-disagreeing with the United States, the taxpayer, or both.9 
Expressing serious concern about the loss of revenue from transfer 
pricing, Congress recently directed the Internal Revenue Service 
("Service") to prepare a report on the current transfer pricing situation. 
The resulting report concludes that the "average annual [transfer pricing] 
gross income tax gap is estimated to amount to $2.8 billion.,,1Q Even 
before this most recent report, the Service recognized the severity of the 
transfer pricing problem and undertook aggressive reform aimed at 
improved administrability." 
8. The challenges of this tax problem produced an explosion of audits and litigation that 
have come to dominate much of the Service's and courts' time. See, e.g., id. at 21-22 (for 
cases closed in fiscal year 1993 and the first half of fiscal year 1994, the Service spent 1/3 of 
its total international examiner time and much more of its economists' time on cases with an 
I.R.C. § 482 issue). See infra text accompanying note 34 (discussing burden on the tax system 
from transfer pricing). 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 17-19 (describing transfer pricing examples) 
10. IRS Report on Application and Administration of I.R.C. § 482 (Pub. 3218), 1999 
DAILY TAX REP. 108, at L-3. 
11. The tax system could not sustain the current approach that (1) relied on complex 
regulations that failed to provide a clear answer in most cases, (2) involved highly 
individualized factual/legal determinations, and (3) ultimately required coordination with a 
separate sovereign. These difficulties in enforcing the transfer pricing regime seemed 
intractable and not susceptible to substantial remediation through regulatory changes. See 
infra text accompanying notes 38-44. The Service, therefore, sought an alternative beyond 
modification of the detailed substantive tax rules and regulations. 
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In a bold move in the early 1990s, the United States led its trading 
partners toward a new model of advance dispute resolution for transfer 
pricing, the APA program, which relies on a backbone of familiar 
mechanisms complimented by certain novel features. 12 The APA process 
is an alternative to the standard taxpayer path of doing the transactions, 
filing a return, facing audit (some level of audit is more likely with 
larger taxpayers), and, finally, possible appeal with settlement or 
litigation. The taxpayer initiates the APA process by approaching the 
Service (and typically the corresponding tax authorities in the other 
relevant jurisdictions) before engaging in the related party transactions 
potentially at issue.13 At this point the taxpayer voluntarily provides 
detailed information to the governments regarding its business activities, 
plans, competitors, market conditions, and prior tax circumstances. The 
critical piece of this presentation is the taxpayer's explanation of its 
planned pricing method. Following discussion and negotiation, the 
parties hopefully reach agreement on how the taxpayer should handle the 
pncmg of these anticipated related party transactions. This 
understanding is embodied in the APA agreement which typically runs 
for three years. 
In order to appreciate the potential issues raised by this innovative 
procedure it is necessary to outline briefly the features of the process 
from the perspective of the various parties. First, why would taxpayers 
participate to the extent it requires disclosure to the government of 
significant information, some of which might otherwise be withheld? 
Ideally participating taxpayers obtain tax certainty before actually 
engaging in their transactions. In addition they obtain a tax treatment 
that is uniformly accepted by all of the taxing authorities, thereby 
eliminating conflict. There is also an expectation that this alternative 
12. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 375 (revising and superseding Rev. Proc. 91-22); 
Rev. Proc 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526 (first introducing the APA process). At its core, the APA 
program is a mechanism by which taxpayers can approach the Service to develop an 
agreement on the tax treatment of their related party transactions under transfer pricing rules 
and related provisions. See I.R.C. § 482 (1999); Treas. Reg § 1.482 (1999) and the regulations 
thereunder. The agreements, which apply for a specified period of future (and sometimes past) 
years, have been treated as confidential and not released to the public. However, in early 1999 
the Service indicated a change in its views on disclosure of APAs and announced plans to 
release redacted versions. See infra text accompanying note 52. However, Congress 
responded in December 1999 by categorizing APAs as "return" information under I.R.C. 
§ 6103, which cannot be disclosed. Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 521; 113 Stat. 1860, 1925. 
Additionally, Congress amended I.R.C. § 61 lOeb) to exclude APAs from the definition of 
written determinations required to be disclosed. See id. § 521 (a)(2). To provide some 
increased information regarding the APA program, Congress directed the Secretary of the 
Treasury to prepare an annual report regarding APAs. See id. § 521(b). 
\3. But see Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 3.06 (outlining rollback provisions). 
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mechanism for dispute resolution might reduce overall costs of 
addressing transfer pricing problems. 
Second, why should governments be willing to engage in this one-
on-one process with taxpayers? Governments may hope to gain 
information about pricing practices and transaction specific issues, to 
utilize a different forum, and to interact with other countries in a setting 
conducive to more comprehensive resolutions of transfer pricing 
"problems." Additionally, governments, have historically borne a 
significant burden for transfer pricing, both in terms of time and money. 
They now look to the APA program to provide less costly dispute 
resolution and to enhance their information base for future 
improvements to the taxation of related party transactions. 
The participating taxpayers and governments represent the central 
but not exclusive parties significant to the APA program. 
Nonparticipating taxpayers (those with and without transfer pricing 
issues) are impacted by both the tax system's problem with transfer 
pricing and by the addition of AP As to the mix of procedural options. 
On the positive side, a successful APA program might reduce 
government administration and enforcement . costs, providing a 
generalized benefit. Also, to the extent the Service gains more detailed 
knowledge about transfer pricing practice and can translate that learning 
into improved rules, then all taxpayers with transfer pricing questions 
may benefit. On the negative side, the program's use of private 
individualized agreements raises a number of risks that might not be 
acceptable in an administrative regime, including the specter of uneven 
application of substantive law. Not surprisingly, the complex and varied 
effects of the AP A program have made this procedural innovation a 
lightening rod for both praise and criticism from those concerned with 
the future of transfer pricing in the U.S. tax system. An in-depth case 
study of this innovation provides insight into the scope of its 
effectiveness for taxing cross border income, and into its broader 
implications for administrative and regulatory reform. 
The creation of the AP A program illuminates the difficult procedural 
choices made in a particular administrative regime in response to 
concrete substantive and procedural problems and goals. But of course, 
the tax system is not entirely unique. Numerous other administrative 
agencies confront comparable issues including complex rules, detailed 
facts, and international players. Thinking about such questions from a 
more universal administrative law theory perspective allows us to see the 
connections across a range of administrative regimes and to develop a 
better understanding of the risks and opportunities in reform. 
HeinOnline -- 21 Mich. J. Int’l L. 149 1999-2000
Winter 2000] On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation 149 
The first step in this process is to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of the AP A program. The paper asks two questions 
regarding the program's effects and success: (1) what is the impact on 
the participants (i.e., does the APAprogram make transfer pricing more 
administrable and if so how) and (2) what is the impact on 
nonparticipants (i.e., what is the effect on the larger community of 
taxpayers with cross border business activities). This dual focus is 
necessary for an evaluation of a new procedural development like the 
APA program. The program does not stand alone; it functions as part of 
a larger integrated regime, the tax system, and the effects on 
nonparticipants may be just as important as the effects on participants. 
Because the form of the APA program clashes with traditional 
frameworks for designing and thinking about administrative systems-in 
particular the distinction between rulemaking and adjudicationl4-the 
program can seem difficult to evaluate. The standard structural protec-
tions inherent in a traditional framework play no role. Thus, a central 
question is how much we are willing to consider alternative mechanisms 
for addressing administrative disc:retion, where the upside of the depar-
ture from more established practices may be the resolution of intractable 
problems. Although the workings of the AP A program can be examined 
and critiqued without specific reference to administrative law, such an 
analysis limits our understanding of both its potential and its risks. 
After reaching initial conclusions regarding the effects and success 
of the APA program on participants and nonparticipants, and the trade-
offs at stake in granting this kind of flexibility to the tax system, the 
paper turns to the second major question-what this success suggests 
more generally about administrative reform and regulation in an interna-
tional environment. The fundamental questions of administrative law 
concern how administrative systems do and should work, and how they 
can be improved. This inquiry ultimately diverges in two directions. The 
first follows the more traditional positive and normative analyses of 
regulatory administrative process with alternative theories based on in-
terest group behavior. The second, though not entirely rejecting such 
premises, pushes more explicitly for reform and innovation, and consid-
ers a "new attitude" essential to any significant reform. Both directions 
of analysis demand investigation into real administrative practice. This 
paper undertakes that task for the AP A program. 
The international applications of the resulting observations may 
prove the most important because they offer an alternative role for other 
countries in the U.S. regulatory and administrative process. Such an 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 163-172. 
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alternative will be especially valuable in an increasingly international 
and complex commercial environment where traditional patterns of 
regulating and decision making by countries may not achieve their 
shared goals. 
To execute this two stage inquiry, Part I describes the background 
transfer pricing struggles that pushed the Service to explore alternatives 
to traditional audit and litigation of these tax problems. Part II outlines 
the introduction of the alternative that emerged, the APA program, and 
its growth over the past nine years. Part III examines the direct impact of 
the APA program, whether and how it has made transfer pricing issues 
more administrable for participants. Part IV considers the indirect impact 
of the APA program, its relation to taxpayers not using the APA process, 
and to the operation of the tax system generally. Finally, Part V uses the 
AP A program case study and the underlying procedural tensions it has 
produced to illuminate the current administrative law debate regarding 
the creation and modification of administrative systems and the plausi-
bility of reform through more interactive and· collaborative 
administrative structures. 
I. PRESSURES ON THE SYSTEM: 
TRANSFER PRICING MELTDOWN 
The administration of the income tax system operated for more than 
seventy years before the introduction of APAs, and throughout that pe-
riod U.S. and foreign businesses engaged in cross border activity. Why 
then did the Service feel compelled to design an alternative program in 
the 1990s? The answer lies in the quick rise of large scale international 
business transactions and the concurrent development of other countries' 
tax regimes. The international nature of modern business adds stresses to 
our tax system which it is not fully prepared to handle. One of the most 
dramatic of these stresses is transfer pricing. Although the tax system 
has wrestled with transfer pricing issues virtually since the inception of 
the income tax, the results have never been entirely satisfactory. Failings 
here were more easily ignored when the volume of transactions was 
smaller, however, the growing scale of international business has inten-
sified the need for better resolution of transfer pricing. Efforts to 
improve transfer pricing through changes in the substantive law met with 
little success. Ultimately, the Service realized that a change in the proce-
dural mechanism for addressing transfer pricing problems might prove 
the best option. Thus, the Service developed a new procedure for trans-
fer pricing-the AP A program. 
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A. The Transfer Pricing Demon 
Transfer pricing and the allocation· of an economic unit' Sl5 profit 
among its various functions is an issue of fundamental and increasing 
significance as more income is earned cross border. In a multi-
jurisdictional world where tax rules differ, taxpayers have an incentive 
to structure their related party transactionsl6 to locate the entire group's 
profit or loss in the most desirable taxing jurisdiction. 17 When a taxpayer 
engages in cross border transactions with related parties, the 
opportunities to limit or avoid income tax dramatically increase. Because 
the parties are essentially a single economic unit, the price paid between 
the two merely splits the income between the two entities, but does not 
affect the wealth of the unit (tax effects aside). Thus, the two parties can 
price the transaction (e.g., the sale of goods, services, intellectual 
property) in a way that puts more income in the entity operating in a 
lower tax jurisdiction-a strategy of transfer pricing. This objective can 
be accomplished by pricing the transactions below or above market 
price. For example, a U.S. company with a foreign distribution 
subsidiary in a low tax jurisdiction has an incentive to sell its goods to 
the subsidiary at an artificially low price so that little profit appears in 
the U.S. parent. When the subsidiary sells the goods to independent third 
parties at market prices, the subsidiary will have an artificially low cost 
and an artificially high profit. This profit is taxed to the subsidiary and if 
the subsidiary is carefully placed in a low-tax jurisdiction then that profit 
bears little, if any, tax. The group's overall profit is the same and reflects 
market rate transactions: the difference between the parent's cost of 
producing the goods and the price the third party finally pays for the 
goods. However, that difference (the total profit) is artificially split 
between the parent and subsidiary so as to reduce U.S. income tax due. ls 
15. The term "economic unit" here includes a parent corporation and its controlled 
subsidiaries. 
16. Related party transactions refer to those between commonly owned or controlled 
entities. Classic examples include two subsidiaries owned by a parent, or a parent-subsidiary 
pair, although the statutory conception of potential "related" parties in the context of transfer 
pricing is not so narrowly drawn. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(4) (defining controlled to 
include "any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable or not, and 
however exercisable or exercised ... "). 
17. See infra note 19 for more discussion of where and how profits should be taxed. 
18. In some cases, the U.S. tax rules would eliminate the benefit of shifting the profit 
into the subsidiary by preventing "deferral" of U.S. tax on the income of the U.S. parent's 
foreign subsidiary. For example, the Code sometimes requires a U.S. parent to include its 
share of the foreign subsidiary's income on its (the parent's) U.S. tax return in the year earned 
by the subsidiary, despite the subsidiary's retention of the earnings. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 951 et 
seq. Such rules are insufficient to stop transfer pricing because they apply only to certain 
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Although proposals to end deferral entirely are offered from time to 
time, there are theoretical and practical barriers to this route. Policy 
decisions in cross border taxation must consider the appropriate goals of 
the tax rules-particularly in terms of the impact of tax rules on taxpayer 
behavior. Typically this analysis is framed as a debate about 
"neutrality"-whether U.S. tax rules should make a U.S. business 
neutral as between investment inside and outside the United States 
(capital export neutrality) or whether the tax rules should make a U.S. 
business equally competitive in the foreign jurisdiction in which it is 
conducting business and competing (capital import neutrality). Allowing 
deferral comports with capital import neutrality but not with capital 
export neutrality. On a more practical level, the political pressure exerted 
by U.S. multinationals and trade groups (in part under the banner of U.S. 
competitiveness in the global ~arket place) plays a significant role in 
what tax regimes Congress likely will adopt. 
Transfer pricing strategies are not limited to U.S. taxpayers seeking 
deferral of U.S. tax. A foreign parent with a U.S. subsidiary would also 
want to take as much profit out of the U.S. subsidiary as possible and 
place it in a low-taxed related party. The parties could use the same 
technique as above if the U.S. subsidiary were the manufacturer/seller 
and the foreign parent were the buyer. If instead the U.S. subsidiary 
were the buyer, strategic pricing would have the U.S. company pay an 
artificially high price to the foreign parent so that when the U.S. 
subsidiary resold the goods its cost would be artificially high and thus its 
share of the profit artificially low. Same goal, different steps. Transfer 
pricing, of course, is not restricted to the sale of goods, but can occur 
with any related party transaction. Moreover, transfer pricing is not 
limited to cases involving low tax countries. In any cross border related 
party transaction, taxpayers have an incentive to assess their relative tax 
positions in the pertinent jurisdictions and determine where it would be 
most beneficial to locate the income. Tax' rate is a major factor, but 
unused losses as well as other specials rules can impact the taxpayer's 
perspective on a particular jurisdiction. 19 
kinds of income earned by the foreign subsidiary. And, of course, they do not (and could not) 
apply at all to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents. 
19. To fully appreciate the issue of transfer pricing it may be helpful to outline a little 
more about how and where profits should be taxed. Basic principles of income taxation shared 
by most members of the international community include: (I) parties (i.e. related parties) 
should price their transactions as if they were independent market transactions-the arm's 
length concept-so that each taxpayer has the "right" amount of income to report, and (2) that 
once a taxpayer has properly identified its income, the various countries that might have a 
claim to tax it must do so based on shared norms as to which country has the priority to tax. 
Regarding the first point, establishing the proper pricing of related party transactions, there 
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B. Historical Treatment of Transfer Pricing 
The United States historically has combated transfer pncmg by 
requiring the price of the transaction between the related parties to 
reflect an arm's length relationship.20 The idea is that the related parties 
should be charging each other the same price they would charge an 
unrelated party. The mechanism for this rule is the broad statutory 
language of the I.R.C. § 482 which grants the Service the authority to 
reallocate income, deductions, and credits between or among related 
parties where the transactions are not conducted at arm's length prices. 
Unfortunately, while the problem and the "solution" may be relatively 
simple to describe, implementation of the statutory response has not 
been simple because of (1) the lack of information,21 (2) the multi 
jurisdictional element,22 and (3) unsettled questions about the validity of 
has been significant debate and change as seen by the history of the I.R.C. § 482 regulations. 
See infra text accompanying notes 20--35. The primary question is how do we know what the 
arm's length price should be. In a few circumstances there may be direct evidence, such as 
sales by the taxpayer of the same goods under the same terms to both related and unrelated 
parties. But in the absence of such direct evidence, efforts have turned to several formulas that 
do not price by reference to other transactions, but by reference to more general numbers. For 
example, the regulations can establish a "proper" transfer price by looking at the profit margin 
or mark up that comparable taxpayers eam in selling similar goods or services to unrelated 
parties. Assuming that the taxpayer in question should earn approximately the same margin or 
mark up, then the proper related party price can be calculated by adding that same mark-up to 
the taxpayer's cost in acquiring the goods. 
As to the second point, allocation of income among taxing jurisdictions, a consensus has 
emerged among most nations and is reflected in the common structure of income tax treaties. 
The consensus view is based on distinctions between active and passive income, and between 
source and residence countries: (1) if a taxpayer is actively engaged in business (e.g. 
manufacturing, or selling goods or services) then the country in which these activities take 
place (the source country) has the primary right to tax the income; (2) if the source country 
does not tax the income then the taxpayer's residence country may do so (under U.S. law U.S. 
corporations have their residence in the United States); (3) if a taxpayer is earning passive 
income (such as dividends and interest not earned in active business) then the residence 
country of the taxpayer typically has priority to tax. This last result regarding passive income 
is usually achieved .by treaties in which the source country for the passive income agrees to 
reduce or eliminate any tax it would have imposed on such income going to the taxpayer. For 
example, if a U.S. corporation is earning dividends from France, then under the France-U.S. 
income tax treaty France acknowledges the United States' greater priority to tax this income 
by reducing the French income tax (usually in the form of a withholding tax) on the income. 
Of course, the United States agrees to do the same for dividends being paid from the United 
States to a French resident. 
20. Code provisions aimed at deferral also impact the effectiveness of transfer pricing. 
See supra note 18. 
21. As an initial matter, many cases lack a comparable sale to a third party to set the 
arm's length price. Thus, the regulations implementing I.R.C. § 482, outline various methods 
to approximate or back into the arm's length price. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 et seq. 
Application of even these substitute methods calls for data both contested and often 
unavailable. See, e.g., infra notes 40--42. 
22. See infra text accompanying notes 30, 31, 35. 
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the arm's length approach due to possible differences between integrated 
multinationals and companies that deal primarily with unrelated 
taxpayers. The track record of transfer pricing regulation and 
enforcement reveals the difficulty that has existed through the history of 
1.R.c. § 482.23 However, as the issue has become more important and the 
volume of related party international trade has expanded, the holes in the 
system have grown very serious. 
By the 1960's, the government became increasingly concerned that 
U.S. corporations were achieving a significant amount of deferral of 
U.S. tax through transfer pricing strategies with affiliates in low or no 
tax jurisdictions, and that the foreign corporations were effectively 
shifting profits out of their U.S. affiliates.24 Thus, the United States 
issued transfer pricing regulations in 1968,25 establishing specific rules 
for reaching arm's length results in different types of transactions.26 
Despite the hope that these regulations would adequately equip the 
Service (and the courts) with the tools necessary to resolve transfer 
pricing cases, it became increasingly apparent during the 1970s and 
1980s that the arm's length standard did not work in many cases: it was 
hard to find the "right price" and hard to draft regulations to identify that 
price with minimal conflict between the taxpayer and government.27 
In the 1980s, the focus on transfer pricing abuse turned to foreign-
owned companies using transfer pricing to move profits out of the 
United States.28 The concern was that foreign-owned companies 
operating within the United States were paying disproportionately low 
23. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the 
Evolution of u.s. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89,95 (1995); see also Notice 88-
23, 1988-2 C.B. 458 (the "White Paper"); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Comm'r, 84 T.e. 96, 114-15 
(1985). Although some version of the provision has been in the Code since 1917, the Service 
first issued regulations in 1935 detailing more specifically how the clear reflection of income 
and determination of true tax liability was to be achieved. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 
97. 
24. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 100 (citing hearings on the President's 1961 Tax 
Recommendations Before the Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 4 
at 3549 (1961»; Stanley Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length, 30 
TAX NOTES 625, 643-44 (Feb. 17, 1986). 
25. T.D.6952, 1968-1 e.B. 218. 
26. Id. 
27. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 112. 
28. See, e.g., Barbara McLennan, Responses to Section 482 Litigation: Advance Pricing 
Agreements or Arbitration?, 54 TAX NOTES 431, 431 (Jan. 27, 1992) (noting the "Pickle" 
hearings conducted in 1990, which explored whether foreign controlled companies operating 
in the United States were complying with U.S. tax law; and also noting then-Commissioner 
Fred T. Goldberg, Jr.'s 1986 statement that foreign owned companies had $550 billion in 
gross sales and negative taxable income of $1.5 billion which lead then-Commissioner 
Goldberg to call for more creative approaches for resolving transfer pricing cases). 
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U.S. income taxes compared to similar U.S.-owned companies.29 With 
respect to both U.S. and foreign owned multinationals, the growing 
magnitude of the transfer pricing problem and the difficulties policing it 
were due to a number of factors: (1) the increase in cross border 
transactions generally,30 (2) the increase in foreign investment in the 
United States,31 (3) the level of complication in transfer pricing audits 
(because of their fact intensive nature)/2 (4) the difficulty in settling 
transfer pricing cases because of the size of the adjustments at issue,33 
(5) the burden of transfer pricing cases on the Service and courts,34 and 
(6) the increased likelihood of double taxation following other countries' 
growing interest in transfer pricing issues.35 
29. See, e.g., George N. Carlson, Cym M. Lowell, Rom P. Watson, Transfer Pricing for 
Goods, Services, and Intangibles, C693 ALI-ABA 117, at 182-84 (quoting Chairman of the 
House Oversight Committee at the outset of hearings on the role that transfer pricing plays in 
the apparently low effective tax rates paid to the United States by foreign multinationals doing 
business in the United States); see also NONPA YMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 3, 7-8. 
30. See, e.g., McLennan, supra note 28, at 431. 
31. See, e.g., id. 
32. See, e.g., NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 33 ("The data requirements and the 
subjective nature of the pricing methods imposed a significant administrative burden on both 
corporate taxpayers and IRS, and also led to uncertainties for corporations about their ultimate 
tax liabilities."); Tax Judge Predicts Procedural Changes to Adapt to Transfer Pricing 
Globalization, 114 DAILY TAX REP. G-7 (June 13, 1997) (citing U.S. Tax Court Judge David 
Laro's assessment that transfer pricing cases might require court appointed experts because of 
their complexity). 
33. See generally George Guttman, IRS Averages: Winning Little, Losing Big, 93 TAX 
NOTES INT'L 197-2 (Oct. 11, 1993) (observing that the Service is often unwilling to settle 
cases after it has invested substantial resources). 
34. See, e.g., NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 6 (for cases closed in fiscal year 
1993 and the first half of fiscal year 1994, the Service spent 1/3 of its total international 
examiner time and much more of its economists time on cases with an I.R.C. § 482 issue). 
U.S. Treasury and IRS Report on the Application and Administration of Section 482 (April 9, 
1992) reprinted in Daily Tax Report (BNA) No. 70, at S-34 (April 10, 1992). ("For the 
foreseeable future, transfer pricing litigation will place a heavy burden on the Service and Tax 
Court."). As an indication of the potential volume of information in transfer pricing cases it is 
interesting to note that Chevron produced at least 650 boxes of documents for the Service in 
the course of its transfer pricing litigation. See Jim Fuller, U.S. Tax Review, 93 TAX NOTES 
INT'L 205-10 (Oct. 25, 1993). 
35. See generally Taxpayers Must Show Substantial Evidence to Back Resale Pricing 
Methods, IRS Says, 242 DAILY TAX REP. G-4, G-5 (Dec. 20, 1993) (IRS Chief, Tax Treaty 
Division reporting that "[i]n bilateral transfer pricing issues ... [the] IRS has seen increasing 
requests by U.S. treaty partners to get information and even to participate throughout the 
whole process"). This interest in transfer pricing gradually manifests itself through the 
enactment and/or revision of transfer pricing regimes in various countries. See, e.g., J. Scott 
Wilkie, New Rules For an Old Game: A Transfer Pricing Update Repon of Proceedings of 
the Forty-Seventh Tax Conference, 1995 Conference Report 42: I, 42:23-42:25 (1995) 
(describing Canada's introduction of transfer pricing penalty provisions as a response to the 
potential threat on the Canadian tax base posed by strong U.S. transfer pricing penalties); 
Alan Shapiro, Bill Dodge, et al., Three Downs and Out: New Canadian Transfer Pricing 
Rules Level the Playing Field, 15 TAX NOTES INT'L 1623 (1997) (outlining the motivation 
HeinOnline -- 21 Mich. J. Int’l L. 156 1999-2000
156 Michigan Journal of International Law 
C. Service's Unsatisfactory Responses to the 
Explosion in Transfer Pricing 
[Vol. 21:143 
In the face of these developments, the Service pursued a series of 
transfer pricing cases against taxpayers, but failed to win major cases.36 
Nonetheless, the Service continued to audit and litigate, and the volume 
of transfer pricing cases in the courts exploded.37 As part of a continuing 
effort to improve this situation, new transfer pricing regulations were 
finalized in 1994.38 
On the positive side, the 1994 regulations addressed a variety of 
observations that emerged from the years of pricing controversy, such as 
the relative uniqueness of many business operations, the complexity of 
determining an arm's length price, and the difficulties raised by the 
transfer of intangibles.39 Unfortunately, the very reference to a concept of 
an artificially high transfer price implies knowing the correct price. In 
reality, rarely is the "correct" price clear and obvious. If a comparable 
uncontrolled40 sale exists, then identification of the proper price may be 
straightforward. But many related-party transactions do not have arm's 
length comparables, either because such transactions are not taking place 
among unrelated parties, or because the information is not available.41 In 
behind the revised Canadian transfer pricing rules issued in 1997); Allan O. Taylor, Transfer 
Pricing: Fundamental Change in the United Kingdom, 6 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING 
REPORT (BNA) 545 (Nov. 12, 1997) (extensive proposed reforms for the U.K. transfer pricing 
system including the introduction of "self-assessment" for companies); IRD to Issue Revised 
Guidelines Draft Soon, Will Likely Launch Formal APA Program in '98, 6 TAX MGMT. 
TRANSFER PRICING REP. (BNA) 385 (Oct. 15, 1997) (New Zealand enacted a transfer pricing 
regime in December 1995, effective in 1996). 
36. See, e.g., Joseph H. Guttentag & Toshio Miyatake, Transfer Pricing: U.S. and 
Japanese Views, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 375, 385 n.57 (noting that five corporations had major 
transfer pricing cases during the period 1990-92 and that the United States lost a significant 
I.R.e. § 482 issue in each); see also IRS Lases Another Transfer Pricing Case, 80 J. TAX'N 
308, 308 (1994) (the Tax Court's rejection of most of the Service's income and expense 
reallocations in Seagate Technologies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 102 T.e. 149 (1994) represents 
the third major transfer pricing loss for the Service in recent months). 
37. See, e.g., Arthur L. Nims, III, Tax Court Management of Jumbo Cases: The New 
Challenge, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 330, 330 (1991) (transfer pricing has become the new 
"growth" area for Tax Court litigation and such cases represent "massive undertakings"). 
38. InterCompany Transfer Pricing Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971, 34990 (1994) 
(T.D. 8552) (to be codified at 26 e.F.R. pt. 1,602). 
39. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-I(c) (describing the "best method rule"); see id. at 
§ 1.482-4 (method for determining taxable income regarding transfer of intangible property), 
see id. at § 1.482-5 (outlining comparable profits method which is based on operating profit 
margins rather than individual transactions). 
40. "Uncontrolled," i.e., a similar transaction or sale with a third party. 
41. See NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 33 ("A major obstacle in enforcing the 
arm's length standard has been the difficulty that the IRS examiners have had in finding 
readily identifiable comparable transactions."); Rolls Royce Executive Discusses Company's 
Path to U.S. APA Agreement, 7 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 180 (July 15, 1998) 
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such cases, the methods used to determine the disputed price are at best 
one step removed. The 1994 regulations acknowledge this challenge by 
specifying additional approaches intended to respond to these more 
difficult situations.42 
The new regulations did not, and were not expected to, eliminate 
transfer pricing controversies because the rules continued to be complex 
and the debates intensely factual. The cross border element further 
compounded the domestic difficulties in developing a straightforward 
approach for related party pricing. If the United States reallocates 
income under I.R.c.§ 482 away from a foreign party and to its related 
domestic party, then the foreign party has less income and presumably 
will pay less tax in its home jurisdiction. Of course, nothing binds the 
foreign country to the U.S. view of the proper pricing and resulting 
income division. In fact, it would not be unlikely for the foreign country 
to disagree and view the income as earned by the foreign party. The 
result could be both countries taxing the income-unrelieved double 
taxation. As a practical matter, there are mechanisms to resolve this kind 
of dispute, but they are not always successful, nor are they costless or 
quick.43 Moreover, some foreign countries view the U.S.'s "aggressive" 
[hereinafter "Rolls Royce"] (noting third party com parables are extremely rare and tend to 
involve one-time only sales). Similarly, taxpayers can have difficulty getting useful 
information about other businesses, especially competitors. Moreover, there are suggestions 
that direct acquisition by a taxpayer of its competitor's pricing data could raise antitrust 
issues. See Dale W. Wickham & Charles J. Kerester, New Directions Needed for Solution of 
International Transfer Pricing Puzzle: Internationally Agreed Rules or Tax Warfare, 56 TAX 
NOTES 339, 352 (July 20, 1992). 
42. For example, the new regulations specifically outlined the profit split and comparable 
profits methods for identifying appropriate prices/ranges of prices in the absence of 
transaction specific data. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-6. See also NONPA YMENT OF TAX, supra note 
7, at 2-3 (noting impact of the regulations). Underlying the more factual or "technical" 
problems of establishing prices in the absence of similar transactions between unrelated 
parties, continues an intellectual debate as to how to handle the fact that multinationals may in 
fact be different from their unintegrated counterparts that deal only with third parties. Should 
arm's length pricing really be the model for related party transactions if, in fact, 
multinationals operate differently and operate as an integrated group precisely because they 
gain various advantages, efficiencies and controls by dealing primarily with related parties. A 
less philosophical, and more concrete manifestation of this question is how to allocate the 
transactional savings of related party dealings, especially in the more formulaic area of the 
l.R.C. § 482 regulations (the comparable profits method and the profit split method). 
43. Income tax treaties contain competent authority provisions to handle situations of 
double taxation but they do not guarantee agreement, nor are they necessarily speedy. See, 
e.g., Christine Halphen & Ronald Bordeaux, International Issue Resolution Through 
Competent Authority Process, 64 TAX NOTES 657, 661 (Aug. I, 1994) (noting that competent 
authority process has been criticized for its slow pace-and that in 1990 the average 
processing time was 3.5 years, although its has been significantly reduced); Elizabeth 
Schwinn, IRS Gets a New Look. New Audit Approach in 1999; Prospects Good for New 
Transfer Pricing Regulatory Projects. 7 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REPORT 716, 716-17 
(Jan. 27, 1999) (noting that in 1998 the percentage of taxpayers receiving full relief from 
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position on transfer pricing as pressuring taxpayers to price their related 
party transactions to favor the U.S. fisc so that such taxpayers can 
minimize costly conflict with the United States.44 
Even before the new regulations were finalized in 1994, the Service 
recognized that it faced a renewed transfer pricing challenge which 
involved high stakes and a serious burden on the tax system. The Service 
sought multiple remedies. To the extent the problem derived from the 
difficulty in reducing transfer pricing concepts to workable rules, 
substantive law reform efforts would likely have limited success (as was 
ultimately seen with the 1994 regulations). The Service recognized that 
the burdens on the tax system from transfer pricing disputes also resulted 
from the non substantive factors noted above, including the role of other 
countries, the significance offactual/legal determinations, and the high 
dollars at stake with its corresponding impact on taxpayer-Service 
negotiations.45 For these reasons, the Service pursued procedural reform 
to improve the resolution of transfer pricing issues. The new procedural 
approach introduced was the AP A program. As a procedural response, 
the APA program essentially accepts the existing substantive law 
baseline, although the program anticipates an interactive effect on the 
underlying tax law. Thus, the core issues raised by the innovation arise 
much less from the substantive tax rules than from the administrative 
and systemic implications of this alternative procedure. The focus, 
therefore, shifts to the exploration of the administrative and procedural 
issues-first in the immediate context of the APA program and its direct 
mission. Then, the analysis moves to the level of administrative design 
generally where links to broader administrative and regulatory debate 
inform concrete arguments regarding the APA program. 
double taxation fell to 87%). "Competent Authority" is a tax treaty term that refers to the 
governmental group or division in each treaty country that is responsible for negotiating with 
the other country to resolve conflicts under the treaty. 
44. See, e.g., Wilkie, supra note 35, at 42:23-42:25 (Canada viewed U.S. transfer pricing 
penalty provisions as encouraging multinationals to overstate U.S. income, correspondingly 
understating income taxable in other countries, such as Canada). Cf Marc Levey and Pierre-
Sebastien Thill, Transfer Pricing in France Moves Closer to U.S. Approach, 7 J. INT'L TAX'N 
388, 396 (Sept. 1996) (noting that as regards U.S. and French approaches to transfer pricing, 
"true parity still may not exist either in the technical reading of the rules or the manner of 
enforcement. ... [and that] [o]nly time, actual reported experiences, and possibly an active 
participation in the APA program can truly identify these gaps and indicate how to bridge 
them.") 
45. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35. 
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In 1990, the Service announced the planned introduction of a new 
procedure which it called Advance Determination Rulings.46 By the time 
the program was formally introduced in March 1991,47 the name had 
been changed to the Advance Pricing Agreement Program, which is how 
it is known today.48 Subsequently, in 1996, the Service issued an updated 
procedure for APAs, Rev. Proc. 96-53, with changes reflecting several 
years' experience with the program. 
What marks AP As as an unusual procedural device in the tax system 
is the fact that they permit the taxpayer and the government to discuss 
and resolve substantive tax issues voluntarily, prior to the transactions 
occurring, and to reach agreement on their tax treatment. At first blush 
this may not seem unusual; a student of the tax system could identify 
other existing mechanisms that allow this kind of interaction.49 The APA 
differs because of the precise nature and context of the interaction. 
Unlike an audit or settlement agreement, the primary function of the 
APA is to cover future transactions.50 Although advance tax rulings exist 
in the United States (for example letter rulings),51 APAs are different for 
several reasons: the agreements involve foreign countries; the issues are 
intensely factual (and the facts very complex) and require significant 
negotiation between the government and taxpayer; the agreements can 
cover a number of years; and the terms of the agreements are 
46. See Full Text of Draft Revenue Procedure on Advance Pricing Rulings. 2 TAX NOTES 
INT'L 565 (1990) (reprinting the unpublished draft revenue procedure prepared by the 
Service). 
47. Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at § 13. 
48. It has been suggested that the name was changed because "rulings" are generally the 
kinds of documents required to be disclosed (with key information redacted), and the Service 
did not intend to have APAs made public at all. See, e.g., Mike McIntyre, IRS Affirms Plans 
for Developing Secret Tax Law on Transfer Pricing. 3 TAX NOTES INT'L 267, 268 (1991) 
(arguing that "[t]he Service apparently made the name change in the hope of improving its 
position in court should its secrecy rule be challenged."). If the agreements were called 
rulings, that fact might hinder the Service's efforts to keep the agreements secret. Id.; see also 
I.R.C. § 61 \0 (describing disclosure rules for various categories of documents). Ultimately, in 
1999 Congress eliminated any doubt surounding disclosure of APAs by amending LR.C. 
§ 6 \03(b) to classify APAs as nondisclosable retUI:n information. See supra note 12. This 
point of secrecy and disclosure is one to which the analysis returns later in Part IV. 
49. See infra text accompanying notes 56-61. 
50. Its role with respect to past years, however, has been expanded and clarified. See 
Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 3.06. 
51. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61 for a description of letter rulings. 
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confidential with no redacted versions released to the public.52 These 
APA characteristics stand in contrast to the operation of the most 
common advance ruling, the letter ruling. Such rulings, which are 
primarily legal determinations applied to relatively generic facts, involve 
only the Service and are published in redacted form.53 The APA 
program, although clearly distinct from the existing array of procedures 
available to taxpayers, drew upon domestic and foreign examples to 
produce a format tailored to the transfer pricing context. The following 
sections describe the origins of the APA program and the final product. 
B. Origins of the APA Process-Existing 
Domestic and Foreign Models 
Once the Service decided to turn to procedural devices as an answer 
to the transfer pricing dilemma, it was apparent that a variety of 
administrative procedures already existed.54 Although none was 
ultimately satisfactory for the task, they set the groundwork for the 
development of the APA process.55 For example, with respect to 
prospective transactions the Service will, at its discretion, grant a letter 
ruling which is "a written statement issued to a taxpayer or his 
authorized representative by the National Office that interprets and 
applies the tax laws to a specific set of facts.,,56 Typically, the Service 
will not issue a ruling unless the answer is clear from applying the law to 
the facts. 57 For this reason, letter rulings are unavailable for transfer 
.., 58 pncIng Issues. 
52. In the course of a lawsuit brought in 1996 by BNA against the Service to force 
disclosure of APAs, the Service changed its views and announced intended disclosure of 
APAs. See infra note 228 for a discussion of the BNA lawsuit. The Service indicated that it 
viewed APAs as subject to disclosure under I.R.C. § 6110. See, e.g., Molly Moses, Judge 
Allows BNA to Propose Schedule for IRS to Make APAs Publicly Available, 28 DAILY TAX 
REPORT G-7 (Feb. II, 1999); IRS-Treasury Letter AnnounCing Intention to Settle BNA APA 
Lawsuit, 7 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 88 (Jan. 27, 1999) (copy of letter sent to 
APA participants indicating the Service's intent to disclose APAs under I.R.C. § 6110). 
However, as noted earlier, Congress responded in December 1999 by statutorily preventing 
disclosure of APAs. See supra note 12. 
53. See infra note 61. 
54. See generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Warren, 
Gorham & Lamont 1991) 1-57-1-59 (outlining the Service's interactions with taxpayers that 
have traditionally extended beyond regulation drafting, audit, and litigation). 
55. See H. David Rosenbloom, Charles T. Plambeck, & Craig A. Sharon, Advance 
Pricing Agreements, 95 TAX NOTES INT'L 131-21 (July 10, 1995) (discussing background of 
APA programs). 
56. 26 C.F.R. § 601.20 I (a)(2) (1999). 
57. 26C.F.R. § 601.201 (b)(5) (1999); Rev. Proc. 96-1,1996-1 I.R.B. 8, § 5.14. 
58. See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Competing Interests Snag APA Program Guidance, 70 TAX 
NOTES 138, 139 (Jan. 8, 1996) (quoting APA program original director Robert Ackerman, 
that APAs differ from letter rulings in that an APA is "not truly an interpretation of the law 
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In the area of transfer pricing, although "literal" facts (e.g., whether 
the taxpayer sold 10 or 110 widgets to its parent, or whether the taxpayer 
charged the parent $300 or $7,000 may not be in dispute) the legal 
significance of facts is disputed. For example, because pricing methods 
often depend on identifying comparables, the parties will argue over 
what constitutes a "comparable" transaction-What is the relevant 
market? What is the relevant good or service being sold? How should 
differences between the taxpayer's transaction under scrutiny and those 
identified as possible comparables be adjusted to ensure comparability? 
In addition, disputes over the appropriate method and its application 
would ensue. This level of factual/legal dispute is considered unsuitable 
for the letter ruling context which attempts to provide guidance on the 
application of law to facts where the facts and their legal significance are 
relatively straightforward. A National Office letter ruling is binding on 
the district office in its assessment of a taxpayer's liability,59 but the 
ruling applies only to the taxpayer who requested it and cannot be cited 
in other cases by either the Service or taxpayers.60 Despite their lack of 
precedential value, letter rulings are published in redacted form to 
provide general guidance.61 
For a taxpayer that has completed a transaction but seeks guidance 
on its tax treatment, the district office may issue a "determination let-
ter,,62 applying principles and precedents of the National Office to a 
specific set of facts. Determination letters are not available for questions 
of an inherently factual nature, thus excluding transfer pricing issues.63 A 
taxpayer that has been audited and seeks to appeal its proposed 
adjustment, undertakes settlement discussions with the regional appeals 
office.64 Unlike letter rulings and determination letters, the settlement 
the way letter rulings are," instead an APA "is an application of law to a given set of facts, 
and those facts are determinative."). 
59. Rev. Proc. 96-1, supra note 57. It is not binding on the Service-thus, the Service 
can revoke or revise a ruling. See, e.g., SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 3-47. 
60. I.R.C. § 611O(j)(3) (1999); Rev. Proc. 96-1, supra note 57; Rev. Proc. 96-5, 1996-1 
C.B.503. 
61. I.R.C. § 6110 (1999) (enacted in 1976). Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, letter 
rulings were not released to the pUblic. 
62. 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(a)(3) (1999). Typically, a determination letter is issued 
regarding pension plans or exempt organizations. See SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 3-60. 
63. 26 C.P.R. § 601.201(e)(2) (1999). Determination letters are published in redacted 
form. I.R.C. § 6110 (c)(l999). 
64. See generally 26 C.P.R. § 601.106(a)(I)(i) (1999). The appeals office serves as the 
last point of dispute resolution within the Service. See SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 9-9. No 
appeal can be taken within the Service from a decision at this level; litigation is the only 
remaining option. The appeals offices generally achieve significant success in settling cases. 
Appeals resolves "85 percent of the unagreed cases that annually leave the examination 
process." Thomas Carter Louthan & Steven C. Wrappe, Building a Better Dispute Resolution: 
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process is available for all tax issues including transfer pricing. 
However, as discussed in greater detail in Part III, the tax system faces 
great difficulty in resolving transfer pricing disputes at the appeals level. 
Although the appeals office's settlement power is enhanced by the 
ability to take account of the hazards of litigation in reaching an 
agreement,65 several other factors conspire to limit success. The absence 
of clear, workable rules, the volume of cases, the high dollar amounts at 
stake and the posture of the issues (and numbers) coming from audit into 
appeals have, in the case of transfer pricing, made the settlement process 
less than satisfactory. 66 
In addition to domestic examples of nonlitigative resolution of tax 
controversies, at least two foreign examples existed as the APA program 
was being designed, both prompted by transfer pricing.67 The first 
example involved General Motors' reported experience in resolving 
income allocation disputes in Europe in the 1980s. To reduce tax 
exposure from such controversy and to reduce the risk of double 
taxation, General Motors sought written agreements from various 
Adapting IRS Procedures to Fit the Dispute, 73 TAX NOTES 849, 850 (J 996). The Service has 
traditionally encouraged resolution of adjustment disagreements through the appeals process 
rather than court litigation because of the perceived savings to all parties in time and 
resources. See SALTZMAN supra note 54, at 9-2, 9-3. 
65. See IRM 8631(2), MT 8-209 (May 19, 1992) (Settlement Objective). A settlement is 
formally concluded when it is embodied in a settlement agreement. In a nondocketed case, the 
signed appeals agreement is usually recorded on Forms 870 or 870-AD, which differ in terms 
of pledges against reopening for further assessment or suing for refund. See SALTZMAN, supra 
note 54, at 9-56. Although these are purely administrative (not statutory) arrangements, and 
are not absolutely binding, they nonetheless have some finality as binding contracts. See id. at 
9-57 to 9-60. See generally Lignos v. United States, 439 F.2d 1365, 1368 (2d Cir. 1971); 
Uinta Livestock Corp. v. United States., 355 F.2d 761 (lOth Cir. 1966); Joyce v. Gentsch, 141 
F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1944); Stair v. United States, 516 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1975); Elbo Coals, Inc. 
v. U.S., 588 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Ky. 1984), affd, 763 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1985). Alternatively, 
a settlement can be reflected in a closing agreement-the only statutorily authorized 
mechanism for entering into a mutually binding agreement. LR.C. § 7121 (1976). Due to their 
finality, however, the use of closing agreements is discouraged by the Service in favor of the 
basic settlement agreements. SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 9-56 to 9-57; IRM 8815, MT 8-
216 (Aug. 5,1992) (Agreement Used When Taxpayer Requests Greater Finality). 
66. An optional mediation procedure introduced by the Service in 1995 (after the start of 
the APA program) is available for the resolution of factual issues including transfer pricing 
disputes that are in the appeals administrative process and have not been docketed. Mediation 
is available only after settlement efforts have failed and is limited by other restrictions. 
Announcement 95-86, 1995-44, LR.B. 27 extended by Announcement 97-1, 1997-2 LR.B. 62. 
Of the nine taxpayers interested in the program and qualified to participate, only two have 
been successfully mediated. See Tonya M. Scherer, Alternative Dispute Resolutions in the 
Federal Tax Arena: The Internal Revenue Service Opens Its Doors to Mediation, J. DISP. 
RESOL. 215, 226 (1997). 
67. See, e.g., H. David Rosenbloom et aI., supra note 55 (noting the role of General 
Motors "rumors" as a background element in the development of the APA concept in the 
United States). 
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European countries stating that they would respect General Motors' 
newly developed pricing model based on the resale price method. 
Reportedly, 16 of the 17 countries approached entered into unilateral 
agreements with General Motors.68 
The second foreign example involved Japan's "preconfirmation 
system" (PCS) introduced by the Japanese National Tax Administration 
(NTA) in 1987.69 Following the adoption of transfer pricing rules in 
1986, Japan established the PCS to provide a mechanism by which 
taxpayers and the NTA could reach a non-legally-binding agreement on 
an arm's length price.70 The PCS model is useful, but its unilateral 
approach and its absence of binding results means that it would not 
address all of the factors that make transfer pricing problematic. 
C. The APA Procedure 
Ultimately, the global recognition of transfer pricing administrative 
problems led to informal discussions among various countries and 
taxpayers, and to the development of the first negotiated pricing 
agreemenel involving the United States and Australia.72 Under the APA 
program introduced by Rev. Proc. 91-22, taxpayers initiate the U.S. 
APA process by requesting an APA from the Office of the Associate 
Chief Counsel International. 73 The request must identify the taxpayer and 
68. See Emily E. Eliot, Apple and GM Tax Chiefs Discuss Their Expectations in 
Obtaining Advance Pricing Agreements, 3 TAX NOTES INT'L 373 (1991) (quoting Chief Tax 
Officer of General Motors, James R. Mogle). 
69. See, e.g., Akira Akamatsu, Japanese Competent Authority Discusses U.S. APA 
Procedure, 14 TAX NOTES INT'L 1109 (April 7, 1997); Takashi Kuboi & Yoichi Asakawa, 
Partnering in Japan: Form of Entry and Recent Tax Issues, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 445, 449 
(1996); Rosenbloom et aI., supra note 55; Guttentag & Miyatake, supra note 36. 
70. See, e.g., Kuboi & Asakawa, supra note 69. The PCS has been available through the 
NT A as an administrative avenue but, for procedural reasons, has been difficult to use. 
Accordingly, only a few companies applied for an agreement under the PCS in the initial 
years. The risk of double taxation, however, has prompted Japan to explore methods for 
drawing more taxpayers into advance discussion and agreement with the government. 
Incorporating the PCS into law is hoped to encourage more extensive use of the process. See 
Gary M. Thomas, Japan to Revise Transfer Pricing Rules in 1997: An Opportunity for 
Comment by the Foreign Community?, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 2000, 2000 (June 24, 1996). 
71. Apple Computer Company's advanced pricing agreement with the United States and 
Australia was announced by the company in March 1991, shortly after the release of Rev. 
Proc. 91-22. See, e.g., Eliot, supra note 68, at 373. 
72. See Rosenbloom et aI., supra note 55. 
73. Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at §§ 4,6. Although the applicable district office of 
the Service plays a role in the APA process, the focus is the National Office and competent 
authority (in the case of bilateral and multilateral APAs). Prior to filing a formal APA request, 
the taxpayer may request a conference. This "prefiling conference" is an opportunity for the 
taxpayer to get a sense of the acceptability of its proposed transfer pricing methodology. In 
addition, the taxpayer can ascertain the level of information that the Service anticipates 
needing to adequately examine the situation. Not all requests require the same level of factual 
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all parties to the transactions; describe the business operations and 
history, the ownership structure, capitalization, financial arrangements, 
and principal business; provide relevant tax and financial data for the 
past three years, descriptions of financial accounting methods used as 
well as differences between tax and financial accounting; and explain the 
taxpayer's and the government's positions on previous and current audit, 
appeal, or litigation issues.74 The request also must include a detailed 
description of the transfer pricing method being proposed by the 
taxpayer and demonstrate this method by applying it to the taxpayer's 
three prior years' data. To establish and evaluate the proposed transfer 
pricing methodology, the taxpayer may need to provide party 
profitability data, functional analyses, economic analyses of the general 
industry, a list of competitors, and a detailed discussion of comparable 
transactions.75 Regardless of whether an APA is signed or not, factual 
oral and written representations or submissions made during the APA 
process may be introduced by either the Service or the taxpayer in any 
administrative or judicial proceeding.76 
Finally, the APA request must outline the proposed set of critical 
assumptions. 77 These are the objective business and economic criteria 
that are fundamental to the operation of the proposed transfer pricing 
methodology-any facts about the taxpayer, industry, or tax regime that 
would significantly affect the substantive terms of an APA, if such facts 
changed.78 As part of the APA process, the Service may require that the 
taxpayer provide, at its own expense, an independent expert acceptable 
to both the Service and the taxpayer (and if necessary the foreign 
government) to review and opine on the proposed method.79 
After the request is completed, it is sent to the Chief Counsel 
(National Office) who coordinates with the district office. These 
interactions form an interesting facet of the APA process. Normally, 
taxpayers deal with the local district or regional offices for most of the 
audit, appeal and litigation of a tax matter. The APA process, however, 
is handled by the National Office. Thus, the APA process brings new 
people into the dynamic without removing the district office from the 
disclosure and economic or legal analysis. [d. at § 4. The prefiling conference can be 
conducted on an anonymous basis, although if the details offered during the conference are 
vague enough to protect the taxpayer identity, the anonymity might hamper the taxpayer's 
ability to get an accurate sense of what the APA process would involve in that case. 
74. Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at § 5. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. at §§ 9.03, 9.04. 
77. [d. at § 5.07. 
78. [d. 
79. [d. at § 8. 
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negotiations. As noted earlier, and discussed in greater depth in Part III, 
the change in personnel focus from the district to the National Office 
plays a key role in drawing taxpayers into the APA process.80 
The Service representatives then meet with the taxpayer, often on a 
number of occasions, to discuss fac~s and economic analysis, and to 
negotiate.81 If the parties reach agreement and the Service grants the 
request, an APA can be signed. If the taxpayer seeks to involve a foreign 
government in the negotiations then (under the procedure's initial 
format) the Service and the taxpayer first reach agreement with each 
other and enter into a memorandum of understanding. Then the U.S. 
competent authority negotiates the issue with the foreign country .82 
Because such "bilateral" APAs involve competent authorities, generally 
they are available only when the other country is a treaty party.83 This 
structure for involving the foreign competent authority in the APA 
process was one of the key features later changed by the Service.84 
Negotiating with foreign countries from a locked-in position proved 
untenable in a program which relied heavily on the foreign countries' 
voluntary participation. 
The incorporation of other countries into the process is often the 
major appeal of APAs because a pricing agreement between the United 
States and the taxpayer may be of limited value if the other country (i.e., 
the country of the foreign related party) takes a very different view of 
the transaction.85 Thus, a bilateral APA can be critical in avoiding double 
taxation. Although avoidance of double taxation is a primary attraction 
of the APA program-and some participants may view themselves as 
merely "stakeholders" who expect to pay a total sum in tax and are 
indifferent as to how that amount is divided among the relevant 
jurisdictions-the picture should not be oversimplified. Tax motivations 
for participating are much more complicated, and the details can take on 
significance in evaluating the functioning of the program. 
80. See infra Part III.A.2.b 
81. Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at §§ 6.03,6.04. 
82. See id. at §§ 6.02, 6.06, 7. 
83. Id. at § 7.01. If the agreement reached by the United States and the foreign 
government is not acceptable to the taxpayer, the taxpayer may withdraw the request and 
simply execute its APA with only the United States, although this does not guarantee that 
double taxation will be eliminated. The foreign country might not share the pricing views 
embodied in the taxpayer's agreement with the United States.ld. at § 7.02. 
84. See infra note 104 for explanation of the change in APA procedure in 1996. 
85. In a number of situations, however, a unilateral APA can be appropriate. See, e.g., 
Procedures for Bilateral APAs Continuing to Evolve, 1996 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 202 
at, J-2 (Oct. 18, 1996) (then-APA program Director Michael Durst refers to the preference for 
bilateral APAs, but recognizes that unilateral APAs may be necessary where, for example, 
they involve a nontreaty country or small international flows). 
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First, even the classic stakeholder may have an interest in where the 
tax payment goes. Some have national allegiances which may lead them 
to prefer a particular recipient. Others may have accounting or 
regulatory repercussions from the tax treatment that create an incentive.86 
Second, some taxpayers are drawn to the process because of current 
audit difficulties. The APA process, with its possibility for rollback 
application, can be an attractive alternative for dealing with existing and 
future problems, saving interest, penalties and current dispute costS.87 
Third, taxpayers in a particular industry may consider the APA program, 
with its ability to rely on treaty authority, as a useful way to combat 
serious gaps or irrationalities of current rules. For example, taxpayers 
engaged in global trading88 sought "recognition" of interbranch 
transactions (to achieve more economic taxation), an outcome not 
directly possible under the Service's interpretation of the Code but 
achievable through the APA program.89 Also a foreign manufacturer 
could be ensured that its U.S. subsidiary would not be considered its 
permanent establishment (and thereby subject to more extensive U.S. 
income taxation) by building that assumption into the terms of the 
APA.90 Such strategic participation in the APA program is the logical 
outcome of any system that offers participants choice. 
Assuming agreement is reached (either with United States alone, or 
with a foreign country as well), the APA is binding between the Service 
and the taxpayer and typically effective for about three years.91 If the 
taxpayer complies with the APA terms, then the Service will regard the 
results obtained from applying the transfer pricing methodology 
specified in the AP A as satisfying the arm's length standard and 
86. One of the changes to the APA process introduced after the program had been in 
operation for several years reduced the role of the taxpayer in the bilateral negotiations. See 
infra note 104. Much of the taxpayer response to this change was quite negative, reflecting 
real concern on the part of the taxpayer that they could be harmed by being left out of that 
stage of the process. See, e.g., Role of Competent Authority Seen Causing Some to Rethink 
Bilateral APA Approach, 191 DAILY TAX REP. J-I (Oct. 2, 1996) (noting complaints about 
the new role of competent authority before the practice was formalized in Rev. Proc. 96-53). 
87. See infra note 105. 
88. Global trading generally refers to the activities of a corporation such as an investment 
bank, that has many offices throughout the world that engage in buying and selling securities 
and financial instruments. Different offices may perform different functions, such as hedging 
for the entire group or handling a particular set of securities or instruments. Often exchanges 
may take place between the branches, especially if they operate like independent units. 
Serious tax problems can arise from the U.S. tax treatment which usually does not recognize 
these transactions. See Diane M. Ring, Risk-Shifting in the Multinational Corporation: The 
Incoherence of the U.S. Tax Regime, 38 B.C.L. REV. 667 (1997). 
89. See infra text accompanying notes 156-159. 
90. See Rolls Royce, supra note 41. 
91. See Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at § 9.01. 
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generally will not contest the application of the methodology to the 
transactions outlined in the AP A.92 As part of the APA, the taxpayer is 
required to file an annual report describing the actual operations of the 
business for the year and demonstrating compliance with the terms of the 
agreement.93 In certain cases, compensating adjustments to the calculations 
for that year might have to be made.94 In the event of fraud or malfeasance 
by the taxpayer with respect to material facts provided or good faith 
compliance with the terms of the AP A, the Service can revoke the AP A. 95 
Clearly the APA process requires a taxpayer to provide a significant 
amount of current data regarding business practices, operations, tax 
treatment, and other sensitive issues. To reduce taxpayer concern 
regarding vulnerability to public disclosure, the Service initially took the 
position that information received or generated by the Service during the 
APA process related directly to the potential tax liability of the taxpayer 
under the Code. Thus, the APA itself and related data would be subject 
to the confidentiality requirements of LR.C. § 6103. In addition, the 
Service noted that the information was likely to be commercially 
sensitive and may be confidential pursuant to any relevant treaty.96 
Although the Service would not name participants or make specific 
observations and only provided s,ummary data and statistics on the 
program, some companies that have participated in the APA process 
have publicly commented.97 As noted later in Part IV, the security 
offered by the Service's position on disclosure in the APA context was 
ultimately challenged by freedom of information act requests and a 
lawsuit seeking redacted versions of APAs.98 In January of 1999, in 
response to the ongoing disclosure lawsuit,99 the Service announced a 
change in its position on the disclosability of APAs. The Service stated 
92. See id. at § 7.02. 
93. See id. at § 10.01. 
94. See id. at § 10.02(1). The example in the revenue procedure indicates that if the APA 
required the transfer pricing methodology to produce results within a certain range but it failed to 
do so, compensating adjustments might be made to bring the results within the agreed range. 
95. See id. at § 10.05(1). Such revocation may be retroactive to the first day of the 
taxable year the APA was in effect. See id. at § 10.05(2). Also, an APA may be canceled by 
the Service if it determines that there was a misrepresentation or mistake as to a material fact 
or a lack of good faith in compliance with the APA, but no fraud or malfeasance. See id. at 
§ 10.06(1). If an APA is canceled, the cancellation is effective beginning on the first day of 
the year in which the misrepresentation, misstatement, omission, or noncompliance occurs. 
See id. at § 10.06(3). Finally, if there is a change in critical assumptions, law or treaty, the 
APA may be revised. See id. at § 10.07(1). 
96. See id. at § II. 
97. See, e.g., Known U.S. Advance Pricing Agreements, 7 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER 
PRICING REP. 482 (Oct. 14, 1998). 
98. See infra note 228. 
99. See infra note 228. 
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its new view that APAs constitute "written determinations" subject to 
redacted disclosure pursuant to the terms of I.R.c. § 6110.100 Congress 
reacted in December 1999 by statutorily protecting the confidentiality of 
APAs under I.R.C. § 61 03(b) and thus preventing disclosure. 101 
After the experience of several years of operating the AP A program, 
the Service updated the process by issuing Rev. Proc. 96_53. 102 The program 
remained essentially the same although some key changes were made to 
reflect the Service's evolving views and experiences. Notable changes 
included a stated preference for bilateral as opposed to unilateral AP As; 103 
the "decreased" role of the taxpayer in competent authority discussions; 104 
the Service's stated preference for rollbacks;105 more specified coordination 
of the National Office, district and appeals in the formation of an APA 
team;106 elimination of the reference to limited APAs covering only the 
appropriate transfer pricing methodology and the factual aspects of the 
transactions at issue; 107 and introduction of a sliding scale user fee. 108 
100. See supra note 52. 
10 I. See supra note 12. 
102. Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12. 
103. Id. at § 7.07. 
104. Under the prior procedure, the taxpayer and the Service could first enter into a 
memorandum of understanding ("MOU") outlining their agreed APA negotiations, and then 
the competent authorities would negotiate. The problem encountered in this approach was that 
other countries felt as if they were being handed a "done-deal" because the MOU had been 
reached between the taxpayer and the Service. See, e.g., Service Releases Letters on U.S. 
Advance Pricing Agreement Process, 15 TAX NOTES INT'L 979 (Sept. 29,1997) (announcing 
release of a Sept. 8, 1995 letter by John Neighbour of Inland Revenue [U.K.) which suggests 
that such a format may create difficulties). The new revenue procedure seeks to bring the 
foreign country into the process prior to an established understanding between the taxpayer 
and the Service, thereby enhancing flexibility for the competent authority negotiations. Some 
taxpayers expressed concern over the change in their role in bilateral interactions, in part 
because of their view that they were not simply stakeholders and that it was not irrelevant 
which country received how much tax. 
105. "Rollbacks" refers to the application of the transfer pricing methodology to prior 
tax years, which are not covered by the APA. See generally Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, 
at § 3.06. For taxpayers currently experiencing a difficult or frustrating audit (for the various 
reasons discussed below in Part III) the APA program, with the prospect of rollback of the 
APA approach, can be appealing. See infra note 113. 
106. Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 3.07. 
107. Such limited APAs described in Rev. Proc. 91-22, § 3.04 would not address the 
expected range of results of applying the methodology to the facts. These APAs, known as 
no-penalty APAs, served to insulate the taxpayers from transfer pricing related penalties. See 
APAs: First Section 6662 Penalty-Proof APA Nearly Complete, Intel Executive Says, 1995 
DAILY TAX REP. 92 G- I (May 12, 1995) (announcing that Intel Corporation was preparing to 
complete the first "penalty-proof' APA that would protect the taxpayer from transfer pricing 
penalties but would still leave it open to transfer pricing adjustments on the transaction at 
issue). The removal of the reference to this category of APA leaves open the question as to 
whether the Service will continue to consider such requests. 
108. Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 5.14 (with fees ranging from $5,000 to $25,000 
based on the taxpayer's gross income or the likely annual value of the transactions at issue). 
HeinOnline -- 21 Mich. J. Int’l L. 169 1999-2000
Winter 2000] On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation 169 
Throughout the nine years that the APA program has been in place, 
the pace of completed APAs and APAs in progress has increased. 109 As 
of December 1999, 230 APAs had been completed. 11O The Service had 
requests pending for an additional 187 APAs, almost seventy-five 
percent of which were bilateral, in conformity with the Service's 
expressed preference for such use of the process. III 
III. EFFECT OF THE APA PROGRAM ON PARTICIPANTS: A 
PROCEDURAL HYBRID ADDRESSING THE DEMAND 
FOR ADMINISTRABLE TRANSFER PRICING 
The continuing administrative problems with transfer prIcmg 
motivated the development of the APA p·rogram. These problems can 
be grouped roughly into two general categories, problems stemming 
from: (1) uncertainty of rule application, and (2) difficulty of resolving 
disputes. This Part examines the effect of the program on its 
participants-whether the procedural changes it introduced were 
successful in making transfer pricing more administrable. The focus on 
"administrability" reflects the problem oriented approach taken in 
designing the program. Change was needed precisely because the 
current system was not workable. What was sought was reform that 
would make transfer pricing rules administrable. However, critical 
examination of the program demands more than a narrow look at this 
procedural reform and its administrability. Complete assessment of the 
program's success and impact for both participants (Part III) and 
nonparticipants (Part IV) reflects the tension among a number of 
relevant evaluative criteria. In weighing the risks and benefits of tax 
system reform, attention to broader administrative theory sharpens the 
choices. Furthermore, for the AP A program to serve as a case study in 
administrative theory and design, it is essential to understand the 
precise impact of the program and the structural decisions that were 
109. In October of 1997, the Service had established another avenue for entry into the 
APA process-the Early Referral Program. The general purpose of the program is to 
encourage certain taxpayers to seek an APA early in an audit, where appropriate, to help 
conserve resources. The referrals are made by the district offices which send the names of 
possible participants to the APA program. Taxpayers are then contacted by the APA office 
and if the taxpayers are interested, they may move forward with an APA and transfer pricing 
issues are dropped from the audit until the APA is complete. See Robert S. Ackerman, 
Negotiating Advance Pricing Agreements for Financial Institutions, 16 TAX NOTES INT'L 
1713 (June I, 1998). See infra note 184. 
110. See IRS Reports Completed APAs Reached Record High of 60 During Calendar 
1999,1995 DAILY TAX REP. 14 G-I (Jan. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Record High]. 
III. /d. 
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made. Only such an in-depth analysis enables broader generalizations 
and observations to be offered later. 
A. APA Program Changes 
The APA program introduced three basic changes to the way the 
Service and taxpayers interact over transfer pricing. First, the APA 
program changed the timing of the interactions. Transfer pricing issues 
were not susceptible to the use of letter rulings/12 so any significant 
interpretation, discussion, or analysis under the existing system occurred 
after the transaction. In the APA process, however, the taxpayer and 
government(s) confront the transfer pricing questions at the outset, 
before the transactions OCCUr." 3 
Second, the APA changed the participants. Traditionally, the initial 
government participant in a transfer pricing issue is the district office, 
when it audits the taxpayer. This stage is followed by an internal 
administrative appeal. Ultimately, if the case fails to be resolved through 
these channels it moves to court. In any event, the IRS National Office 
and representatives from the relevant foreign countries are not involved 
in these early stages."4 The APA, however, brings together all of the 
potentially interested parties (taxpayer, district office, National Office, 
foreign government) in the up-front process. Rather than sequential 
involvement, if any, the APA program facilitates the contemporaneous 
interaction of the full set of actors ultimately involved in a transfer 
pricing issue. 
Third, the APA changes the mission and "scope of power" of the 
government in handling the individual taxpayer's transfer pricing 
problem. In the traditional audit context, the district's authority is 
constrained in terms of flexibility and creativity. As discussed below, the 
main government actor in the APA negotiations (the National Office) 
possesses greater degree of flexibility due to a variety of factors, 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57. 
113. This, of course, is a generalization. Some APAs are motivated by the fact that the 
taxpayer finds itself in a messy transfer pricing audit and decides to pursue an APA, with the 
hope it will have retroactive effect. See, e.g., Complexity of Deals Prevents Uniform Financial 
Products APAs, 3 FIN. PRODUCTS REP. 959,960 (Jan. 2, 1998) (quoting Karl Kellar, then-
APA Program Branch Chief, "One of the main reasons that taxpayers do come into the APA 
program is because they are undergoing an audit and they want to deal with transfer pricing 
issues that arise. In that way, they can get certainty for both the future and the past in a 
consistent manner."). 
114. Foreign countries may also be conducting audits, but the timing of their 
administrative process does not necessarily correspond to when the Service is examining the 
years in question. 
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including its place in the administrative hierarchy and its reliance on 
treaty power in reaching certain results with other countries. 
The combination of these changes produced a new procedure that 
was, in critical ways, a hybrid of pieces of the system that existed-
some occurring ex ante and others ex post. In designing an alternative 
structure to address the transfer pricing problem, the National Office had 
the flexibility to move beyond the traditional patterns to reorganize 
interactions with taxpayers and other taxing authorities. Whether and 
how these changes actually improved administrability can best be 
ascertained by examining how each change affected the resolution of 
transfer pricing issues. 
1. How the Procedural Changes Impact Uncertainty 
Despite the arrival of the new transfer pricing regulations in 1993 
and 1994, the rules under 1.R.c. § 482 remain too vague to provide 
many taxpayers with certainty regarding the taxation of their related 
party transactions. Uncertainty here can be costly and likely to produce 
disputes for several reasons. First, errors in pricing are quite possible 
given the spectrum of interpretation in applying the rules and identifying 
relevant third party data. 115 Such errors can be expensive as the range of 
possible "arm's length" prices can be quite wide and the potential tax 
adjustments (including penalties) 116 quite significant. 117 Because 
acceptance of an adjustment could be costly, taxpayers have a strong 
incentive to challenge audit adjustments. 
Second, the only forum for obtaining certainty in the existing system 
is through audit, appeals and potentially litigation. liB The process can 
115. See generally IRS 1992 Annual Report, Pub. No. 55 (May I, 1993) reprinted in 93 
TAX NOTES TODAY 125-76 (June 14, 1993) ("Transfer pricing is an area of ambiguity for 
both foreign and domestic corporations"). 
116. See generally Large Companies Reconsidering Opposition to APAs Practitioners 
Say, 1993 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 185, J-1 (Sept. 27, 1993) (suggesting that larger 
corporations are more willing to consider an APA because of the increased threat of penalties 
under the new I.R.C. § 6662 rules (covering valuation and misstatement and documentation)}. 
117. As of September 1992 (and again as of June 1994), proposed adjustments for large 
(i.e. those with assets of $100 million or more in year of return) taxpayers' transfer pricing 
cases awaiting administrative resolution in appeals or litigation totaled $14.4 billion. See 
NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 23. 
118. Because these after-the-fact dispute resolution steps offer less to the taxpayer, there 
is less incentive for the taxpayer to be more forthcoming than strictly required in fair 
compliance with the law and audit process. In theory one might think that an audit settlement 
would provide sufficient guidance going forward as to transfer pricing treatment for a given 
taxpayer. This has not seemed to occur, for several reasons: (1) the issues are very fact 
intensive and the business conditions change, (2) for new products and transactions, error can 
carry penalties, (3) audit positions are not binding, and (4) audit is not conducted immediately 
so there are several years of lag time during which the taxpayer must be filing on this issue 
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involve substantial transaction costs in terms of lawyer and accountant 
fees, internal resources, as well as the lost opportunity to modify or 
h th . 119 C ange e transactIOn. 
Although participation in the AP A process may not be cheap, it is 
likely to have lower transaction costs than audit, appeals, and litigationl20 
for a number of reasons: (1) fewer layers; (2) less hostility, resulting in 
more productive discussions; (3) taxpayer incentive to cooperate 
combined with Service representatives not focused on high dollar audits; 
and (4) flexibility derived from parties not yet committed to their 
positions (in part because the future transactions have yet to occur). 
Third, the fact that transfer pricing generally involves cross border 
transactions means that in addition to domestic uncertainty there is the 
international uncertainty. The other country in the related party transfer 
might view the appropriate pricing quite differently and double taxation 
could result. 121 Again, the price of uncertainty is high, leading taxpayers 
to consider challenging audit positions of the governments. 
Fourth, the Service's continued interest in transfer pricing, combined 
with other countries' increasing interest, suggests that the opportunities 
for taxpayers to achieve "no taxation" on their related party transactions, 
as opposed to double taxation, might be more limited. Thus, the 
potential upside of taking aggressive pricing positions and playing the 
audit lottery is diminished. 
without additional guidance; by the time guidance is available, facts have probably changed. 
enough so that the taxpayer cannot be certain of the Service's view. 
119. See, e.g., NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 27-28 (noting that major I.R.C. 
§ 482 cases illustrate that they can be "... extremely expensive for taxpayers and the 
government by requiring the employment of outside experts, resulting in long drawn out 
litigation and keeping corporate tax liabilities in an uncertain status for years ... "). The four 
major I.R.C. § 482 cases highlighted by the GAO 1995 report lasted, on average, 15 years 
from earliest audit to court resolution. Id. at 27. 
One central problem with the existing mechanisms for resolving transfer pricing issues is 
that they occur after the transaction. For example, transfer pricing issues typically arise on 
audit, a number of years after the transaction has been completed and the returns have been 
filed. Such ex post mechanisms offer certainty, but it is too late to change the transactions for 
the years under audit (or the years filed but not yet audited), and the audit process does not 
provide a guarantee as to treatment of future transactions. Similarly, in cases of potential 
double taxation, conflicting assessments of the related party transactions typically are not 
addressed until well after they take place, and even that discussion (conducted through the 
treaty competent authority process) can be long in producing results. See supra note 43. 
120. If a taxpayer did not anticipate being audited, or if audited, did not anticipate a 
serious likelihood of these issues being raised, then the comparison of costs might weigh 
against pursuing an AP A. 
12l. C/., Canadian Telecommunications Firm Touts APA's, 1997 DAILY TAX REp. 230 
G-3 (Dec. I, 1997) [hereinafter "Canadian Telecommunications"] (noting that the 
combination of significant cross border transactions combined with the risk of serious transfer 
pricing penalties in the United States and Canada made APAs the right decision for that 
taxpayer). 
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A number of features in the AP A program directly impact certainty 
for the taxpayer. The basic structure of the program, as a mechanism to 
obtain a binding agreement governing the treatment of a specified group 
of future transactions, directly responds to the need for clear projec-
tions. l22 The inclusion of foreign governments in bilateral and 
multilateral AP As offers the potential for real certainty-the kind that is 
only possible if all the relevant players are involved. As discussed 
below, the flexibility possible in negotiating an APA (due in part to 
National Office's treaty authority, its position relative to the district, and 
the fresh start aspect of the relationsY23 makes it more realistic for the 
parties to reach a mutually acceptable application of the transfer pricing 
rules. Finally, to the extent the AP A process may lay the groundwork for 
changes or developments in transfer pricing rules, a taxpayer's 
participation in the process affords the possibility of influencing the 
direction of such changes and thereby increasing certainty and reducing 
future conflict. l24 
Moreover, having the APA discussion in advance may enable a 
taxpayer to shape the transfer pricing rules it faces. Where a current rule 
is very unclear, or in the extreme, prohibits a desired result, the 
taxpayer's ability to discuss and negotiate on the point before it decides 
to engage in the transaction is very much like negotiating with the 
Service for a particular rule to be applied prospectively. This differs 
from after-the,.fact dispute resolution. If a taxpayer engages in a 
transaction and then seeks a particular treatment in audit, the taxpayer 
mayor may not receive the desired result. Hence the taxpayer will be 
forced to treat the transaction in an undesired manner without the 
opportunity to "undo" the transaction. In this way, although settlements 
and litigated cases produce rules, their impact is significantly different 
than if the same results had been reached prior to the transaction's 
occurrence because the taxpayer bears the risk of losing. 
Based on this review, the AP A changes seem effective in providing 
certainty:25 Two caveats, however, must be noted that limit this effect. 
122. See, e.g., Lawyer Says Taxpayer Sought APA to Avoid Dispute Over Brand's 
Overseas Value, 6 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING SPECIAL REp. (BNA) 205 (July 30, 1997) 
(uncertainty over possible Service views on the brand name development in Asia led taxpayer 
to conclude an APA). 
123. See infra Part ill.A.2.c for a more detailed discussion of the impact of the National 
Office authority and flexibility in resolving transfer pricing issues. 
124. For example, the Service's experiences with APAs involving global trading paved 
the way for the proposed global dealing regulations. See infra Part N.C.2. 
125. See, e.g., Canadian Telecommunications, supra note 121 (taxpayer telecommunication 
firm's corporate tax director outlined certainty and resource savings as advantages of APAs over 
audits). 
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First, the taxpayer's interaction with the government on transfer pricing 
in the APA process is not the final step. The taxpayer generally will also 
face an audit as to compliance with the terms of the AP A. At the present 
time it is unclear whether taxpayers with APAs will have easy audits on 
the covered transactions. If district/taxpayer relations are strained, or if 
the district did not share in the views reflected in the agreement, the 
scrutiny of transfer pricing, even with an APA, may remain a sticky 
126 process. 
Subsequent audits raise another issue about the effectiveness of 
APAs. The removal of the transfer pricing issue from the audit plate 
might also encourage Service auditors to spend this time they have saved 
looking at other issues, especially if the taxpayer is a large multinational. 
If so, was the AP A worth the effort? This question cannot be answered 
until enough APA years have come up for audit. However, even if the 
observation regarding auditors' time allocations is correct, that does not 
mean the taxpayer does not benefit from the resolution of the transfer 
pricing issues. Transfer pricing, as discussed earlier, can involve large 
numbers, great variations, and significant penalties. Once identified it 
often can be challenging to resolve. Although audits are never easy, 
many other issues that could be raised might be less contentious and less 
costly to contest or accept. 
The second caveat recognizes that the greatest certainty comes from 
the participation of both the United States and the other relevant taxing 
jurisdictions. However, these other jurisdictions cannot be forced to 
participate. Initially, some countries were not very receptive to the new 
procedure, but gradually more countries have either implemented their 
own "APA" programs or are considering the possibility.127 Still others 
have indicated a willingness to engage in the AP A process for certain 
126. Cf. APA Early Referral Program Attracts First Taxpayer, Director Barrett Reports, 
21 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 21, at G-4 (Feb. 2, 1998) ("Several practitioners have 
complained that they had experiences in which the field refused to roll back an AP A."). 
127. See, e.g., A Global Review of Advance Pricing Agreements, 7 TAX MGMT. 
TRANSFER PRICING SPECIAL REP. (BNA) No. 31 (Jan. 27, 1999) (review of APA programs in 
14 countries); U.K. Tax Official Outlines Scope, Goals of Formal APA Program, 1999 DAILY· 
TAX REP. (BNA) No.1, G-2 (Jan. 4,1999) (U.K. releases draft APA program legislation); see 
also Ernst & Young Transfer Pricing 1997 Global Survey, 15 TAX NOTES INT'L 761, 771 
(Sept. 8, 1997); Australia Issues Final APA Rules Similar to U.S. Requirements, 22 TAX 
PLANNING INT'L REV. (BNA) 16 (1995) (Australian Tax Office issued final APA procedures 
"that substantially mirror" the U.S. program); lRD to Issue Revised Guidelines Draft Soon; 
Will Likely Launch Formal APA Program in'98, 6 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 
(BNA) 385 (Oct. 15, 1997) (New Zealand likely to introduce APA program in early 1998); 
Geralyn M. Fallon, Advance Pricing Agreements, 75 TAXES 304, 306 nn. 8, 10 (June 1, 1997) 
(Canada introduced its own APA procedure in 1993, and the Netherlands in 1994). 
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industries (e.g., global trading). 128 Nonetheless, the APA program's 
changes to the resolution of transfer pricing questions added increasing 
certainty for taxpayers in the process. This success, however, depends on 
the multiple changes described involving timing, participation and scope 
of authority. 
2. How the Procedural Changes Impact 
Difficulty in Dispute Resolution 
In addition to eliminating issues of uncertainty, the APA program's 
procedural innovations also sought to conquer the core obstacles to 
, improved dispute resolution. 
a. Limited Information 
Part of the difficulty with transfer pricing rules is that both the 
taxpayer and government lack sufficient information. The government 
does not fully understand each industry and transaction, so the 
regulations, although detailed, do not offer significant guidance on the 
application of these concepts in specific circumstances. Audits do 
provide the Service with more information on transactions and markets, 
but the adversarial context and the lack of incentive for taxpayers to 
volunteer information not literally required limits this avenue of 
information acquisition. '29 Similarly, taxpayers lack information on the 
government's use of methods, views on comparables, and actual practice 
in applying the transfer pricing methodologies. Finally, other countries, 
perhaps in some cases because of lack of information, have been 
inclined to view the United States' strong emphasis on transfer pricing 
as unduly aggressive,I3O arguing that transfer pricing is essentially the 
allocation of a limited pie. '31 The situation may be exacerbated by 
regulations involving complex methodologies, the real impact of which 
can only be appreciated through case-specific application. 
128. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 127, at 311 (Germany expressed willingness to 
consider global trading and financial instrument APAs). See supra note 88 for a description of 
global trading. 
129. In some sense the APA program could be viewed like the mediation introduced into 
the tax system in Announcement 95-86, because both are seeking a format that encourages 
taxpayers to come forward with more information. See, e.g., Alexei P. Mostovoi, Tax 
Mediation: Is It Just a Test, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 1871, 1875 (Dec. 2, 1996) (discussing 
taxpayer incentives and willingness to disclose information in mediation). 
130. See, e.g., U.S.-French APA Could Be Completed Under Tax Treaty, 1994 DAILY 
TAX REP. (BNA) No. 127, at G-3 (July 6, 1994) (DECO representative observed that some 
countries were wary about the U.S. APA process because the United States has "more 
experience, resources and aggressive rules."). 
131. See, e.g., id. (French ministry official suggests that they believe the United States is 
using APAs to "get a larger share of the tax cake."). 
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The changes brought by the APA program improve the flow of 
information. 132 The voluntary nature of the program (with the carrot of 
up-front resolution and certainty) demands more extensive disclosures 
from the taxpayer than would a traditional audit, and thus provides the 
Service with a better picture of how various businesses, industries, and 
transactions are conducted. The veracity of the disclosures is secondarily 
guaranteed by the fact that material misstatements or omissions later 
discovered by the Service can invalidate the agreement. The Service also 
gathers more information on how variations in methodologies play out; 
it can require trial tests with taxpayers and get detailed data and 
feedback. Information generated in this fashion may result in more 
useful formulations of transfer pricing rules. Foreign countries may find 
that their participation in the APA process, with the joint case-specific 
analyses, gives them the opportunity to better understand U.S. transfer 
pricing approaches and may mitigate their hostilities or concerns. 133 
For the taxpayer, the informational benefit from the APA relates 
closely to the certainty obtained through the process. Taxpayers are 
repeat players only in a limited sense. They might renew an expired 
APA, or return with additional transactions or related parties, but what 
they really want to know is how transfer pricing applies to them. The 
Service, on the other hand, is a repeat player that not only seeks to 
resolve the case at hand, but also to improve the system. The resolution 
of an individual case means more than just one less contentious, 
unpredictable audit down the line. It means more potential insight into 
transfer pricing treatments. 134 
The APA's role in enhancing information could be viewed as 
temporary, in whole or in part. For example, if the Service ultimately 
found its APA experiences sufficiently informative, it could conceivably 
produce a new set of regulations that offers more guidance to the 
taxpayer. In that scenario, individual case by case analysis would be 
132. See Michael C. Durst Additional Structure, Growth Characterize IRS Advance 
Pricing Agreement Program's Past Year, 6 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING SPECIAL REP. 
(BNA) 2, 4 (Oct. 29, 1997) (suggesting that because the APA program gives the Service 
earlier "hands-on" experience with particular rules and problems, it "can provide uniquely 
valuable lessons for use in drafting and refining transfer pricing regulations and revenue 
rulings."). 
133. The value of the APA process in this regard might be inferred from the decision of 
a number of countries to implement their own internal "APA-like" procedure. See generally 
U.K. Tax Official Outlines Scope, Goals of Formal APA Program, supra note 127, at 0-2. 
134. For example, on March 6, 1998, the Service released proposed regulations 
regarding the taxation of "global dealing," which were developed in part through the benefit 
of the APA experience with taxpayers engaged in global trading. Allocation and Sourcing of 
Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers Engaged In a Global Dealing Operation, 63 Fed. 
Reg. II, 177 (1998). See supra note 88 for a description of global trading. 
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necessary until the Service developed an adequate understanding of 
business practices and the impact of transfer pricing income 
reallocations. If the new penalty regulations and documentation 
requirements make taxpayers less aggressive, that change, in conjunction 
with improved guidance from the Service, could reduce the volume of 
transfer pricing audits and cases. 
Alternatively, the informational role of the program could be 
permanent vis-a-vis transfer pricing generally, but temporary as regards 
particular issues or problems. For example, after sufficient exposure to a 
particular industry or transaction, the Service could provide a detailed 
description of how it approaches the arm's length standard in such cases, 
as done in Notice 94-40 and the global dealing regulations addressing 
transfer pricing. The scope of this informational role is considered again 
in Part IV in connection with the impact of the APA program on 
nonparticipants. 
b. Hostility Between Taxpayer and Agent 
The state of taxpayer government relations has impeded resolution 
of transfer pricing issues which require cooperation and exchange of 
information. The APA program makes several changes in personnel (the 
who and what authority of the government) that impact the various 
relationship problems experienced in transfer pricing. 
In the traditional tax dispute path, the first step is audit, which 
involves the taxpayer and the district office. Resolution at this stage can 
be hampered for several reasons related to the participants. The district 
office (agent/audit team) is the level of the Service in constant contact 
with the taxpayer (especially in the case of larger taxpayers, where there 
may be "permanent" on-site examiners in what can be an adversarial 
relationship). Frictions can develop that are exacerbated by this constant 
interaction. Once the taxpayer has come to view the agent/district level 
as hostile and unreasonable, and the agent/district has come to view the 
taxpayer as aggressive, deceptive and uncooperative,135 the chance for 
successful negotiation and resolution of complex issues is limited. '36 The 
135. See, e.g., Eliot, supra note 68. Although rotation of auditors might ameliorate some 
of the direct taxpayer-agent difficulties, there potentially is a serious learning curve issue. 
Continued familiarity with a taxpayer, its industry and its reporting history can allow an agent 
to develop an informed picture of a taxpayer. 
136. See generally Lyons Sees APA Requests Accounting for Half of Competent 
Authority's Case Load, 5 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. (BNA) 429, 429-30 (Nov. 27, 
1996) (IRS Assistant Commissioner (International) observing that, for example, the district 
and competent authority are "two very different institutions" with different objectives-with 
the field's role being more adversarial as compared to competent authority's more "settlement 
oriented" role); Scott Shaughnessy, U.S. APA Program Offers 'One-Stop Shopping,' II TAX 
HeinOnline -- 21 Mich. J. Int’l L. 178 1999-2000
178 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 21:143 
appeals office, though distinct from the district audit function and 
personnel,137 still can have difficulty resolving transfer pricing issues 
emerging from the audit. Often the posture of the issue, including the 
size of the adjustment, the gap in the parties' numbers and the 
recalcitrance of the participants at that point inhibits settlement at the 
appeals level. 138 
The APA involves the National Office in the discussion at the 
outset. This new participant not only acts on its own views and 
authority, but it can also help mediate the views of the taxpayer and 
district. In part, the National Office is able to do this because of the 
absence of an intense one-on-one history with the taxpayer. Plus, its role 
in the process begins before positions have become entrenched (a 
problem experienced by appeals). In fact, where the focus is future 
transactions, not only are positions not yet fixed, the actual subject 
matter has yet to occur. 139 As a result, the APA process attracts taxpayers 
by granting the opportunity to sidestep or modify an unproductive 
relationship at the district level and obtain a bit of a "fresh start.,,140 
This impact of the APA process is borne out by comments of an 
early APA participant. Immediately following the release of Rev. Proc. 
91-22, Apple Computer Co. ("Apple") announced that it had completed 
an AP A regarding the sale of products to an Australian distribution 
NOTES INT'L 402, 403-04 (1995) (noting view of some practitioners that the field agents are 
typically "more revenue-oriented than National Office [and] tend to be more exacting on 
taxpayers with whom they have greater familiarity."). 
137. See, e.g., Halphen & Bordeaux, supra note 43, at 662 ("Traditionally, each IRS 
function has a strictly defined role: the Examination function [audit] is responsible for 
identifying an audit issue and developing supporting facts and methods; Appeals is 
responsible for exploring the range of a reasonable settlement given the strengths and 
weaknesses of the case and hazards of litigation."). 
138. See, e.g., Steven C. Wrappe, Advance Pricing Agreements: The IRS Rediscovers 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 1581, 1585-86 (1994) ("Sometimes a 
large adjustment in the Notice (of Deficiency) assumes a life of its own and, regardless of the 
merits, it becomes difficult for anyone at subsequent stages to take responsibility for 'giving 
up' a substantial proposed deficiency." (quoting Thomas C. Durham». 
139. In substantively reaching the APAs, the up-front nature of the discussion enhances 
the flexibility of the parties' positions because an in-hand dollar amount is not being 
surrendered. See generally Durst, supra note 132, at 2 (noting that the up-front nature of the 
APA process enhances the parties' flexibility in part because they still have the option to 
change their business decisions). To the extent taxpayers gain by certainty, they are more 
willing, as part of the process, to reveal more information to the government, which in tum 
provides the government a more informed foundation on which to contemplate modifications 
and changes to transfer pricing. 
140. See, e.g., Shaughnessy, supra note 136 (quoting Deputy Associate Chief Counsel 
International Benedetta Kissel that the "non-adversarial approach is at the core of the APA 
Program. "); Durst, supra note 132, at 3 (APAs are useful for "resolv[ing] an especially 
contentious examination history (or the IRS field examiners may suggest to the taxpayer that 
the program be used in this manner)"). 
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subsidiary.'41 According to Apple, the APA process was preferable to the 
typical audit experience in which the Service selected only particular 
related party transactions for adjustment-those that should be adjusted 
in the U.S. favor. In addition, Apple expressed satisfaction with the 
central role of the National Office in APAs, characterizing interactions 
with "these higher level IRS personnel" as much better than those with 
the "more antagonistic auditors.,,'42 Another taxpayer, Hitachi Metals 
America, turned to the AP A program after its second "very contentious 
audit"-Hitachi had been frustrated by the district's "unnecessary" 
information requests, its factual positions, its large proposed adjustments 
and its apparent interest in "horse trading.,,'43 
Although the personnel changes 'improved the government-taxpayer 
relationship for transfer pricing, it may have come at a cost. A common 
district reaction, at least at the outset, was that APA participants were 
"deceiving" the National Office, which has much less familiarity than 
the district with the taxpayer's detailed history and operations. '44 This 
concern (as well as an appreciation of the learning curve savings in time 
and resources that the district can bring to the process) may have 
prompted the Service to make the district a more formal and active part 
of the National Office AP A process in the 1996 updated procedure. '45 
Another source of concern regarding the participant changes is the 
potential for manipulation of the process. Given that the district-taxpayer 
relationship may be mutually strained, but that the APA process can be 
initiated only by the taxpayer, strategic uses of the program may be 
possible, leaving the district averse to the APA program. Again, the 
1996 changes to the program may reflect sensitivity to this concern and 
to the importance of having the districts as partners in a process in which 
they are both up-front and tail-end (in the audit of the APA years) 
participants. Furthermore, the introduction in late 1997 of a "program" 
141. Eliot, supra note 68. 
142. /d.; See also McLennan, supra. note 28, at 437-38 (characterizing the APA staff of 
the Chief Counsel's office as "generally more experienced and more knowledgeable than 
revenue agents in the field"); E. Miller Williams, Jr., Basics of the U.S. Advance Pricing 
Agreement Program, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 723 (Aug. 26, 1996) (characterizing APA process 
as less confrontational than audit and noting that the APA process (unlike audit with its 
possible focus on the desired tax results) seeks to determine the correct methodology). 
143. Hitachi Explains How Bilateral APA Resolved Decade of Audits, Years of 
Outstanding Issues, 7 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 59 (June 3,1998). 
144. Cf John Turro, Apple Computer Readies for APA Replay, 5 TAX NOTES INT'L 278, 
279 (Aug. 12, 1992) (noting view that field examiners "would be better able to verify the 
company's [APA] submissions than the National Office personnel"); Kathleen Matthews, 
Major U.S. Trading Partners Respond to U.S Transfer Pricing Regulations," 94 TAX NOTES 
INT'L 205-3 (Oct. 24, 1994) (taxpayer finding field role in APA process makes meeting 
"more like an examination than a negotiation"). 
145. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12. 
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that encourages field examiners to recommend appropriate taxpayers for 
the APA process could have a balancing effect. 146 
In addition, the involuntary nature of the taxpayer-government 
relationship in traditional audit and litigation of transfer pricing 
contributes to the difficulty in dispute resolution. Although most audits 
are probably involuntary and negative from the taxpayer's perspective, 
this element of the relationship may be even more crucial in a 
substantive area such as transfer pricing which is already burdened with 
other baggage (lack of information, significant uncertainty, and high 
dollar amounts). A taxpayer resolving transfer pricing through the APA 
program may be inclined to approach it with a different attitude because 
it is a mutually beneficial interaction. Unlike the audit context, the 
taxpayer comes forward and initiates the process in exchange for 
certainty and the opportunity to influence the development of transfer 
pricing. 
For example, in global trading, which posed some potentially 
unusual issues, the taxpayers that participated in the APA process 
presumably had an impact on the way in which such transactions were 
handled as reflected in Notice 94-40 and the subsequent global dealing 
regulations. The Service, having chosen to establish the APA process, 
similarly views it as a beneficial interaction for the reasons outlined 
earlier,147 including the perceived administrative savings from reduced 
controversies,148 the ability to gain more detailed information relevant to 
improved transfer pricing guidance, and the opportunity to interact with 
foreign governments in developing transfer pricing policies and fleshing 
them out through concrete applications. The result is a more mutually 
beneficial activity sought by both sides that requires the cooperation of 
both to work. Emphasis on the "voluntary" nature of interaction with the 
government in the APA process, as compared to audit, may seem 
inconsistent with some of the reasons taxpayers are attracted to the APA 
program. How can the APA be viewed as voluntary if taxpayers are 
drawn to it because of a difficult current audit or because they anticipate 
audit and double tax problems in the future and view the APA process 
simply as a more cost effective package than audit, appeals and 
litigation? Considered in this light, there is the unstated view that 
resolving transfer pricing is not really an elective act of the taxpayer, but 
146. "IRS Launches Program to Identify Likely APA Candidates at Beginning of 
Audits," 6 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 331 (Oct. I, 1997). See infra note 184. 
147. Except in the case of some district offices that may view their participation in the 
process as having their hand forced by the taxpayer who has the choice. 
148. See, e.g., NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 21-22 (for cases closed in fiscal 
year 1993 and the first half of fiscal year 1994, the Service spent 1/3 of its total international 
examiner time and much more of its economists' time on cases with an I.R.C. § 482 issue). 
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rather something that must be accomplished in some forum. The 
arguments about voluntariness and inevitability, however, are not 
contradictory but rather target different concerns. The emphasis on 
voluntariness and its effects on relationships can be understood as a 
choice about the forum, when in many cases the use of some forum is 
inevitable. 
c. Limited Authority 
To the extent that transfer pricing issues are difficult and involve 
other countries, the district has somewhat limited opportunities for 
creativity and flexibility. The APA program, however, introduces 
participants (the National Office/ APA team in the Chief Counsel's 
Office) with a broader scope of authority than the district or appeals 
levels. 149 This authority derives from a number of features, including the 
administrative structure of authority in the Service and the ability to 
draw upon treaties in reaching particular tax results. 
As to structure, the National Office's mission is "to develop broad 
nationwide policies and programs for the administration of the internal 
revenue laws and related statutes, and to direct, guide, coordinate, and 
control the endeavors of the Internal Revenue Service."lso The Chief 
Counsel for the IRS, who functions as part of the National Office, serves 
as the chief legal advisor for the Service. lSI The duties performed by the 
Chief Counsel's Office include providing legal opinions, preparing 
rulings and technical advice memoranda, and assisting litigation, 
treaties, regulations, and recommendations for offers in compromise and 
closing agreements. IS2 Thus, the National Office, in part through the 
activities of the Chief Counsel, provides the centralized tax law guidance 
149. See infra note 153. Cf McLennan, supra note 28 (GM former chief tax officer 
characterizing IRS agents as more results oriented and revenue driven than the Chief 
Counsel' s Office). 
150. Internal Revenue Service Manual (IRM) 1112.21; see also JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ON 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH GOVERNANCE AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, ICX-44-97 (1997) 
[hereinafter IT. STAFF DESCRIPTION]. 
151. Traditionally, the Chief Counsel has served under the direct authority of the 
Department of Treasury. IT. STAFF DESCRIPTION, supra note 150. Under the IRS 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, the Chief Counsel generally will now report directly 
to the Commissioner. However, joint reporting to both the Commissioner and the General 
Counsel for the Department of Treasury will be made with respect to (I) legal advice and 
interpretation of the tax law not solely relating to tax policy, and (2) tax litigation. In the case 
of legal advice or interpretation of tax law relating solely to tax policy, the Chief Counsel will 
report to the General Counsel. See I.R.C. § 7803(b). 
152. IT. STAFF DESCRIPTION, supra note 150; I.R.C. § 7803. 
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for Service personnel. 153 For example, the National Office (attorneys in 
the Chief Counsel's Office) provide Field Service Advice Memoranda 
("FSAs") in response to inquiries from these personnel. A major goal of 
the FSAs is to ensure "that field personnel apply the law correctly and 
uniformly." 154 
The National Office, as the locus of international negotiating power 
in the Service, has been able to rely on treaty authority to achieve 
resolutions in APAs that arguably are not available under current law. '55 
(This feature of the tax system may strike some readers as inappropriate. 
However, such a result should not be considered lawless; rather it 
reflects the legal and practical relationship between the Internal Revenue 
Code and tax treaties). In negotiating APAs on interbranch transactions, 
the APA program in the National Office recognized the "existence" of 
branches in a way that would have been constrained had only domestic 
law (and not treaty authority) been available. '56 For certain taxpayers, 
especially banks and financial services entities that regularly engage in 
business motivated interbranch transactions, the U.S. tax rules on 
branches can produce unpredictable and uneconomic tax results. The 
rules usually will not recognize interbranch transactions, that is, 
transactions between branches or offices of a single legal entity such as a 
corporation. The rationale is that a taxpayer cannot contract with itself. '57 
In an effort to circumvent this domestic tax treatment, some taxpayers 
were thought to be using the APA process to obtain de facto recognition 
of these transactions. Without specifically acknowledging this claim, the 
Service announced in 1995 that it had completed its first cross border 
interbranch AP A. 158 The Service explained that it had relied on its 
153. SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 1-6,1-10. 
154. Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 609 (1997). 
155. If the Service is deciding how to tax a given transaction it is supposed to follow the 
existing statutory and regulatory regime (i.e. the Code and regulations). For example, in 
issuing a letter ruling prior to a transaction, or taking a position in audit afterwards, the 
Service is expected to rely on the tax rules in place. However, if the transaction is cross border 
and involves more than one taxing authority, the picture changes. Thus, if after the transaction 
conflict emerges between the two countries' tax treatment, they will attempt to resolve it 
through the competent authority mechanism operating under the relevant tax treaty. In the 
process of reaching resolution, the U.S. competent authority may have the discretion/authority 
under the treaty to depart from the Code and thereby reach a result not strictly available under 
existing domestic law. (Note that a treaty cannot be used "against" the taxpayer to produce a 
result more adverse than that available under the Code.) In the APA process, the negotiation 
and debate between the United States and other countries occurs prior to the transaction, but 
because it takes place under the aegis of the tax treaty framework the same authority is 
available to the Service in determining tax treatment. 
156. See, e.g., Ring, supra note 88. 
157. See id. at 668. 
158. See First APA Covering Cross-Border Interbranch Bank Transactions Concluded, 
1995 Daily Tax Rep. 450-1 (BNA 1995). 
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authority under the mutual agreement provision of the relevant treaty to 
provide a tax result not otherwise available under U.S. statutory law. The 
Service issued this APA as soon as it concluded that it had the authority 
under the treaty to recognize interbranch contracts, despite its inability to 
do so under purely domestic law. 159 This is a paradigm of how the 
National Office, which is the dominant governmental player in the APA 
process, can bring more flexibility to the table than the district or appeals 
offices in the audit/appeals process. 
Related to the observations about the impact of the National Office's 
authority, is the impact of the foreign governments' presence in the AP A 
process. The inability of the taxpayer and the district to bring the foreign 
taxing authority to the table in the audit/appeals process means that the 
U.S. audit of the taxpayer often takes place in the shadow of what is 
happening or may happen in the other country. Although competent 
authority is available to address potential issues of unresolved double 
taxation, as noted earlier, the time frame for this involvement is long and 
most importantly, it occurs ex post, typically as the last stage in 
resolution of a cross border issul!.l60 Thus, the inclusion of the foreign 
governments in the APA process dramatically impacts the dynamics of 
the negotiation. As the percentage of requests involving bilateral or 
multilateral APAs approaches 75% of total requests, the availability of 
foreign governments can improve cooperation and certainty. 161 
B. Evaluation 
The changes wrought by the APA program significantly respond to 
the two major administrative problems that bog down transfer pricing 
review by the Service (i.e., uncertainty and difficult dispute resolutions). 
In both areas the changes were fairly successful in improving 
administrability, with some reservations. The degree of success 
depended on the combined interaction of the changes. Although 
159. Id. At the time this first APA was announced, the Service had ten interbranch 
APAs pending, suggesting the importance of this issue and the flexible APA treatment. Id. 
See generally "Practitioners Find Documentation Process for Interbranch Deals Difficult, 
Tedious," 3 FINANCIAL PRODUCTS REPORT 986 (Jan. 16, 1998) (noting that taxpayers, 
particularly bankers, turn to the AP A process to cope wi th interbranch financial product 
transactions to have them recognized for tax purposes). The proposed global dealing 
regulations (issued in March 1998) provide some more generally accessible relief from this 
failure to recognize interbranch contracts. See generally Yaron Z. Reich et aI., Proposed Regs 
on Global Dealing Operations, 78 TAX NOTES 1689 (1998). 
160. See, e.g., International Issue Resolution Through Competent Authority Process, 64 
TAX NOTES 657,661 (1994) (noting the competent authority process has been criticized for its 
slow pace and that in 1990 the average process time was about three and a half years, 
although it has since been reduced). 
161. See Record High, supra note 110, at G-1. 
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individually the changes would have been insufficient (as suggested 
earlier, "certainty" with the United States, though helpful, is of limited 
value for taxpayers facing other, active taxing jurisdictions), in 
combination they created a more administrable path for transfer pricing. 
1. Hybrid Nature of APA Program 
How the combination of these changes worked can be understood by 
seeing the APA program as a hybrid of administrative actions that 
traditionally were either ex ante functions (specifying rules applicable to 
taxpayers up-front) or ex post functions (formalizing tax treatment, 
providing certainty to individual taxpayers and negotiating with foreign 
governments). In contemplating the design of the APA program the 
Service did not limit consideration to the existing patterns of Service 
interactions with taxpayers. Changes included not just isolated 
modifications, but also expansive, interactive decisions that together 
substantially reshaped the Service's approach. For example, changes in 
timing that provided government interaction before the transaction were 
needed for improved certainty. The new structure also required the 
involvement of foreign countries and of officials with sufficient 
authority to craft more creative results. Thus, success hinged on a 
mechanism that, in a single procedure, reordered the taxpayer's 
relationship with both the Service and the foreign country. 
Although transfer pricing issues frequently rise to the level of direct 
clashes between countries over pricing, the actual multilateral 
discussions typically occur only ex post. Ex ante, the countries operate 
individually to develop and implement their rules; taxpayers confront 
each country separately.162 It is only ex post, and more specifically after 
audit and domestic resolution, that the interaction of the two (or more) 
countries' tax systems on the transaction are fully evaluated. The APA 
process, as a hybrid, eliminates the separation and brings the multilateral 
discussion into the planning stage where the various advantages outlined 
above are enjoyed. This package of changes would not have been 
possible if the Service had been constrained to follow the existing 
patterns of ex ante and ex post involvement with taxpayers. However, 
this hybrid nature produces not only the core of the APA procedure's 
success in administrability, but also the seeds of its problems (both 
perceived and rea!), particularly for nonparticipants as explored below in 
Part IV. 
162. Of course general international dialogue through organizations such as the OECD 
do produce serious discussions. See, e.g., COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. 
AND DEV., TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINAT'L ENTER. (1979). 
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Translation of this picture of the AP A program into the language 
and framework of administrative law can offer insights from that 
discipline. The traditional administrative law analysis begins with the 
division of administrative functions into rulemaking and adjudication. 163 
Although it is widely acknowledged that the line between the two is not 
solid,l64 the division provides a rubric for assigning tasks, 
responsibilities, power, and limits to agency actions. Appropriate agency 
activity usually can be placed in one of the categories. A variety of 
factors distinguish rulemaking from adjudication. In all cases these 
factors are only general tendencies, not absolute descriptions. 165 One of 
course is the "timing" of the administrative action's effect-does it 
impact past or future events (a version of the ex ante/ex post 
observation). 166 Others include that rulemaking: (1) focuses on the 
general rather than the specific, 167 (2) entails the elaboration of stan-
dards,168 (3) is generally publicly stated and accessible,169 (4) allows 
broad participation in its creation,I7O (5) is usually more binding on the 
agency,171 and (6) is more likely to come from higher authority (at least 
compared to initial adjudicatory action).172 
Measured against this basic framework, the AP A program is 
problematic because it defies straightforward categorization. The very 
features that contributed to the APA program's hybrid format create this 
unorthodox picture. The primary concern with this uneasy classification 
is that the checks and constraints of the standard rulemaking/ 
163. See, e.g., Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 259, 259 (1938) (identifying rulemaking and administrative adjudication as the "primary 
categories in the study of administrative law"). 
164. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the 
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 924 n.7 (1965) (noting 
critiques of the "rulemaking-adjudication dichotomy" on the grounds that it operates on the 
assumption that "clear lines can be drawn"). 
165. See, e.g., id. at 930-42 (outlining certain characteristics of rulemaking, but 
observing the ways in which adjudicatory proceedings can reflect the same qualities). 
166. See, e.g., 5 U.S.c. § 551(4) (1994) (the Administrative Procedures Act defines a 
rule as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and 
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy ... "). See generally 
Frederick Schauer, A Brief Note on the Logic of Rules with Special Reference to Bowen v. 
Georgetown University Hospital, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 447 (1990) (examining the meaning and 
role of rules); Fuchs, supra note 163, at 260. 
167. See Schauer, supra note 166, at 450-52; see also Fuchs, supra note 163, at 263; see 
also Freeman, supra note 1, at 14. 
168. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 164, at 926-27. 
169. Cf id. at 940-41. 
170. See, e.g., id. at 930-31. 
171. See, e.g., id. at 926. 
172. See generally supra text accompanying note 153 for discussion of the National 
Office role. 
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adjudication dichotomy are absent, leaving agency discretion 
unrestricted. The importance and consequences of controlling agency 
discretion through the rulemaking/adjudication distinction are pursued in 
greater detail in Part IV. For the present, it is useful to note that the APA 
program's case by case approach, the absence of extensive explication of 
standards, the degree of nondisclosure, the limited range of participants 
(i.e. only one taxpayer per APA), and the implicit expectation of 
flexibility for the Service to change its position with later taxpayers, 
point towards an adjudicatory classification. However, the APA's 
guarantee up-front of specific tax treatments for future transactions and 
the high level of Service personnel involved demonstrate core 
rulemaking qualities. Changing these features of the APA program to 
align more closely with traditional rulemaking or adjudication would 
likely impair its function and "success". The question, therefore, is how 
much flexibility should be permitted on the rulemaking/adjudication 
pattern? Parts IV and V explore the effects of granting agencies some 
opportunity to work outside of the standard framework. 
The ex ante nature of the APA program features prominently in Part 
IV's critique from a tax system implementation perspective and in Part 
V's analysis from an administrative law perspective. Nonetheless, it is 
important to be clear that the APA program's success in ameliorating the 
structural and procedural problems of transfer pricing was not due 
simply to the program's ex ante nature. As indicated by the changes 
described above, both the timing and the type of government interaction 
were critical. As to timing, the ex ante aspect eliminates taxpayer 
concerns about penalties and documentation, provides the government 
with more detail on taxpayer business, and facilitates coordination with 
other governments because immediate dollars are not at stake. An ex 
post format, even an informal one such as arbitration, might not achieve 
the same benefits as the AP A program in terms of attracting foreign 
countries. While it is not impossible to imagine other countries agreeing 
to participate in such transfer pricing arbitration, it could nonetheless be 
difficult to implement bilateral arbitration. Part of what the countries are 
achieving in the AP A process is some level of agreement on transfer 
pricing rules. It might, therefore, be hard to provide arbitrators with an 
agreed set of rules without the parties themselves actually conducting 
negotiations. 
As to the type of interaction, the informality of the APA negotiation 
process contributes to the program's success. That the parties have the 
flexibility to examine the transactions and develop bilaterally acceptable 
treatment is both a draw and a key to achieving resolution. A rigid 
process, even if ex ante, would be unlikely to deliver comparable 
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success, because it would limit the parties' (including the U.S.' and 
foreign governments') opportunity to modify, refine, and develop their 
transfer pricing practices in an interactive setting. 
2. Parallels to Other Regulatory Reform 
Comparison here of the AP A program to recent developments in the 
environmental area highlights common problems that both regimes 
sought to solve through procedural innovations. Like transfer pricing, 
environmental regulation (which classically operated from a command 
and control structure)173 has suffered from a number of limitations. The 
central planning approach fails to gather enough information to help 
design responses sufficiently sensitive to a range of environmental and 
business situations. 174 Data gathering is also impeded by distrust of 
government and the lack of incentives for industry to share information 
or openly participate with the government. 175 The complexities of some 
environmental issues such as the cleanup programsl76 have led to high 
transaction costs in determining liabilities and remedies. Moreover, the 
scale of liability in these cases significantly raises the stakes for the 
parties.177 Finally, the international implications of environmental 
regulatory action in the United States have increased with global 
integration. 178 As difficult as a rigid command and control approach may 
173. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing 
Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 585-87 (1996) [hereinafter Paradigm](describing the 
centralized, rigid, and uniform approach to regulation); Richard B. Stewart, Models for 
Environmental Regulation: Central Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 551 (1992) [hereinafter Models] (the command and control 
approach has "produced uniform, inflexible standards that result in high compliance costs, 
restrict innovation, discourage efficient use of resources, and require detailed central planning 
of economic activity."); Sunstein, supra note I, at 627 ("[a] large source of regulatory failure 
in the United States is the use of rigid, highly bureaucratized 'command-and-control' 
regulation."). 
174. See Stewart, Paradigm supra note 173, at 587. See also Sunstein, supra note I, at 
627 (a major factor in regulatory failure in fields such as environment protection is the "rigid, 
highly bureaucratic 'command-and-control' regulation ... [and] programs [that] dictate 
national control strategies for hundreds, thousands, or even millions of companies and 
individuals in an exceptionally diverse nation"). . 
175. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note I, at 70 (to the extent regulatory negotiations are 
viewed as a zero-sum exercise, granting the government more open access to business and 
operating information is considered "crazy"). A separate incentive question frequently 
surfaces in environmental regulation discussion-the issue of whether particular modes of 
regulation encourage or discourage industry from developing better technologies such as 
pollution controls. See, e.g., Stewart, Paradigm, supra note 173, at 589. 
176. See, e.g., id. at 590 (discussing the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"». 
177. See id. 
178. See id. at 595. 
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be on the domestic front, its failure internationally is magnified. Many of 
these enumerated environmental regulatory problems parallel those in 
transfer pricing (e.g. role of facts, reliance on generalized regulations for 
diverse circumstances, high stakes, high transaction costs, absence of 
incentives to disclose information to the government, importance of 
international coordination with growing cross border volume). 
Significant differences do remain. Environmental regulation, like 
other health and safety fields, represents an intervention by the 
government into market practices. As a result, justifications for such 
intervention, and assessment of its success often rely in part on market 
based terminology and comparisons. 179 For example, critiques of 
environmental regulation often focus on inefficiencies created where a 
regulation designed to mitigate some market failure ultimately costs 
more than the initial harm. Reform efforts here challenge "command and 
control" regulation and tout the benefits of a "presumption in favor of 
flexible, market-oriented, incentive-based regulatory strategies.,,18o 
Environmental regulation also differs from transfer pricing in that it has 
a wider immediate audience. More parties perceive a direct impact from 
environmental regulation. Not only is the regulated entity deeply 
concerned, but the "community" facing the environmental risk may be 
as well. In contrast, although the taxpayer views its transfer pricing 
problem as material, the broader public lacks a clearly defined role. 
Despite these differences in market orientation and scope of 
participants, the significant operational similarities in the two fields have 
led to the development of related innovations such as the focus on 
redefining the parties' interactions to create a more successful process. 
On the negative side, as considered further in Parts IV and V, the turn 
toward procedural improvements produced parallel difficulty in 
measuring quality and value beyond the assessment of functional and 
. I 181 operatlOna success. 
179. See, e.g., Croley, supra note I, at 4 (agencies whose main purpose is redistributive 
and lack a market counterpart, e.g., Social Security Administration or the Internal Revenue 
Service, differ in part from those whose work is to modify behavior that would otherwise be 
produced by the market); Sunstein, supra note I, at 618-19 (describing value and importance 
of private markets but outlining market failures that justify social regulation). 
180. Sunstein, supra note I, at 633. See also Stewart, Models, supra note 173, at 547 
("As the high cost and limited effectiveness of [command-and-control] tools has become more 
evident, the United States has begun shifting to the use of market-based incentives in its 
environmental policies."). 
181. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of 
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L. J. 1255 (\997). 
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3. Further Questions on the APA Program's Effectiveness 
However, understanding the critical ways in which the APA 
program confronted the sticking points of transfer pricing and comparing 
them to choices made in other fields is only part of the inquiry into 
effectiveness. Several other significant questions remain. The first 
concerns the degree of impact of the program-its actual significance. 
The portion of transfer pricing business funneled through the program is 
small. Although the program draws large multinationals, the total 
number participating is only a fraction. Moreover, even though the 
agreements may cover a high dollar segment of the participating 
multinational's business, it typically does not cover all of that taxpayer's 
transfer pricing. Whether this level of volume should influence the 
perception of the program's success depends on its goals, short and long 
term. Allowing the program to serve as a pressure valve for taxpayers 
facing serious problems (e.g., audit relations, double taxation or 
predictability in light of penalties) may be acceptable if the program can 
ultimately improve transfer pricing generally. Clearly, that has been an 
explicit goal of the Service-to provide better transfer pricing guidance 
in formats available to all taxpayers. As discussed in Part IV, there has 
been limited success to date on that front. 
Alternatively, even if the program encompasses an increasing 
number of taxpayers and transfer pricing business, through expansion of 
Service personnel and growing taxpayer interest, does it justify the 
government's expenditure of resources in running the program? Such a 
question, which calls for comparisons and projections of the expenditure 
of resources in audit and in the APA program, is the next logical 
empirical inquiry if it is established that the program is useful and 
working on other dimensions. 
The second area of concern regards the procedural fairness of the 
process. Resource allocation aside, does the creation of this alternative 
path pose problems of fair and equitable treatment of taxpayers 
regardless of the method of dispute resolution selected? Part IV 
examines this question in greater detail and offers suggestions on what 
features are critical to ensure a level of procedural equity. However, the 
focus in Parts III and IV on different aspects of the procedural impact of 
the program should not completely overshadow the question of the 
substantive nature and quality of APA outcomes. 
Certainly the design and focus of the APA program was a direct 
response to a number of procedural and structural problems with the 
baseline system for handling transfer pricing. Thus, the initial 
measurements of success look to whether the changes effectively 
respond to those procedural and structural problems, and whether they 
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generate any new ones. Nonetheless, procedural changes can have an 
equally powerful impact on the substantive soundness of outcomes. As 
noted, one hope for the program has been that a deeper understanding of 
taxpayer businesses and transactions could help the Service design better 
transfer pricing treatments. But evaluation of the actual substantive APA 
results turns on data not publicly available at present, although the 
prospect of annual APA program reports improves the chances for future 
study. Unfortunately, to determine whether the APA process is having a 
negative impact on substantive outcomes, as compared to results 
obtained through non APA channels, requires audit data that is even less 
likely to be publicly available. 
A third set of concerns involves the question of abuse and strategic 
behavior in the APA process-in particular the bargaining strength of 
the parties and the taxpayers' powers of self selection. As to bargaining 
power, if the Service has been unsuccessful in litigating transfer pricing 
cases, why would a taxpayer agree to participate in the program without 
being guaranteed a good deal? That is, what kind of bargaining power 
can the Service have in the program? 
Despite its historical problems in litigation, the Service's position in 
the APA program is considerably stronger for several reasons. First, the 
new documentation requirements and penalties for improper transfer 
pricing l82 raise the stakes for taxpayers-because the price of losing, 
even if unlikely, is much higher. Second, the intensified attention by 
foreign governments' to transfer pricing increases the possibility of 
double taxation. Third, for taxpayers in more unchartered territory, such 
as global dealing and for which existing rules work poorly from an 
economic perspective,183 the prospect of reaching an initial agreement 
with the Service may be more appealing. Finally, the costs of audit and 
litigation, even if successful, may be significant and worth eliminating. 
In terms of strategic possibilities for taxpayers, they certainly exist. 
By virtue of being a voluntary program for taxpayers, presumably 
participants and nonparticipants self select to be in the most individually 
favorable category. Thus, for example, a taxpayer who is willing to take 
an aggressive transfer pricing position and who believes audit can be 
avoided, will not enter the APA program. Conversely, taxpayers 
displeased with audit prospects (whether because of relations with the 
district, challenges from other countries, or details of the domestic law) 
will opt to enter the program. Such is the nature of any voluntary 
program with the government. Whether it ultimately poses a problem 
182. See I.R.C. §§ 6038A, 6662. 
183. See Ring, supra note 88. 
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depends on how much the government benefits from the participating 
taxpayers, and the government's ability to maintain some serious audit 
pressure on nonparticipants. 
In addition to the prospect of taxpayer self-selection for the program, 
is the possibility of taxpayers manipulating unduly favorable 
agreements. For example, if a taxpayer who has negotiated one or more 
APAs for its various businesses finds one of the APAs to be very 
favorable, it might seek to divert a large portion of business through the 
entity with the good AP A. The degree to which such a strategy could be 
pursued is limited. For an AP A to remain valid, various assumptions 
about the business, economic environment and transactions must 
continue to be true. Thus, while the business volume in the favored 
entity could be expanded, it would not be possible to channel other 
activities through that entity and receive the APA coverage. Moreover, 
the term of an AP A is restricted, typically to three years. The upside is 
that any Service mistakes have a finite duration. The negative is that 
renegotiations are required to extend the coverage of an expiring 
agreement, although the scope and depth of such discussion can vary 
significantly. 
The conclusion at this stage is that the AP A program as a procedural 
response to a problem of tax administration has been relatively effective 
in its direct application as measured by taxpayer and government 
participation in a process that achieves resolution and furthers 
international dialogue. Assessment of particular substantive effects 
requires further information. However, the procedural and administrative 
analysis does not end with the investigation of the APA program's 
internal dynamics. Instead, the consequences of this procedural 
development for nonparticipants, and for the quality of the tax system 
generally, must also be scrutinized. 
IV. EFFECT OF THE APA PROGRAM ON NONPARTICIPANTS: 
THE SILENT PIECE OF THE PROCEDURAL HYBRID 
The pervasive sense of frustration and failure with respect to transfer 
pricing motivated the creation of the APA program. The three major 
changes described in Part III were successful in improving the function 
and administrability of the system for direct participants. As a result, the 
tax system has an alternative dispute resolution path for transfer pricing 
that seems to work for some taxpayers facing difficulty in the traditional 
audit, appeal, litigation route. 
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The question considered here is the impact of the program on 
nonparticipants and the secondary effects of this alternative procedure 
on the tax system. For taxpayers who have transfer pricing issues but are 
not involved in the APA process two major areas of concern emerge: 
access/participation and results. In the course of examining these 
concerns, a third interrelated issue, disclosure, emerges as central in both 
potential problems and solutions for nonparticipants. Thus, this Part first 
considers the nature of access to and participation in the APA program. 
Second, it explores the question of comparability of results between 
APA and non-APA paths. Finally, drawing upon some of the 
complications identified for participation and results, this Part examines 
the contours of the APA program's disclosure policy in an effort to 
reconcile the program's treatment of participants and nonparticipants. 
Ultimately, the APA program is part of a broader tax system that 
must operate and be analyzed as a whole. No one piece functions 
independently. Therefore a new procedure's impact on those not opting 
for it can be just as significant as its direct effects, in terms of evaluating 
the success or merits of the procedure. The criteria for evaluating the 
"success" or "usefulness" of the APA program become more complex 
when the ramifications of the program for the tax system and 
nonparticipants are taken into account. In that area, more of the tradeoffs 
of the program emerge-and measuring them turns on several criteria 
including horizontal equity; "correctness" of rulemaking; fostering of 
international cooperation; and transparency of process. None of these 
goals or criteria is paramount or exclusive. Different criteria have more 
or less salience for the various issues raised here in Part IV. 
A. Taxpayer Access and Participation 
To the extent the APA program represents a partial remedy to 
problems faced by taxpayers with transfer pricing issues, a significant 
question is who can participate (Le., are there limits on access and 
participation)? As an initial matter, however, the general topic of 
"taxpayer access" to the APA program cannot be taken literally. In 
theory, any taxpayer with a transfer pricing problem can approach the 
APA office with a request for either a unilateral or bilateral/multilateral 
APA. In fact, the entire program has a strong element of taxpayer control 
and electivity because only the taxpayer can initiate the procedure. 
Hence the APA program serves as the taxpayer's trump card in 
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interactions at the district level because the Service cannot force the 
. h 184 taxpayer mto t e process. 
The first problem of participation and access emerges from the 
profile of who seeks an APA. "Profile" reflects an assessment of motive, 
as well as a description of key taxpayer characteristics such as size, 
country of origin and industry. Approximately 187 APA applications are 
pending, and almost 75% are for bilateral or multilateral APAs. 185 An 
initial observation from the profile statistics is that larger multinationals 
are seeking AP As, even though both large and small businesses face 
serious transfer pricing problems. 186 That is, taxpayer size relates to who 
gets an APA. Although the existence of APAs is presumably 
advantageous to taxpayers generally (because they have the option to 
decide if, when, and for what issues to pursue one), in practice smaller 
taxpayers have lacked that option because of cost. Regardless of 
company size, the cost of pursuing an APA is not trivial. 187 As outlined 
earlier, however, APAscan be less expensive than the alternative of 
audit, appeal and litigation. In assessing this cost savings, however, a 
taxpayer must consider the probability of audit as well as the probability 
that the transfer pricing issue will be identified. Larger companies are 
more likely to view audit as inevitable, and thus more likely to find the 
savings attractive. 188 In addition, to the extent the total cost of an APA is 
184. One counterpoint is the early referral program initiated Oct. I, 1997 through which 
the Service's district offices seek to identify taxpayers who have a transfer pricing issue in 
audit that may be appropriate for an APA. See Rev. Proc. 96-9, 1996-1 C.B. 575. The 
decision whether to pursue an APA remains with the taxpayer, and few have chosen that path. 
See Albertina M. Fernandez, Use of Secret Comparables Goes Against Nature of APAs. 
Official Says, 79 TAX NOTES 1233 (June 8, 1998) (quoting APA Program Director Richard 
Barrett on the very limited taxpayer response to the early referral program); IRS Concludes 
First Cost Sharing APA with Low Buy-In as Prime Issue. Barrett Says, 8 TAX MGMT 
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 571 (1999) (only two taxpayers thus far have sought an APA via the 
early referral program). That said. the picture is more complex because some taxpayers may 
find themselves "compelled" to pursue an APA, while others may find they face practical 
barriers to presenting an APA request. For example. a history of troubled transfer pricing 
audits or transactions in foreign countries that actively pursue transfer pricing could lead a 
taxpayer to feel compelled to pursue an APA. See supra note 105. 
185. See Record High. supra note 110, at G-1. . 
186. See e.g., I.R.S. Notice 98-10, 1998-6 I.R.B. 9 (noting that small business taxpayers 
were not participating in the APA 'program to the same extent as large taxpayers, at least in 
part due to cost). 
187. Even though the government fee for filing an APA application is calculated on a 
progressive fee schedule, the other costs including lawyer and accountant fees, expert reports, 
as well as internal resources devoted to the process are not so easily scaled. 
188. Large corporations (those with more than $10 million in gross assets) are divided 
into two groups for purposes of audit. Corporations with assets exceeding $250 million are 
audited under the Coordinated Examination Program; the others under the general audit 
program. See SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 58-15 to 58-19. The "inevitability" of audit, 
however, is not a guarantee that a particular issue will be spotted. Also, in some cases, the fact 
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not directly related to taxpayer or issue size, larger taxpayers can absorb 
the cost more easily.189 This constitutes a participation concern because 
there appears to be no policy intent to limit access to larger taxpayers, 
thereby disadvantaging smaller ones where the two are competitors. l90 
That is, differential participation poses concerns for horizontal equity to 
the extent that there seems no relevant distinction between larger and 
smaller taxpayers. Although it might be argued that smaller taxpayers 
would be less likely than larger ones to have the resources to swamp the 
Service in a transfer pricing audit and would be more willing to pursue 
an APA, the costs of the APA process can be significant enough to 
discourage their participation. 
The initial structure of the APA program offered no remedy for this 
access and participation concern. The 1996 revised procedure introduced 
a sliding scale user fee, but that only mitigated the direct government fee 
for the procedure and not the more costly advisor fees and internal 
resource allocations. 191 The Service, however, expressed concern for 
small taxpayer participation,192 and recently initiated a more streamlined 
track for certain small businesses. 193 Although this formal response to the 
participation problem is important, its limited scope must be noted. At 
present, the new track is available only for certain types of transfer 
pricing issues (the ones perhaps more likely to need in depth 
that the APA costs are certain and must be incurred today makes it more difficult for a 
corporation's tax department to convince management to allocate the funds needed to pursue 
the APA-even when a best estimate cost comparison (including time discount) favors the 
AP A process. 
189. See e.g., Timothy W. Cox, Australian Tax Office Releases Draft Ruling on 
Advance Pricing Agreements, 9 TAX NOTES INT'L 1279 (Oct. 24, 1994) (noting that although 
the APA process provides certainty and eliminates double tax, it may not be cost effective for 
small businesses). 
190. Arguably, this concern about small taxpayers is neither new nor unique; taxpayers 
with more resources often may have more options and more success in the tax system. 
However, it may be more important where the resource question directly impacts the 
taxpayer's opportunity to participate in a procedure which itself is the response to a 
problematic area of taxation. 
191. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12. 
192. The Service has indicated for some time that it was aware of the burdens of the 
process on smaller taxpayers, and was contemplating ways in which to address it. See, e.g., 
Kathleen Matthews, U.S. Branch [FA Meeting Highlights Cross-Border Corporate 
Reshufflings, Tax Treaties, APAs, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 776 (March 21, 1994) (then-APA 
director Robert Ackerman noting Service's interest in developing "truncated" APA guidelines 
for small taxpayers, those with $ 100 million or less in sales); I.R.S. Notice 98- 10, supra note 
186 (inviting comment regarding a special APA process for smaIl taxpayers). See also Temp. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT (1994) (the 1993 temporary regulations contained a safe harbor for 
small taxpayers which did not appear in the final regulations because of problems with its 
application). 
193. See I.R.S. Notice 98- 10, supra note 186. 
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evaluation-intangibles).194 The Service's reluctance to expand the track 
is understandable in a large dollar subject like transfer pricing; perhaps 
the Service's indication that flexibility may be considered on a case by 
case basis reflects a compromise for developing a broader small taxpayer 
track. 195 
The second access problem concerns whether differential 
participation in the APA process creates advantages for certain members 
of an industry.196 If, within a given industry, some taxpayers seek APAs 
and other do not (and we might even assume that it is disproportionately 
the larger taxpayers which are seeking them), will the former taxpayers 
derive some competitive advantage over their non-APA seeking 
counterparts? For example, if the conclusions reached in APA 
negotiations with taxpayer A are not disclosed or are disclosed in a fairly 
limited form, then taxpayer B who does not seek an APA may receive 
different treatment than taxpayer A through the process of audit, appeal 
and litigation. That is, taxpayer B may not get the same rule. 197 Or, 
taxpayer B may find itself receiving the treatment granted taxpayer A 
without the opportunity to fully debate the appropriateness of its 
application, as taxpayer A did in the APA negotiations. The differences 
could have an important competitive impact if the transfer pricing issues 
involve large sums, seriously affect business structure, or carry interest 
and penalties. If taxpayer B could have sought an APA but simply chose 
not to, the subsequent discrepancies might not imply unfairness. But, if 
we believe that taxpayer B may have valid reasons for not pursuing an 
APA (e.g., cost, limited internal resources,198 operations in a nontreaty 
countryl99) , then we may be particularly concerned about different 
outcomes. 
194. See id. (''Transactions involving non-routine intangibles ... would not ordinarily 
be amenable to such special procedures ..... ). 
195. See, e.g., id. at para. 7. 
196. See, Stratton, supra note 58, at 139-40 (fonner Treasury International Tax Counsel 
Stephen Shay voicing concern over the absence of disclosure with APAs because for 
taxpayers competing in the same industry, the APA program "should not be a point to provide 
a competitive advantage over another company."). 
197. As discussed in greater detail in the following section, results can vary for different 
reasons, and the reasons why they vary are important. See infra Part IV.B.!. Inappropriate 
variation will be most harmful within the same industry because of the competitive impact of 
taxes. 
198. Pursuing an APA requires resources from the corporation itself in tenns of 
gathering and organizing infonnation, and negotiating. If the company faces other demands 
on its time and resources, an APA may not be realistic. 
199. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 7.01. ("bilateral or multilateral APAs 
generally are preferable ... when competent authority procedures are available with respect to 
the foreign country or countries involved"). In the absence of a treaty and the corresponding 
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How do we evaluate this aspect of participation? Unlike the above 
discussion which focused on the affirmative opportunity to participate 
and the elimination of unjustified2°O barriers to participation, this view of 
"participation" includes more than a direct role in the procedure. It 
includes access to the developments of the administrative process-the 
new rules, approaches and interpretations emerging from the APA 
program. One way of stating the problem envisioned here is that because 
of the hybrid nature of the APA program, a taxpayer that does not use 
the procedure to resolve a transfer pricing issue runs not only the risk of 
having a different "process" to resolve the issue but also of having a 
different rule applied. This fear, which arguably could exist across the 
board because taxpayers' ultimate tax treatments are rarely made public, 
is fueled by the possibility for creating "private law" through the APA 
program. 
As outlined above in Part III, an administrative regime like the tax 
system has both rulemaking and adjudication functions, although the 
degree of difference between the two is debated.,,20' While 
acknowledging the fluidity between the two categories, attention should 
be directed to one of the traditional differences, timing.202 The 
rule making function is an ex ante interaction in that it refers to 
identifying rules to which taxpayers will be held in their future 
transactions. In an open legal system, this kind of interaction or function 
should be uniform, consistent and visible; taxpayers should face the 
same rules up-front, before engaging in their transactions. Even if results 
vary, which they will for a variety of reasons,203 a taxpayer's risk 
regarding potential tax treatment should be the same, so that the 
government is not inappropriately favoring one taxpayer over another. In 
competent authority mechanism, the APA program lacks an avenue of interaction with 
another country to produce an APA. 
200. A justified barrier would, for example, be one that requires taxpayers to explain 
their business and identify their competitors. A taxpayer not wanting to share any information 
in the procedure would not have a valid claim that its participation was unfairly limited. 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 163-72. See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 163, at 
260-65 (discussing the difficulty in drawing distinctions between rulemakingllegislation and 
adjudication). 
202. See supra text accompanying note 166. See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 163, at 260-61 
(noting partial reliance on the distinction that rulemaking concerns the future where as 
adjudication affects past or present events and relies on past facts). 
203. Although both taxpayers entered into their transactions "knowing the rule to be 
applied," the non-APA participant's final treatment might differ from the APA participant's 
because of several factors endemic to the ex post dispute resolution process (including 
taxpayer/district dynamic; large dollar gaps to negotiate; litigation risk; and view of foreign 
country), which are handled differently in the APA process. The importance of why results 
could be substantially different is considered in detail, infra Part IV.B. 
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terms of "similar,,204 taxpayers, there is no reason that this standard 
cannot be met. Moreover, there is a value to fair process independent of 
actual results. The fact that rules can be developed through traditional 
adjudicatory proceedings, or that particular problems or cases can be 
resolved by a new rule, does not undermine the importance of the ex 
ante/ex post distinction in this context. The distinction and focus are not 
on rulemaking v. case resolution per se, but on the degree of risk or 
certainty possessed by the taxpayer at the time of the transaction, and the 
f h .. 205 nature 0 t e government mteractlOn. 
The other basic function, adjudication, is an ex post interaction 
typically occurring after the taxpayer has engaged in the transaction 
under consideration (e.g., in audit). The important aspect of this function 
here is to produce results. The results themselves need not be the same 
because the "application" process (unlike ex ante) usually does not 
involve "comparable" cases-questions of litigation risk, proof and 
specific facts come into play. Of course, "new" rules or interpretations 
may emerge from the process. That, however, should pose no problem 
given the uniform ex ante risk faced by all taxpayers. Moreover, a 
pricing conclusion reached after the fact, perhaps at the appeals level 
where litigation risk and offsetting issues are relevant, would be of 
somewhat lesser planning value for other taxpayers.206 
Although many actions reasonably may be classified as ex ante or ex 
post, the APA procedure is a hybrid that fits neither.207 Relative to the 
actual occurrence of covered future transactions, the procedure seems ex 
ante and calls for clear, established rules applicable to all. The procedure 
is also ex post in that it specifies final treatment (assuming taxpayer 
compliance with the agreement's terms) and thus is more context 
specific. The hybrid nature of the APA program means that concerns 
about the impact on nonparticipants are especially poigniant. To the 
204. The analysis here assumes that one can identify sufficiently similar taxpayers for 
whom the tax system would seek to provide similar rules. 
205. An initial criticism of these stated benefits of ex ante rule consistency questions 
what the real value is if taxpayers (and administrators) can both realistically predict that 
taxpayers with more resources can obtain (through the progress of audit, appeal and litigation) 
results substantially different from those that taxpayers with fewer resources can obtain. This 
challenge to the significance of ex ante rule consistency stands independent of the existence of 
the APA program. The response turns on the role of risk. While additional resources might 
improve a taxpayer's chance of a successful outcome in a dispute with the Service, it is by no 
means guaranteed (and most certainly is not the tax system's goal). Even that taxpayer bears 
the risk of undesired tax treatment. 
206. This point is part of a larger and much more complicated consideration of the role 
of disclosure in the APA program and the tax system more generally. These issues are 
explored in greater detail in section B below. 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 165-72. 
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extent a taxpayer engaging in the AP A process obtains certainty about 
the rules to be applied to its transfer pricing, and to the extent such rules 
may differ from those clearly available to non APA participants, valid 
cause for concern exists. The APA participants would be obtaining a 
different rule, but with certainty and in advance of committing to the 
actual transactions-essentially a form of private law. 
Where does this observation lead? It points to the questions 
addressed in the following two sections: results and disclosure. A 
taxpayer is ultimately concerned about its final tax treatment, the actual 
results it obtains. Depending on the comparability of transfer pricing 
results for APA participants and nonparticipants, we may be more 
comfortable about the degree of access to "new" rules. More generally, 
adequate disclosure of APA terms would help eliminate the veil that 
leaves nonparticipants (including taxpayers, Congress, and academics) 
uninformed about the new developments in the APA process. 
B. Results and Comparability in APA Process 
Both as a tool for evaluating participation and as an independent 
concern, comparability in APA and non-APA results is criticaeo8 Simply 
stated, the expectation here is that AP A results should be comparable 
(i.e., a taxpayer should not be treated better or receive more favorable 
tax treatment simply because it used the APA process-the "private 
law" concern). However, an assessment of the comparability of results 
depends on understanding why results differ, and deciding whether the 
reasons they differ are appropriate. The question of results turns out to 
be complicated and reflects more than a debate over literal results. As 
suggested below, the use of the term "results" can be misleading as 
different observers may have different points in mind. 
Before undertaking the inquiry two caveats must be noted. First, any 
analysis here is impaired by the absence of full information and the lack 
of data on a wide range of taxpayers and disputes. Moreover, even if 
APAs were substantially disclosed we would still need detailed 
information about other taxpayers' treatment in audit and appeals to 
complete the study. Such information, however, is unlikely to be made 
publicly available in the near future. Second, the focus on results should 
not be taken to mean that there is a single correct tax treatment or tax 
due. Rather, it reflects the view that if certain premises are made in the 
208. See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 58, at 139-40 (former Treasury International Tax 
Counsel Stephen Shay expressing concern that different taxpayers may be receiving different 
treatment through the APA process). 
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substantive tax law, then certain outcomes are sensible and plausible, 
and others are not. 
1. Appropriate Reasons for Varying Results 
Most comparisons of APA and non-APA results should reveal 
differences, but due to appropriate factors. This section identifies a 
number of significant but valid reasons for difference. The question then 
remains, what potential concerns linger? 
The first reason results can appropriately differ is that the 
comparison is one of results received at different stages which have 
different roles and constraints. Thus, a comparison of APA results and 
audit (i.e., exam level) results must recognize exam's focus on 
identifying adjustments. Litigation risk may not be factored in at this 
stage. However, the expectation that appeals will be assessing litigation 
risk may push audit to produce a higher assessment to be negotiated and 
compromised later.209 The interaction between taxpayer and Service at 
this level, while not uniform, is structurally more adversarial than others. 
Additionally, an audit's duty is to find adjustments, it needs to justify 
time spent reviewing a taxpayer, and it is rewarded for passing on big 
dollar adjustments to appeals, which means differences should be 
expected.2lO Thus, APA results are not likely to equal those provided by 
audit. 
Even the appeals stage is not the right point of comparison for an 
AP A. Although appeals does consider litigation risk, and is the stage at 
which the taxpayer and Service explicitly negotiate and compromise, the 
results obtained at this level do not incorporate the views and positions 
of the other country or countries involved. That is the province of the 
competent authority proceeding. In addition, if an audit position is 
particularly extreme, then even subsequent appeals and competent 
authority negotiations may fail to bring the results back to the "more 
appropriate" point because of the practical constraints on appeals in 
209. For example, for fiscal year 1993, $900 million in proposed large I.R.C. § 482 
issues were settled at a sustention rate of 27%. See NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 24. 
The primary reason cited by the Service for reaching these settlements was hazards of 
litigation relating to facts or evidence open to judgment (accounting for 63% of the reduction 
to proposed I.R.C. § 482 adjustments). The next most important reason for settlement was 
"hazards of litigation relating to uncertainty about how the courts will apply the law." [d. at 
25. 
210. See, e.g., id. at 181 ("The U.S. General Accounting Office recently reported that 
taxpayers were able to settle transfer pricing cases at the Appeals level for an average of 24 
cents on the dollar." (citing GAO Testimony Before Senate Governmental Affairs Committee: 
Updated Information on Transfer Pricing, Delivered March 25, 1993, Transfer Pricing 821 
(Mar. 31, 1993))). 
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terms of conceding large adjustments. Appeals could also move in a 
slightly different direction than the APA because of explicit or de facto 
offsetting compromises on other issues simultaneously on the table. The 
opportunity for this kind of modification at the APA level is less likely 
because of the more limited jurisdiction of the APA program.211 
Given the increasingly large fraction of cases which are bilateral or 
multilateral, the APA procedure is usually the first and final step in the 
process.212 The APA process can be seen as compressing a series of 
otherwise separate functions in the Service and producing the final result 
in a more unified manner and in a presumably shorter time period.213 
Thus, for taxpayers pursuing the traditional path, the proper point of 
comparison with an APA is the result ultimately emerging from the 
competent authority proceedings.214 For both sets of taxpayers that is the 
final point for a given transfer pricing issue domestically and 
internationally. But even then, the sum of the individualized steps of 
audit, appeals, and competent authority, does not necessarily equal the 
condensed version-the AP A. 
A second basic reason results validly may differ is because of the 
underlying transfer pricing rules used in audit as opposed to the APA 
program. In contrast to most current audits and appeals, APAs are being 
conducted against the backdrop of the new transfer pricing regulations, 
whereas audit cycles under these new rules are only just beginning. 
Thus, differences would be expected. This point, however, should not be 
overstated. The actual implementation of the old rules through the audit 
process, appeals and competent authority, already incorporated more of 
the new regulations than would be supposed by a strict reading of the 
rules.215 For example, the comparable profits and profit split methods, 
which were not explicitly authorized under the old regulations, but are 
"specified methods" under the new regulations, were nonetheless a 
factor in many transfer pricing discussions. 
211. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12. 
212. This assumes that the taxpayer complies with the terms of the agreement and thus 
the agreement remains valid. 
213. To the extent that taxpayers are able to package seven, eight, or nine years of issues 
together in a single process, resources should be saved because of the transfer pricing issues 
forgone. It should also ensure greater consistency in treatment across the years. It is, however, 
also possible to have audit cover an issue over several audit years. See, e.g., I.R.S. Manual 
Ch. 35 § 3( 19)(6) (certain closing agreements may be used to provide "that resolution of an 
issue under consideration during an audit cycle can be applied to resolve the same issue in 
prior or subsequent tax years that have ended before the date of the agreement."). 
214. U.S. income tax treaties contain a "Competent Authority Procedure" that can be 
used as a forum to address potential double taxation problems resulting from two countries' 
transfer pricing adjustments ofa taxpayer. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 91-23,1991-1 C.S. 534, § 2. 
215. See generally NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 7. 
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A third observable difference in APA and non-APA results relates to 
the first, but is worth identifying separately-the reliance on treaty 
authority to permit APA participants to enjoy up-front certain rules not 
available under domestic law. The example noted earlier involved 
interbranch transactions which the United States traditionally has not 
recognized.216 That standard U.S. tax position, however, can result in 
taxation that does not reflect the underlying economics. This problem is 
most severe in businesses that frequently rely on interbranch contracts-
financial institutions engaged in global trading. For these taxpayers, the 
APA process represents an opportunity to get different tax rules applied 
to their global trading operations under the auspices of the Service's 
competent authority power from the treaties. Until the Service recently 
issued new proposed rules,217 taxpayers not obtaining an APA had to 
treat their transactions under the existing framework. This is a clear case 
of the results available under an APA being undeniably different from 
those available through traditional avenues, but it is not inappropriate 
because in the parallel traditional stage, competent authority, other 
taxpayers could receive treatment predicated on the treaty. 
Dissimilar results also can develop because of the different path for 
unilateral APAs and bilateral APAs. If APA negotiations involve one or 
more foreign countries who take a different "theoretical" view as to how 
to best approach arm's length pricing, there may be differences between 
bilateral APAs. In addition, bilateral APA results could differ from both 
unilateral APAs and from audit/appeals of similar situations. An 
example of this departure is seen in the negotiation of APAs with Japan. 
The U.S. APA office and competent authority have often viewed the 
comparable profits method as better suited than the profit split method to 
many cases involving related party distributors.2lB Japan, however, has 
argued for use of the profit split method. The different positions seem to 
reflect a combination of bottom line tax revenue expectations as well as 
opposing interpretations of the relationship between parent and 
subsidiary distributor: arm's length distributor for hire relationship v. 
partnership-like relationship.219 For purposes of considering the results, 
216. See supra text accompanying note 88. Recently, however, the Service released 
proposed regulations granting recognition to some interbranch transactions. 
217. Proposed global dealing regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. II, 177 (1998). 
218. See generally Guttentag and Miyatake, supra note 36 (The United States seems to 
seek to limit the use of the profit split method because it is an internal approach that does not 
rely on third party transactions and data). 
219. See, e.g., id. at 384 ("Japanese companies may rightfully be concerned that the use 
of U.S. companies as comparables could result in over-allocation of income to the United 
States, because U.S. companies generally may be more profitable .... The comparable profit 
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however, it is sufficient to note that in some of these bilateral Japan-V.S. 
AP A cases, the countries have agreed to what has been termed a "hybrid 
method".220 Whether the hybrid method is considered pure compromise 
or an independent method with integrity, it is clear that the likelihood of 
obtaining this hybrid treatment from the Vnited States in any other 
context (i.e., unilateral APA or non-APA process) is minimal at present. 
The above analysis outlines the range of factors validly producing 
difference in APA and non-APA results: including "procedural 
efficiencies,,221 and comparison with the "wrong" stage in the process.222 
To the extent these have formed the basis of some concerns about 
negative impacts of the APA process on nonparticipants, they are 
unfounded. The APA process is a condensed (but not equal) version of a 
number of steps in the process, steps that typically occurred sequentially 
ex ante and ex post.223 Any residual dissatisfaction with differences 
produced by these factors must acknowledge that they are not unique to 
the APA program, but are pervasive in government enforcement action 
across fields. The existence of multiple levels of agency review often 
produces different results although such difference is not the goal. 
Additionally, the move from the domestic to the international realm 
frequently will lead to varying results. 
Even if we concluded there should be no systemic reasons such as 
litigation risk or posturing (e.g. agents seeking large adjustments upfront 
in anticipation of settlement) for different results, it is not plausible or 
appropriate to expect the treatment emerging from the last domestic 
administrative stage (appeals in the tax context) always to be consistent 
with a case requiring international resolution. APAs form part of an 
international dialogue where some mutual agreement must be reached. 
All countries, however, do not share similar views, thus the 
accommodations that the V nited States reaches in each AP A cannot 
method ultimately forces a Japanese multinational group to realize as much profit as a U.S. 
multinational .... "). 
220. See, e.g., Akamatsu, supra note 69. The use of the term "hybrid" here is different 
from the general use in this paper which identifies the APA program as a hybrid procedure. 
221. As discussed in Part III, the change in participants and their roles in resolving 
transfer pricing issues was in part aimed at remedying potential conflicts inherent in the 
taxpayer/district dynamic. See supra Part III.A.I.b. 
222. For example, comparing audit with APA fails to incorporate (I) the differences 
potentially due to the negotiation dynamic based on the role of audit versus appeal, and how 
that compares to the APA team, (2) the impact of treaty power on the Service's "ability" to 
accept results not clearly permissible under domestic law, and (3) the effect of the foreign 
country and its negotiating position on any final resolution. 
223. The factors discussed above that contribute to difference are mostly due to 
comparing the APA process with traditional steps, short of the competent authority 
proceeding; thus, the role of the treaty or the other country is not yet factored into the non-
APA side. 
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always be the same, nor can these accommodations always match the 
final U.S. domestic position (e.g. the appeals level determination). 
2. Inappropriate Difference in Results 
The remaining question' is, what factors may be creating 
inappropriately different results? The answer is any departures or 
developments in transfer pricing reached in the AP A program. That is, 
the real and relevant concern about results is a concern about the rules 
that taxpayers are facing before they enter into their transactions. For 
example, although the interbranch APA treatment was justified by the 
Service because the departure from existing domestic rules was based on 
treaty not purely the APA program', it is quite possible to imagine that 
less dramatic or obvious departures from existing rules occur 
independent of a treaty. Such departures may be less apparent to the 
extent that the current tax treatment is less clear. For example, treatment 
of foreign currency exchange or distribution subsidiaries may not be 
explicitly addressed in the current regulations, but a new understanding 
and practice may be developing at the APA level. In fact, one must 
presume this to be the case since the Service indicated it was considering 
producing issue specific guidance instead of redacted APAs. Unless the 
results are publicized, taxpayers not pursuing an APA have little 
assurance they will know of the "new views", or even if they know of 
them, that they will be able to convince audit and appeals they should 
apply.224 In fact, the audit and appeals officers themselves may not be 
fully informed of the APA developments. Under these circumstances, 
differing results would arguably be inappropriate. 
Of course, how would a taxpayer know if results differ, and how 
could it prevent such differences? At a minimum, the answer to both 
involves disclosure. What a taxpayer needs to know is how it was treated 
in the traditional administrative process and then compare the results to 
similar industry APAs. If the APAs use a method or variation not 
available to the nonparticipant then there is a serious concern that the 
difference was inappropriate. What is the solution? Essentially, the 
same. If all taxpayers have access to redacted APAs, they can monitor 
on their own behalf and point out on audit what appears to be the "new" 
approach. This does not guarantee comparable or high quality results, 
but does (if respected) address major concerns of inappropriately 
224. Although the main focus of APAs is future years, it is possible to rollback the 
results to earlier open years. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 8. Part of the value of 
an APA, from the taxpayer's perspective, comes from the opportunity to get the audit level 
personnel involved in a dialogue with the National Office-and thus get them more 
comfortable with any new transfer pricing approaches. 
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different results. The pressure here for disclosure on the grounds of 
ensuring "equal treatment" of taxpayers is actually more complex than 
the term suggests. Implicit in a search for equal treatment is a desire to 
eliminate both accidental differences in tax treatment as well as those 
potentially motivated by misuse or abuse of power. But an additional 
value from disclosure occurs even when all parties' face comparable 
treatment. In that circumstance, disclosure still can play a critical 
function on a substantive law level. Disclosure opens the tax treatment 
and rules to outside scrutiny-from taxpayers, Congress, academics and 
the pUblic. Thus, the pressure to eliminate "private law" should be seen 
to encompass claims for equality and quality in rulemaking. 
C. Role of Disclosure in the Impact of APAs on Nonparticipants 
From the above discussion of nonparticipants' two primary concerns 
about the APA program, the question of disclosure emerges. Ultimately, 
decisions about the disclosure of APA terms playa significant role in the 
effect of the program on nonparticipants and on the tax system more 
broadly. This issue of secrecy and disclosure confronts the degree to 
which the methods and results from individual taxpayer APA 
negotiations are made available to the public. At the outset, the Service 
maintained that the content of APAs was privileged taxpayer 
information subject to confidentiality under I.R.c. § 6103.225 Although 
the general participation statistics released by the Service as well as the 
random and occasional comments from taxpayers participating in the 
APA process provided some information on the scope and tone of the 
program, it has proven insufficient to satisfy the demand for the release 
of redacted APAs. Moreover, the nondisclosure policy in place through 
early 1999 led to the conclusion that APAs are creating a source of 
"private law.,,226 To the extent treatment is not publicly revealed, it may 
225. See Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at § II; John Turro, United States: IRS 
Official Says No APA Disclosure. But Generic Information to be Provided, 4 TAX NOTES 
INT'L 709 (Apr. 6, 1992) (quoting IRS Associate Chief Counsel International, Robert E. 
Culbertson) [hereinafter Turro]; Stratton, supra note 58, at 138-39 (quoting the Service's 
view that APAs are not like other disclosed agreements, that disclosure would discourage 
participation because of the degree of sensitive information involved, and that a redacted APA 
would look "like a piece of Swiss cheese" and thus be unhelpful). 
226. See, e.g., James R. Mogle, Advance Pricing Agreements Under Revenue Procedure 
91-22,45 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 356, 359-60 (July/Aug. 1991) (arguing 
that there is no support for the Service's position [at that time] that an APA and supporting 
documentation are tax return information, and warning taxpayers to be prepared for possible 
public disclosure of a redacted APA); Turro, supra note 225 (noting the concern that 
undisclosed APAs would lead to the development of a private law of transfer pricing); Mike 
Mcintyre, The Case of Public Disclosure of Advance Rulings on Tramfer Pricing 
Methodologies, 91 TAX NOTES INT'L 2-27 (Jan. 9, 1991) (expressing concern at the Service's 
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effectively constitute private law either because (l) it is not available in 
audit to taxpayers not pursuing APAs, (2) it is not sua sponte offered by 
the Service to other taxpayers seeking APAs, and/or (3) it is not 
available to taxpayers planning future transactions outside the APA 
process. Such a scenario would be most sensitive for taxpayers operating 
in the same industry where tax treatment is one factor which can provide 
a competitive edge.221 Disclosure, usually presumed to mean the release 
of redacted APAs, would alert taxpayers to their options, better assure 
consistency in the treatment of taxpayers, and contribute to a sense of 
fair play and openness in the tax system. It is possible to suggest, 
however, that rather than being harmed by nondisclosure, 
nonparticipants should be viewed as poised to obtain an unfair 
advantage if disclosure of APA terms is made because the 
nonparticipants would be able to free ride off of the time, effort, and 
expenditures of other taxpayers. This claim also would apply to the 
disclosure of letter rulings. The degree of undesirable free riding might 
be mitigated by (l) the absence of certainty when relying on another 
taxpayer's APA, and (2) the fact that if smaller companies are more 
likely to be the free riders, that benefit balances the burden of serious 
transfer pricing compliance costs on smaller taxpayers less able to bear 
such costs. 
The Service's initial response to the concerns about nondisclosure 
was to establish a plan for the release of industry-wide guidance after a 
critical mass of APAs had been executed.228 As noted earlier, the Service 
view that APAs are more like closing agreements, which are not disclosed, than letter rulings, 
which are published in redacted form). See supra notes 12 and 52 (describing the Service's 
change of view on the disclosability of APAs and the subsequent legislative response). 
227. Another level of disclosure concerns (reminiscent of the history of letter rulings and 
rulings under l.R.C. § 367) considers the equitable treatment of tax advisors. The fear is that 
to the extent APAs are kept secret, those tax advisors (law firms and accountants) that are 
involved in APAs will have an advantage in retaining and assisting clients over those not 
already involved, solely because the agreements are unpublished. See generally, Treasury 
Wanted to Prevent Agreements from Becoming 'Private Law', Lubick Says, 8 TAX MGMT. 
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 572 (Oct. 27, 1999) (hereinafter "Private Law") (Treasury 
Department wants to ensure that the "public and practitioners without specialized transfer 
pricing training were not being disadvantaged when they sought APAs."). Ostensibly, the 
government has no interest in some taxpayers being better advised than others, nor would it 
seek affirmatively to provide a profitable specialty to a limited pool of advisors. The degree of 
accessibility of the agency's decisions is a relevant factor in characterizing administrative 
action as rulemaking or adjudication. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 164. 
228. See Turro, supra note 225. Despite the plan for more generalized releases, a major 
legal publisher filed a lawsuit against the Service in 1996, seeking release of transfer pricing 
methodologies contained in APAs, essentially seeking publication of redacted APAs. See 
BNA v. IRS, D.C. D.C., No. 96-CV376, 2/27/96. The publisher initially sought the 
information through a Freedom of Information Act (a "FOIA") request and a request under 
l.R.C. § 6110, both of which were denied; the former on the ground that the methodologies 
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changed its positIOn and declared that APAs were "written 
determinations" covered by I.R.C. § 6110's disclosure rules, thereby 
prompting Congressional action to block disclosure and only require 
reporting.229 The question this section considers is whether this level of 
disclosure in the APA program is appropriate to meet equity concerns, 
given the effect on both the APA participants and the nonparticipants. In 
answering this question, it is important to consider what disclosure is 
normatively expected for various tax-related government interactions. 
With that baseline established, we can then consider what implications 
the hybrid procedural setting has for the ultimate analysis of disclosure. 
Related to this issue of equity is the view that transparency in an 
administrative regime is valuable as an independent goal regardless of its 
absolute connection to improved equity or outcomes. Thus, there may be 
additional grounds for higher levels of disclosure. 
1. Disclosure Ex Ante and Ex Post 
A review of the basic practices in the current tax system regarding 
disclosure, while not binding, provides guidance on expectations for 
disclosure. From tax returns to court proceedings, there is a spectrum of 
disclosure treatments which, taken together, suggest an underlying 
policy. An important caveat must be acknowledged regarding disclosure. 
Although general norms and baselines can be ascertained from the 
operation of the existing income tax system, we still lack a 
comprehensive normative picture of the basis for and contours of 
privacy in a regulatory regime. Nonetheless, the basic scope of the 
constitute confidential return information and contain confidential taxpayer information, the 
latter on the ground that APAs are confidential documents protected from public disclosure. 
Following the December 1999 amendment to I.R.C. § 6103(b) preventing disclosure of APAs, 
BNA and the Service agreed to the dismissal of the suit. See "BNA, IRS Agree to Dismiss 
Lawsuit Seeking Access to Redacted APAs," 8 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 740 
(Jan. 12,2000). 
The effort to force disclosure of APAs parallels the battle in the early 1970s over letter 
rulings, which at that time were not disclosed to the public. Two lawsuits were filed and 
ultimately the courts of appeal for the District of Columbia and the Sixth Circuit found the 
letter rulings to be subject to disclosure and not protected as tax return information under 
I.R.e. § 6103. See SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 3-30; Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 
F.2d 350 (D.e. Cir. 1974); Freuhauf Corp. v. IRS, 522 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and 
remanded for reconsideration in light of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,429 U.S. 1085 (1977). 
The issue of disclosure was finally addressed by I.R.e. § 6110, enacted by Congress in 
1976, which was intended to serve as the exclusive remedy for disclosure of rulings and 
related material. See I.R.e. § 6110(1); General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, at 
304 (Comm. Print 1976), reprinted in 1976-3 e.B. (Vol. 2) 316. I.R.e. § 6110 generally 
provides for the disclosure in redacted form of any "written determination," that is, a ruling, 
determination letter, or technical advice memorandum. See 1.R.e. § 6110(a),(b)(I). 
229. See supra note 12. 
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disclosure question can be evaluated by accepting the apparently 
existing parameters for disclosure and then considering their treatment in 
the APA context. To the extent a new or different fundamental theory of 
disclosure is advocated, it would require an independent argument on the 
principles governing disclosure. 
In ex ante interactions, the pattern is to provide significant 
disclosure, except for taxpayer identifying information (including 
names, dollar amounts, specific industry activity, etc.). This makes sense 
because the interaction, typically some type of ruling, is establishing a 
rule or interpretation. There is no litigation risk factored into the 
analysis;230 nor is there a dispute over facts (i.e., they are assumed). 
Given the prospective nature of such advice, a lesser disclosure policy 
would not only invite criticism, but the actual creation of private law. 
Rules to which we hold taxpayers should be public to ensure notice and 
equal application of the law. At the same time, however, continued 
secrecy or privacy for the taxpayers' specific details seems appropri-
ate.231 Publication of such current financial and business information 
could put the taxpayer at a significant competitive disadvantage as 
compared to others in its industry both domestically and globally. 
Furthermore, it might deter taxpayers from seeking guidance from the 
government at the most useful point-before transactions have occurred. 
Both the particular taxpayer and the Service can benefit from this up-
front clarification. 
Ex post, from tax returns to appeals, there is typically no disclosure 
of the taxpayer-government interactions. Again, a rationale can be 
discerned from the pattern: for these generally backward looking 
interactions (with no guarantees of future treatment)232 there is much less 
230. Litigation risk is understood here to refer to an effort to ascertain one's chance of 
prevailing in court in a given case in light of the particular facts and circumstances and their 
relation to the rules. If a much broader conception of "taking litigation risk into account" were 
used, then essentially all functions of an administrative agency like the IRS would be said to 
include consideration of such risk. That is, even when a regulation is issued, the Service is 
aware that such a regulation could be challenged in courts. Similarly in the context of the 
APA program, it could never be said that the results were reached without any thought to how 
alternative IRS positions would fare in court. But litigation risk as used in this broader sense 
is more a function of the fact that every action by an administrative agency is ultimately 
reviewable in court. 
231. See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 58, at 139-40 (outlining taxpayer claims for 
disclosure that nonetheless are sensitive to the need not to reveal confidential taxpayer 
information). 
232. There are exceptions such as closing agreements. See, e.g., 14 MERTENS LAW OF 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 52.03 (1997) ("A closing agreement is a written agreement 
between an individual and the Commissioner which settles or 'closes' the liability of that 
individual (or the taxpayer or estate for whom he acts) ... A closing agreement may relate to 
tax liability for a past taxable year or relate to specific items in past or future years."). 
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information of valid and significant use for other taxpayers, particularly 
when balanced by the risk to the taxpayer at issue from the disclosure. 
For example, tax returns contain current business data and the taxpayer's 
own legal conclusions. Neither should play an important role in others' 
tax planning.233 And although the settlement at appeals does in fact 
establish a taxpayer's tax treatment (and involves the same data at a less 
"contemporary" point in time), its general relevance is somewhat 
limited. The settlement reflects not only the facts and legal rules, but 
also the Service's assessment of its own litigation risks. Litigation risks 
(including the context of the issues and the precise facts) vary from case 
to case, so a settlement reached at this level has less bearing on other 
taxpayers, and certainly no precedential value. That does not mean 
disclosure would be of no valid interest to other taxpayers. Disclosure of 
audit settlements would give taxpayers the ability to evaluate and predict 
the Service's behavior in audit. Nonetheless, a stronger argument can be 
made for why disclosure at this stage should be limited. 
In litigation, the fact that most taxpayer information may be released 
in the form of court opinions and other litigation documents reflects the 
difference between internal agency settlement and the adjudicatory 
process through the courts. Settlement is more context specific because 
of the inclusion of litigation risk. However, litigation risk has no place in 
judicial decisions. The tax system expects and requires compliance with 
the rules and it is that compliance which is assessed at trial. That factor 
alone would be insufficient to explain the degree to which taxpayer 
information is disclosed in cases. Clearly other factors are at work, 
including a powerful vision about the importance of a public judicial 
process, as well as the likelihood that taxpayer data revealed in a case 
will usually be at least several years out of date. 
Thus, although the APA program's disclosure policy is not bound by 
the particular treatment of any current disclosure pattern, the tax 
system's disclosure practices seem to focus substantially on the ex 
ante/ex post line as well as the degree of negotiation and risk assessment 
involved. Where the government exercises primarily legal decision 
making authority (Le., it is not negotiating) the demand for disclosure is 
strong. Conversely, government action premised in part on other factors 
(e.g., in settlement negotiations) presents a less compelling case for 
disclosure. Thus, a taxpayer's first interactions (letter rulings prior to the 
In practice, the agreements reached in audit may provide some indication of what will be 
acceptable in the future. However, where the agreements are based extensively on 
compromise of issues and risk they may be less useful. 
233. Moreover, protection of a taxpayer's contemporary data (i.e. the return 
information) might enhance compliance with the tax laws. 
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transaction) and last interactions (judicial decisions) with the 
government are the ones in which disclosure is expected. Both focus on 
the legal issue without regard to other aspects of negotiation and 
litigation risk. In addition, both represent a final stage-the letter ruling 
as the last word on taxation prior to the transaction, and the judicial 
decision as the final word after the transaction. 
2. Disclosure in the APA Procedure 
Turning to the APA context, direct application of the ex ante/ex post 
perspective combined with an eye towards the nature of the government 
role would require disclosure of APA terms with necessary redactions. 
APAs are forward-looking arrangements that produce more finely tuned 
specifications of the law prior to the transactions. As the law is being 
refined and developed, such information should be available for all 
taxpayers evaluating the potential impact of future action. Anything 
short of "full application" of the law should not be granted in advance to 
some taxpayers and not others. In such a case, two separate taxpayers 
seeking to comply with the rules will in good faith conduct their 
transactions very differently, and each will be correct because their laws 
are different. 
At the start, the government must spell out the law to be applied and 
the taxpayers must strive to apply it. After the fact, greater uncertainty 
arises because of issues of proof. If these uncertainties ultimately lead to 
different results for taxpayers it should be less problematic because each 
taxpayer took a risk in conducting itself and filing a return short of the 
"law." Each taxpayer adopted a stance with no guarantee of different 
treatment and risked the results.2;4 Even if the discrepancies in taxpayer 
treatment in settlement are due to human inconsistency, and not 
assessment of litigation risk, that variation is less serious than variation 
234. A very rough analogy to criminal law that may shed some light on this conception 
of the past/future distinction is the role of the plea bargain. On the books, various crimes carry 
specified penalty ranges. However, after a person has committed a crime, it may be possible 
to plea bargain to a lesser offense and reduced penalty. This scenario is accepted because the 
government in each case must confront its litigation risks and resources. It would not, 
however, be possible (nor conceivable) to allow individuals to approach the government 
before committing a crime and reach an up-front agreement as to some lesser crime and 
penalty for which the individual if caught would be charged and sentenced. Obviously, the 
parallel to the tax case is limited. First, disclosure is not an issue in the criminal context 
because the plea agreements are made public. Second, the tax disputes at issue are civil 
administrative disputes with the government and typically involve basic transactions that are 
permissible in some form. Nonetheless, the analogy helps capture the visceral sense of a 
distinction between the appropriateness of the variability of the rule of law before and after 
the relevant actions have been taken. 
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in the ex ante statement of the law because it does not provide one 
taxpayer a predictable advantage over another. 
Although direct application of the tax system's disclosure practices 
would seem to require release of redacted APAs, the question remains 
whether anything special about the APA process would support 
nondisclosure. Interwoven in the debate regarding disclosure in the APA 
program is a competition among several administrative values including 
improved rulemaking, facilitation of international cooperation in 
regulatory regimes, and the independent value of transparency. Several 
arguments can be made that full disclosure, with redaction of the barest 
taxpayer identifying details, would not be appropriate in the AP A 
process. First, the nature of the subject matter makes it impossible to 
provide meaningful APA disclosures while simultaneously protecting 
the taxpayer-specific data contained in the APA. This is the "Swiss 
cheese" point previously made by the Service-that APAs are not like 
other agreements and a redacted APA would look "like a piece of Swiss 
cheese" and thus be unhelpful.235 Therefore the plan to release either 
industry or issue based advice was viewed as an effective mechanism for 
conveying current Service thinking and approaches on transfer pricing 
without releasing individual data. This position, however, is not 
dispositive. If disclosure would fail to achieve certain critical results 
(e.g., equity, transparency), then the risk posed by the program could be 
determined to be so severe as to warrant its rejection in the absence of an 
another disclosure solution. 
However, to the extent transfer pricing guidance tends to be context 
specific, generalized guidance may be insufficiently detailed to 
adequately inform taxpayers, and context may be difficult to provide 
while protecting "privacy". The standard view is that the core APA 
agreement is relatively boilerplate and the real information, and power, 
resides in the attachments specifically applying the treatment to the 
taxpayer's situation. Even for taxpayers reasonably satisfied with the 
level of detail provided in a release like Notice 94-40, the pace at which 
such releases are being issued renders them more of a theoretical than 
actual alternative. To date, Notice 94-40 (and the subsequent 1998 
proposed global dealing regulations) has been the only release of its 
type. Moreover, the Service has indicated that it is moving away from 
"industry-based" guidance,236 which is how that notice could be 
235. See TUITO, supra note 225, at 709 (quoting comments of IRS Associate Chief 
Counsel International, Robert Culbertson); Stratton, supra note 58, at 138-39 (quoting 
Service views on the value of disclosed APAs). 
236. Apparently some industries had initially expressed interest in pursuing an 
"industry-wide" APA. See Kathleen Matthews, U.S. Branch [FA Meeting Highlights Cross-
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characterized, and may focus on issue-specific guidance, such as the 
treatment of currency exchange, distribution subsidiaries, and location 
• 237 
savmgs. 
The lengthy period between drafting and releasing a notice is 
understandable from the perspective of an administrative agency. 
Releases outlining the Service's approach to a problem cannot be 
quickly drafted and published; they must be evaluated for their overall 
conformity with the system. That administrative delay merely enhances 
the appeal of disclosure of redacted AP As--once the AP A is finalized 
for the taxpayer, the only additional step necessary for disclosure is to 
redact the appropriate information. Although there may be some delay 
due to debates over what is and is not redacted, one anticipates this 
process could be handled more expeditiously than release of a notice. In 
addition, to the extent the APA program is part of an evolving process, 
the notices may be significantly outdated by the time they are issued.238 
The second argument that disclosure in the APA program cannot be 
the same as disclosure usually made for ex ante government interactions 
is premised on the "source" of the program's success-its flexibility, its 
ability to take a very contextual look at transfer pricing. The contribution 
and value of this type of case-by-case development in transfer pricing 
presupposes the flexibility to tinker with the system in each new case. If 
disclosure were expected to reduce the APA office's sense of flexibility 
and creativity in approaching transfer pricing, it would detract from this 
major benefit of the program. But what is the current source of 
flexibility and why would it be diminished through disclosure? 
Border Corporate Reshufflings, Tax Treaties, APAs, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 776, 780 (1994) 
(then-APA Director Robert Ackerman reporting that the Service was "working with several 
taxpayers' groups to identify the appropriate industry to develop a generic industry-wide APA 
approach."). For a variety of reasons, including cost and collective action problems, the 
pressure for that has declined. Similarly, the APA office has concluded that global trading and 
financial instruments aside, which it views as a unique circumstance, the situations of industry 
members are too varied to make that kind of guidance useful. See Shaughnessy, supra note 
136, at 406 (then-APA Director Michael Durst stating that "[w]ithin an industry, every 
company's situation differs and there would be no way of doing an industry-wide APA," but 
suggesting they would try more guidance like Notice 94-40). Instead, the APA office expects 
that developing treatments of recurring issues like currency exchange and distribution 
subsidiaries would provide more informative guidance. See id. 
237. See generally Stratton, supra note 58, at 138-40 (noting shift away from industry 
guidance to issue-specific guidance). 
238. This observation would not necessarily imply that APAs themselves are out of date. 
The typical term is about three years, whereas it may take a while to feel enough perspective 
has been gathered to release a notice. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 5.09(1) 
(suggesting sample term of three years). Thus, APAs can be incrementally improved, but a 
Notice may be a less flexible format. 
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The flexibility itself may derive from several sources: (1) given 
bilateral APAs are predominant, most APA negotiations are done under 
the umbrella of treaties and the broad discretion they grant the 
competent authorities to resolve issues of double taxation, (2) the 
continued availability under the new transfer pricing regulations of 
unspecified methods,239 and (3) the effect of secrecy in limiting a 
taxpayer's ability to rely on prior APA terms to claim the same 
treatment. As to the first two points, their impact in promoting a flexible 
approach would continue unchanged if APAs were disclosed. As to the 
last point, one might argue that evolving flexibility is legally 
permissible, and thus, if the APA office wants to change course it should 
not be reluctant to say that we have changed our prior approach because 
of an improved understanding in this area. 
The concern here about disclosure, however, may reflect a more 
sensitive and realistic assessment about the crystallizing effect of 
disclosure despite the propriety of the Service's affirmative use of the 
process as a creative laboratory; there is an inherent implausibility of 
continued flexibility in a public forum. Also, foreign governments may 
be hesitant to place themselves in the position of confronting taxpayers 
who treat redacted APAs as virtually binding authority, rather than as 
simply offering insight with no precedential value. This concern might 
be satisfied by not specifying the foreign country in a reacted AP A. 
The third argument against even redacted disclosure is the 
possibility that many taxpayers would not pursue an APA under such 
terms, and without adequate volume the broader benefits of the program 
would be limited.240 This contention is unprovable until tried. Of course, 
many taxpayers who have already completed the process would, if 
asked, most likely indicate disclosure would have been a serious factor 
weighing heavily, if not dispositively, against an APA. Even taxpayers 
seriously considering an APA might express such views if they expect 
the benefits of secrecy for their future APA to be greater than the present 
benefits of additional data on the APA program. However, taxpayers 
who are much less certain of seeking an APA, or who perhaps have 
239. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(a), (d) (outlining use of methods not otherwise 
specified in the regulations to evaluate arm's length pricing in the transfer of an intangible). 
240. See generally Stratton, supra note 58, at 138-40 (quoting various former IRS 
officials regarding the role of nondisclosure in trying to attract participants to the new 
program and the view that even now a policy of redacted disclosure would make a difference 
to taxpayers at the margin and might counsel against an APA); see, e.g., Practitioners Say 
More Countries Will Enter into APAs in Future, 1996 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 171, at G-
5 (Sept. 4, 1996) (identifying potential disclosure of sensitive information and trade secrets as 
a serious concern for Chrysler Corporation in considering an APA, especially in an industry 
where there are only three big U.S. automakers). 
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decided against it, would seem to have much more to gain from 
disclosure. In terms of taxpayer reaction to disclosure, early applicants 
may have been particularly concerned about disclosure in an otherwise 
new and untested program.241 Now taxpayers may be more relaxed in this 
mature, although evolving, program. Also, the implementation of the 
documentation requirements and penalty rules have added an additional 
boost to the appeal of the APA program guaranteeing a stream of 
. . 242 partIcIpants. 
A final argument that seeks to minimize the call for disclosure in 
APAs contends that anyone worried about "private" or "secret" law in 
the APA context should be worried about it more extensively (i.e., in 
examination and appeals, where resolutions are not made public).243 
Certainly the risk has always existed that taxpayers are not receiving 
"similar" treatment in audit or appeals (i.e., the Service could be 
"playing favorites,,).244 However, this risk in the APA context differs 
because the taxpayer-Service interaction occurs ex ante and the 
relationship lacks the same negotiation and risk assessment evident at 
other stages. The APA provides the taxpayer participant not just with 
"special treatment," but "special treatment" that is guaranteed before the 
taxpayer takes the risk of engaging in the transaction. 
3. Assessment of APA Disclosure 
Disclosure policy in the AP A program forms a direct link between 
the impact of the program on participants and nonparticipants. 
Depending on the policy adopted, the effectiveness of the program 
shifts: the more limited the disclosure, the more attractive the program is 
for participants, and thus, the more likely it is to be a successful 
alternative for such participants. Limited disclosure, however, poses 
risks for nonparticipants in terms of their ability to evaluate the equality 
of rules imposed and the comparability of results achieved through the 
APA and non-APA processes. It poses risks more universally in terms of 
the limited scrutiny afforded transfer pricing treatment and 
developments. Because the APA program must be understood as an 
alternative procedure that is part of a larger interconnected tax system, 
241. See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 58, at 138-39 (former Associate Chief Counsel 
International Robert Culbertson stating that one reason for the confidentiality aspect of the 
APA program derived from the Service's desire to encourage taxpayer participation in a new 
program that required such participation to provide sensitive business information to the 
government). 
242. See supra note 116. 
243. See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 58, at 138 (citing former Associate Chief Counsel 
International Robert Culbertson's view that any such fears should not be limited to APAs). 
244. See id. at 139. 
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the impacts on both participants and nonparticipants are critical. The 
question then is how to strike that balance. 
Rules, modifications, and developments made available to a 
taxpayer before entering into a transaction should be available widely, 
and the best way is to disclose the treatment. Taxpayers will then face 
comparable tax risk going into their transactions. The APA interaction is 
before the taxpayer's transaction and therefore changes the taxpayer's 
risk. As a result, the AP A's terms should be disclosed unless the ex post 
elements of the program raise serious opposing concerns. 
Attention to the ex post features of the APA program could suggest 
that the price of disclosure is too high because it inevitably would 
require disclosure of contemporaneous taxpayer information. Such 
disclosure would put the taxpayer at a disadvantage with respect to its 
competitors. This ground, with its implicit balancing or cost-benefit 
approach, cannot stand separately from a specification of the particular 
form of disclosure made. At the extreme, disclosure of a very heavily 
redacted APA (with exclusion of the identity of the foreign country) 
should be possible to protect trade secrets, financial data, and market 
strategies of the APA participant. The real concern, therefore, must 
reside in the expectation that "completely Swiss cheese" redacted APAs 
would offer so little guidance that public demand for information would 
ultimately lead to disclosure of APAs according to less stringent 
redaction standards. This conflict is not usually faced in the traditional 
ex ante function of developing rules because no individual taxpayer's 
facts are used to define the rule. 245 Except for the interbranch and global 
trading APAs, the specification and elaboration of the method may be 
intimately connected to the APA participants' facts, transactions, and 
data. Arguably, trying to express these applications of transfer pricing 
divorced from their factual context may be difficult. 
Although there is little disagreement as to the basic contention that 
rules proffered ex ante (i.e., before the transactions are done) should be 
publicly available, the real issue is the implementation of this in a hybrid 
procedure like the AP A. Satisfactory resolution of this balancing 
question has been impeded by (1) the absence of even heavily redacted 
disclosures, (2) the absence of substantial other guidance (e.g., notices 
on industries, issues, or methodological points), and (3) the one 
sidedness of information (i.e. those advocating disclosure generally lack 
245. Although letter rulings are issued based on a particular set of facts provided, the 
requirement that the legal question be relatively clear on the facts means that the precise 
details and contours of the facts are not that critical. Thus, a highly factual and contextual 
legal question like transfer pricing is not considered appropriate for a letter ruling. See supra 
text accompanying notes 56-58. 
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exposure to a significant number of AP As, and are asked to accept the 
conclusion that it is impossible in most cases to reduce APAs to 
meaningful, yet data protective, documents). Based on the 
considerations outlined, disclosure of redacted APAs seems required. To 
the extent their "Swiss cheese" nature would render them less than 
illuminating, the Service could complement their content with more 
explanatory general guidance. 
What then should be made of the current situation in which 
Congress has implicitly approved the APA program for the present, but 
has statutorily preempted any effort by the Service to disclose 
individual, redacted APAs? The legislation limiting disclosure and 
calling for annual APA program reports resulted from taxpayer fears of 
the release of redacted APAs. Thus, one anticipates that these reports 
will constitute less complete disclosure than would have been available 
under the Service's disclosure plan. Such a conclusion, however, is not 
inevitable. Congress specifically detailed the information required in the 
annual reports, including APA statistics; general descriptions of 
businesses, transactions, and functions covered by APAs; methodologies 
used to evaluate transactions; critical assumptions made; sources of 
comparables used; and nature of adjustments made to comparables.246 
Depending on the level of information provided, such aggregate data 
could offer more concrete guidance regarding appropriate transfer 
pricing analysis than heavily redacted APAs. Although the fact that APA 
participants prefer reports over redacted APAs suggests the reports will 
be weaker, a true comparison of information released would require 
seeing sample redacted AP As. 
In this disclosure discussion, however, an underlying tension must 
be confronted in order to evaluate the realistic prospects of a disclosure 
plan. A tension exists between the explanation for why transfer pricing is 
difficult and the explanation for why disclosure is useful and plausible. 
On the one hand, the claim is that transfer pricing is fact intensive and 
not susceptible to quick and easy rules. On the other hand, some kind of 
disclosure is sought as a mechanism for providing guidance to taxpayers 
generally. If it is hard to resolve transfer pricing cases in a rule oriented 
fashion, how can any useful, aggregate information emerge from APAs? 
There are two facets to this problem. First, is it possible to have sensible, 
predictable, coherent rule making here--can APAs be more than ad hoc 
bargains? The answer should be yes, on a relative scale. That is, 
although the importance of facts may make complete uniformity of 
246. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
170, § 521 (b )(2), 113 Stat. 1860 (1999). 
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outcomes difficult (one can think of other areas where this arises, such 
as questions of whether a payment is a gift, or whether a security is debt 
or equity), it should be possible to help clarify relevant factors and 
approaches. In theory, the Service could issue such guidance in the 
absence of the APA program. One reason this may not have occurred is 
the Service's need and desire to obtain a more comprehensive picture of 
particular transfer pricing scenarios and issues first. A format that entices 
taxpayers to be forthcoming with information is most useful in that 
capacity. Another reason such non-APA guidance may not have been 
prepared is that any unilateral issuances not developed in conjunction 
with other countries would be of limited value. They would not reflect 
the other country (or countries) involved and might not even represent 
the Service's final position that would emerge from ultimate dealings 
with the foreign country. 
Second, on a more practical level, what APA "answers" will we see 
following the implementation of the required APA reporting? The 
Service, though desirous of providing guidance to improve transfer 
pricing compliance, also wants the opportunity to develop this area 
without being held too strictly to errors or changed judgments. 
Even with Congress taking the decisive step to permit only APA 
program reporting, other countries participating in the APA program 
may resist. 247 These countries could bar disclosure of information either 
under their treaties with the United States, or as a condition to their 
participation in the program. 248 The United States could, of course, 
complete bilateral APAs only with countries willing to permit 
disclosure, but this route could produce limited participation levels. In 
essence, the success of the APA program relies on participation for two 
reasons. First, the program is most beneficial when all of the relevant 
countries to a transaction are involved. As discussed earlier, although 
unilateral APAs are occasionally appropriate, bilateral APAs are usually 
the most valuable. Second, a major advantage of the APA program is the 
expanding knowledge and experience base it offers the Service. This 
requires a large pool of APAs, and anything that limits the number of 
participating countries would inevitably limit the number of APAs. 
247. See generally Private Law, supra note 227. Confidentiality may also be critical to 
other countries who have legitimate concerns to protect their interest. 
248. See, e.g., "President Signs Law Clarifying APA Confidentiality Policy, Mandating 
Study," 8 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 710, 710 (Dec. 22, 1999) ("For the future, 
taxpayers and treaty partners will determine before an APA is completed which portions of it 
they wish to redact .... [flor example, if a treaty partner were to insist that no information on 
transfer pricing methodology be revealed, the Service would not include that information in 
its report. "). 
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Alternatively, if the United States were unwilling to limit the 
participating countries to those accepting disclosure, it instead could 
have viewed the program as purely an interim function and, for the 
limited window of its operation, continued to tolerate the tension created 
by nondisclosure. By not taking this path (and by announcing its 
intention to disclose), the Service may have been indicating its view that 
the APA program should serve as more than a short term institution, and 
its belief that other countries can be persuaded that such disclosure 
policies are sensible. The United States has been successful in shaping 
and influencing the views of other taxing jurisdictions on a variety of 
issues. If disclosure is an important part of a well functioning APA 
program, the Service may be willing to promote that position. The recent 
Congressional action in this area, however, renders such advocacy futile 
for the present. 
The question remains whether disclosure through annual reports 
could be a sufficient remedy for the problems outlined above in subparts 
A and B. Three major concerns continue:(1) inadequate disclosure; (2) 
failure to change Service beh:lVior (i.e. a "so-what" response to 
discrepancies); (3) a more subtle difficulty in persuading the Service that 
there is a difference between the reports and the particular taxpayer's 
treatment (for example, some of the same factors that made transfer 
pricing a challenging issue could make it hard for taxpayers to convince 
the agent (audit level) that a particular treatment outlined in the APA 
report should be "applied" to their situation). The original problems with 
transfer pricing may be serious enough to encourage acceptance of a less 
than perfect procedural option. In addition, other observations may 
mitigate worry over reliance on disclosure. First, as discussed above, 
disclosure is not an on/off switch, but a spectrum. It may be possible to 
tinker with the form and content of the reports to improve their 
usefulness. Second, two "back-stop" options exist, one for participating 
taxpayers, one for nonparticipants. If the Service behaves unreasonably 
aggressively in the APA process, taxpayers need not participate. 
Alternatively, if the Service's APA positions are "too" easy relative to 
usual audit treatment, the Service will be inundated with participants 
(although it is not clear what the "right" number of participants should 
be). Taxpayers not participating can tum, as a last resort, to the courts to 
challenge the Service's more stringent audit positions. Third, 
Congressional oversight looms large for the Service. The tax system has 
been the focus of recent sweeping legislative inquiry and action to 
address inefficiencies and abuses.249 Such legislative involvement is a 
249. See supra note 3. 
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draconian, though powerful, constraint on general trends of abuse by the 
Service. Finally, we can push for more explicit guidance for audit and 
appeals from the APA process beyond the reports (for example more 
notices, rulings, and regulations). 
Ultimately, one intangible effect of the nondisclosure position will 
continue to haunt the program. Even if the APA annual reports prove 
robust, the literal fact of secrecy regarding actual negotiated agreements 
helps harbor doubts about equal and consistent treatment in the program. 
Regardless of the true facts, the lack of transparency can undermine any 
program's claim to legitimacy. For the moment, Congress has made the 
assessment that this balance of disclosure and secrecy represents an 
appropriate trade off. Whether the choice withstands the pressure for 
information will depend in large part on the quality of the reports. 
D. Assessment of APA Program's Impact on Nonparticipants 
The focus in Part IV has been on the collateral effects of the APA 
program: (l) whether there are inappropriate participation differences 
that create advantages for some taxpayers, and (2) whether APA results 
that differ from audit and appeals demonstrate an inappropriate 
advantage to APA participants. The analysis turned in part on the ex 
ante/ex post distinction and the role of the particular government body 
involved. What constitutes acceptable participation or comparable 
results depends on the point in the tax system under consideration.250 
Ultimately, the conclusions for both questions were linked by the role of 
disclosure. Although access and participation in the APA program is 
relatively open and improving with the efforts to draw in smaller 
taxpayers, "participation" in the new rules is weak because of disclosure. 
Similarly, despite some valid explanations for differing results, the 
concern remains that something like the special treatment of interbranch 
transactions exists251-different rules available up-front for APA 
participants. Better reporting may alleviate this continuing suspicion as 
well as facilitate the dissemination of emerging (though not binding) 
views. 
250. As to the question of the scope of "participation" in the process, one could counter 
that cases pronounce rules, and that only the immediate taxpayer can participate. Although 
this description is accurate, the full comparison is not. The ex ante/ex post emphasis on a level 
playing field is still maintained. Everyone engaging in the transaction before the court 
decision faced the same rule (and its same potential for varied interpretation). After the 
decision, all new transactions are subject to the new rule. Thus, although direct participation 
in the establishment of the rule is not universally open (in part because that is an adjudicatory 
procedure, not an administrative one), the goal of equal risk is preserved. 
251. But without the treaty based justification for difference. See supra text 
accompanying notes 158-159. 
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This examination of the troubling features of the AP A program 
commenced by delving deeply into APA process and its relation to the 
tax system. Assessment of the program's usefulness necessitated such a 
specific inquiry. However, this undertaking is more than a case study in 
taxation. Both the problems that prompted the creation of the AP A 
program and those raised by its implementation tell a story about 
administrative regulation that transcends tax, and speaks to universal 
issues in administrative law. Fundamental conflict exists between the 
traditional framework of administrative law (a structure based on 
rulemaking and adjudication) and the demand for creative solutions to 
problems experienced in many regulatory fields. The establishment of 
new rules through an adjudicatory process is usually acceptable if 
transformed into precedent in accordance with the rulemaking and 
adjudication pattern. However, the APA program's decisionmaking does 
not produce precedent in the classic adjudication model, nor does it 
conform to the model of classic rulemaking. The APA program's 
"hybrid" nature, its very departure from the traditional models so critical 
to its success outlined in Part III, helps explain the problems identified in 
Part IV. They are the obvious result of a clash between the value of an 
administrative system which declares its rules up-front and the value of a 
flexible administrative process that permits learning, experimentation, 
and testing. 
Procedural innovation in tax is not ,the only example of conflict-
similar creative, flexible developments in the environmental area pose 
comparable problems.· For example, Project XL implemented by the 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") allows a company to 
negotiate a comprehensive permit (possibly making tradeoffs among 
various emissions). The permit program focuses on providing extensive 
information to the government, predicting results, testing the actual 
conditions, and then updating terms based on the new information.252 
Flexibility in this individualized process is expected to generate creative, 
superior solutions. Although the format of Project XL includes a broader 
range of participants than the APA program, including community 
groups, their impact on the process and results has been questioned.253 
Another EPA program, the "Brownfields Economic Redevelopment 
Initiative" allows the "prospective purchaser of contaminated property" 
to reduce its liability if it pursues voluntary, satisfactory cleanup, the 
extent of which can be negotiated.254 
252. See Freeman, supra note I, at 55-56. 
253. See id. at 56. 
254. See Breger, supra note I, at 333-34. 
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In the language and discourse of administrative law, the dangers 
posed by such flexible administrative processes are captured under the 
rubric of accountability for administrative agencies-controlling 
discretion.255 Accountability and discretion issues lie at the heart of the 
APA disclosure debate. They also play a prominent role in critiques of 
the EPA initiatives.256 Various forces, including regulatory capture, can 
lead agencies astray in exercising their discretion, especially if agencies 
and regulated industries are negotiating alone.257 Not only does 
disclosure constrain discretion and limit regulatory capture, but in the 
APA setting, foreign countries perform this function as well through the 
exercise of their often powerful self interests. 
Flexibility in an administrative regime can be messy, as 
demonstrated by the APA program. However, we may better understand 
and improve such innovations through a detailed knowledge of their 
operation and an appreciation of the connection of their problems to the 
larger themes, goals, and tensions in administrative law. The effort to 
facilitate flexible regulatory process makes sense, especially in an 
international context where the global implications are substantial and 
the likelihood of conflict is high. 
V. THE APA PROGRAM AS A CASE STUDY FOR 
ADMINISTRA TIVE LAW THEORY 
At the outset, this paper made the claim that a case study of the APA 
program was not only critical in evaluating the innovation's role in the 
tax system but also could enhance the dialogue and debate surrounding 
administrative law. There are two levels on which analysis of the APA 
program may be beneficial: (1) on a broad theoretical level the APA 
program can illuminate the usefulness of the overlapping and competing 
theories of the administrative system by testing each against the 
experience of the program, and (2) on a more functional level, the APA 
program's creative origins and its current operation offer guidance on 
the programmatic benefits of various types of flexibility In 
255. See Freeman, supra note I, at 82. 
256. See, e.g., Breger, supra note I, at 335 ("Making regulatory agreements more 
'individualized', however, makes it less likely that consistency will be achieved and general 
standards followed"). 
257. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note I, at 81 (noting that a "collaborative model that 
includes only agencies and industry" would likely draw the attentions of regulatory capture 
fears); see, e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and 
Empowerment, 16 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 435, 438 (1991) (discussing factors producing agency 
capture). 
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administrative systems generally. Thus, this Part divides the 
administrative inquiry into two directions. The first focuses on three 
basic theoretical frameworks used to analyze administrative systems and 
their functioning (public choice, neopluralism, and public interest). The 
validity and applicability of one theory over the others would be 
important in contemplating reform. However, failing the ability to 
identify a dominant theory, we may nonetheless discern conditions 
under which a given theory is more or less relevant. Regardless, these 
often abstractly considered theories require real world testing. 
The second direction examines administrative theories (civic 
republicanism and collaborative governance) whose vIsion of 
administrative process centers more explicitly on facilitating reform and 
innovation through redefining relationships. Even if the normative 
aspects of these approaches, in particular their rejection of interest group 
representation as a pivotal feature of administrative law is overstated, the 
value of emphasizing new ways to structure administrative relations 
remams. 
Making the leap from a discussion of the AP A program anchored in 
the tax literature to one linked to administrative law debates is more 
feasible than might be thought initially. While administrative law 
discussions typically do not focus on tax examples, and tax analyses 
typically are not undertaken against an administrative law backdrop, the 
questions about the APA program pursued in this paper parallel 
questions posed generally in thinking about the administrative system. 
The major issues include how to understand the dynamics and effects of 
an existing process and how to think about change and innovation. 
Although this section will not purport to offer a comprehensive analysis 
of the intersection of the APA case study 'with administrative law theory, 
it is appropriate and useful here to try to sketch those connections in 
some detail. 
A. Forumfor Testing Administrative Law Theories 
The first step in using the APA program as a testing ground for 
administrative law is to outline the current picture of the theories in 
question. Obviously such a description is a shorthand and not inclusive 
of the numerous variations of the different models. Moreover, the goal is 
not to demonstrate the complete relevance or irrelevance of a given 
theory, but rather to use a case study to advance understanding in at least 
two ways: (1) by revealing the complexity of administrative law analysis 
within a single example; and (2) by indicating directions for the 
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expansion and development of the theories.258 Three general theories of 
regulation and the administrative state can be identified: (1) public 
choice, (2) neopluralist, and (3) public interest. These theories share a 
common foundation in their view of the function and significance of 
interest group behavior. 
The first theory, public choice, begins with the understanding that 
administrative law and regulation are justified in part on the ground that 
such efforts respond to the "market failure" in providing necessary rules 
or outcomes in the absence of the administrative state. 259 The theory then 
concludes that the administrative state generally is unsuccessful at 
repairing this market failure and instead is providing regulatory benefits 
to well-organized political interest groups which benefit at the expense 
of the general pUblic.260 The second theory, the neopluralist, is similar to 
public choice in that it also places organized interest groups at the center 
of the regulatory process. Neopluralism notes the dominant role that 
interest groups play in setting regulatory standards but concludes that 
their competition produces results very roughly reflecting the general 
public interest as a whole.261 This competition oriented picture takes the 
process and the results to be less imbalanced than the public choice 
theory and thus is less critical of the regulatory system.262 
258. In providing this overview, the paper relies in part on the recent work of Steven 
Croley which seeks to take a more global and comprehensive look at the range of theories and 
their relationship to each other and to the administrative process. See Croley, supra note I; see 
also Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the 
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 168-69 (1990) (outlining the 
classical public interest theories and the opposing theories premised on special interests and 
regulatory capture). 
259. See generally Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974) (describing a "public interest" theory as adopting the view 
that regulation is supplied in response to public demand to correct market failures); Sam 
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212 (1976) 
(under certain models "the existence of market failure is sufficient to generate a demand for 
regulation"). To the extent the theory is normative in terms of justifying the creation of the 
regulatory state as opposed to positive in highlighting how such a state operates, it has less 
direct relevance to distributive and redistributive regimes such as social security and taxation. 
See Croley, supra note I, at 4 n.7. 
260. See Croley, supra note I, at 5; see generally, William C. Mitchell & Michael C. 
Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
512,517 (1991); Peltzman, supra note 259, at 212-13. But see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & 
Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 895-900 (1987) 
(reviewing empirical studies and suggesting the evidence reflects shortcomings in the public 
choice approach). 
261. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for 
Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371, 384 (1983) (suggesting that "political policies that 
raise efficiency are more likely to be adopted than policies that lower efficiency"). 
262. Croley, supra note I, at 5, 59; see also Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and 
Public Deliberation: An Interpretative Essay, 94 YALE L. J. 1617, 1619-20 (1985) 
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The third theory, public interest, is also more open to a potentially 
positive regulatory role and process. However, this theory adopts public 
choice's critical view of interest groups, and holds that only full 
disclosure of the administrative process to general public scrutiny and 
monitoring saves an administrative regime from capture by such 
groups.263 Where particular processes afford the public this critical 
scrutiny of regulatory decision making, the theory contends that results 
tend to reflect the general public interest.264 In contrast, where the 
process fails to provide such scrutiny and the decision makers operate 
without public oversight, results tend to benefit well-organized interest 
groups at the expense of the public. 
Each of these theories contains both positive and normative 
elements, and it is not completely clear to what degree the theories are 
contradictory, compatible, or complementary. One of the claims of 
recent scholarship is that the administrative law debate can be advanced 
by grounding these theories in the details of specific administrative 
processes.265 It is in this capacity that the analysis of the APA program 
and its operation may be valuable. 
One caveat, however, must be noted. Although all regulation moves 
through administrative regimes and thus theoretical discussions have 
wide application, important distinctions exist. Social regulation in areas 
such as environment, food safety, and occupational safety differ from 
regulation in taxation and social security. The former represent acts of 
government intervention into conduct otherwise undertaken by the 
market. The government justifies its intervention on the grounds of 
market failure. 266 In contrast, redistributive regimes such as taxation and 
social security, do not redress market failure but instead serve a function 
entirely separate from the market. Thus, to the extent theoretical 
discussions focus on normative justifications for the creation of 
particular administrative regimes, universal answers do not exist. Social 
regulation and redistributive regimes rely on different foundations. 
(explaining that this focus on interest group competition envisioned the public administrator's 
role as to "accommodate ... the varying demands ... of competing groups" and that'''public 
interest''' was understood as an "aggregation and reconciliation of these claims [and that] the 
administrator succeeded to the extent that he was able to placate the competing groups"); 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669,1723-48 (1975). 
263. See Croley, supra note I, at 5; see also Levine & Forrence, supra note 258, at 174, 
184, 192-93 (outlining theory that the degree of "slack" (i.e. lack of public scrutiny) a 
regulator experiences on a given issue impacts the degree to which the regulator will pursue 
interest group or ideological results instead of general interest results). 
264. See generally Croley, supra note I, at 68. 
265. Jd. at 7. 
266. See supra note 259. 
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However, to the extent the administrative theories seek to probe what 
happens in a regulatory regime, both redistributive and social regulation 
regimes share some common analyses. Understanding the various ways 
in which power, structure and process interact in a regulatory setting has 
universal salience. The similar problems experienced implementing 
environmental and transfer pricing regulation attest to the potential value 
of shared learning among regimes that differ in other respects. 
In considering whether the AP A program in particular can provide 
any support for one of these theories, it is important to consider all three 
facets of the APA: namely its creation, its modification, and its 
operation. The creation of the APA program provides little direct 
support for any of the three theories. The program was initiated at the 
prompting of the Service itself in response to what it, and many 
taxpayers, perceived to be serious problems with the operation of the 
transfer pricing tax rules. However, even more significant than the fact 
that the Service initiated the program is the fact that the general response 
of the intended audience-multinational corporations with significant 
cross border related party transactions-was not warm. It seems 
unlikely, therefore, that the program was the result of pressure from a 
narrow interest group of taxpayers as would be predicted by the public 
choice theory or from a competition among well-organized interest 
groups as predicted by the neopluralist theory. Certainly, of course, a 
few taxpayers were interested in APAs. Shortly after the program was 
formally introduced the Service announced the first completed APAs, 
which obviously had been underway prior to the formal announcement. 
Nonetheless, the overall factual picture of the development of the 
program does not really support a strong claim that one or more narrow 
interest groups were the primary actors behind the program. Nor is it 
clear that its creation reflects the triumph of narrow interests over the 
general public interest. To the extent that a significant motivation for 
and potential outcome of the program is the alleviation of administrative 
burden and the improvement of transfer pricing regulations, the benefit 
is both a specific one for taxpayers facing transfer pricing issues, and a 
general one for the public in terms of improved tax administration. Of 
course the degree of disclosure poses some difficult questions that are 
considered below in evaluating the APA program's operation. 
The creation of the program also fails to provide much evidence that 
the public interest theory was at work here. The APA program was 
presented in 1991 as a complete, new program. The general public, even 
through their congressional representatives, had little oversight of the 
creation process. Despite the fact that the creation of the APA program 
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lends little direct support to any particular administrative theory, the 
subsequent modifications present a slightly different picture. 
Two notable changes to the program, the restructuring of the role of 
foreign governments267 and the introduction of a special APA route for 
small businesses, were both responses to concerns raised by particular 
"interest groups." In the case of foreign countries' place in the APA 
process, the Service found that under the 1991 structure, other nations 
considered their role in the development of the taxpayer's transfer 
pricing treatment inadequate.268 Given the critical position of foreign 
nations in preventing the double taxation that the AP A was designed in 
part to eliminate, they served as a significant "interest group" whose 
needs had to be accommodated.269 Thus, it is not surprising that the 
Service reevaluated the foreign countries' role and ultimately revised the 
program-to the initial dissatisfaction of at least some taxpayers.270 
On one level this modification seems to support an administrative 
theory along the lines of public choice, with the foreign countries 
emerging as the successful interest group. This picture, however, is 
complicated by the fact that this "interest group" is another foreign 
government acting in essentially the same regulatory capacity as the 
Service. Considered in that light, a characterization of the foreign 
government as an "interest group" may be misleading. Although there is 
no one valid interpretation of public choice theory and its view of 
interest group competition, the simple case presumably envisions a 
single government/regulatory body responding to various interest groups 
formed from the general public, all portions of which are bound by the 
final decisions stemming from the regulatory process. A foreign 
government with an equal claim to the same regulatory authority does 
not operate as a traditional interest group in that context. It does not even 
have the same relationship as a state level agency in a federal system, or 
even as another federal agency with an interest in the topic. The tax 
bodies of other countries are in precisely the same position vis a vis 
transfer pricing as the Service without any ultimate supranational 
authority. Moreover, transfer pricing decisions of one country directly 
impact those of another. The result is the intersection of two 
independent, although connected, regimes. This relationship cannot be 
examined exclusively within the context of traditional administrative law 
267. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
268. Id. 
269. The Service's preference for bilateral and multilateral APAs over unilateral APAs, 
(the former typically offer much more predictability and dispute reduction) is easy to 
understand. However, it necessarily depends on the cooperation of foreign sovereigns. 
270. See supra note 86. 
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concepts. Thus, it may make sense to seriously explore the applicability 
of international relations theory in evaluating that dynamic. What this 
example does clarify is that administrative law theories, as difficult as 
they may be to work with in the domestic context, become more 
complicated with the inclusion of other governments and their parallel 
regulatory bodies.271 
Regarding the other significant modification of the APA program, 
the creation of a small business track, more than one administrative 
theory seems relevant although none exclusively so. Viewed as a 
response to demands from smaller international businesses that the AP A 
program be more accessible to smaller taxpayers, the modification may 
seem an example of public choice theory (or perhaps neopluralist 
theory). However, it may not be accurate to consider the creation of the 
smaller business track to be a concession counter to the general public's 
interest, nor a change taking place outside the public's attention. 
Thinking in terms of the public interest theory, it is relevant to note that 
the Service continually publicized its desire and intent to provide an 
APA format more suitable for smaller businesses. The prospect of this 
particular modification seemed to raise no general or interest group 
specific complaint. Rather, it aligned with a fundamental view that if the 
APA program exists it should be accessible to the full range of relevant 
taxpayers. 
As noted earlier, this section seeks to measure the three general 
theories of administration and the regulatory state against the experience 
of the APA program. The first part of this assessment looked at the 
creation and modification of the program. This second part now reviews 
the implementation of the program. It is here that fuller clues exist 
regarding the aptness of various administrative theories in this context. 
The individualized nature of the AP A process and the refusal to consider 
disclosure until the Service's short-lived announcement suggest that 
"good" would fail to result from the clash of interest groups because 
each party who wants to "play" (i.e., negotiate transfer pricing 
individually with the Service) could engage the government in relative 
privacy.272 The APA regime makes it difficult, if not impossible, for 
competing groups or the public to monitor or challenge the resulting tax 
treatments and policies. Thus, if one takes the baseline behavior shared 
271. As is often the case for international issues, parallels to state-federal relations in the 
United States may prove useful, although the absence of the federal structure internationally 
means countries' relationships to each other do not completely match state-state and state-
federal relations in the United States. 
272. Unless the foreign government is counted as a competing interest group, which as 
suggested above, does not aptly describe the role of other governments in the process. 
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by the neopluralist and public choice views, one might see the 
handiwork of public choice and its· dismal portent, as the eventual 
prospect of the AP A program. 
Certain additional observations about the program, however, might 
nullify this prediction. The degree of resistance to the APA program 
exhibited by taxpayers suggests that the corporations did not see 
themselves as predominantly in a position vis-a-vis the Service to 
compete or pressure for desired tax treatment. Rather, the paramount 
taxpayer concerns regarding the provision of detailed information to the 
Service suggest they saw a different relationship. Of course, some 
taxpayers did go forward with the process, but those decisions seem 
sufficiently explained by their particular risks of possible bad audits, 
current bad audits, or high transaction costs. Even assuming this 
description of taxpayers' understanding of their relationship with the 
government prior to starting the APA process is accurate, it still remains 
plausible that once engaged in the process, the factors of 
individualization and nondisclosure (until now) enabled participants to 
pursue their agendas in a public choice-like arena. However, the more 
unique aspect of the APA regulatory environment as compared to typical 
"domestic" settings may impede a participating taxpayer's ability to 
fully achieve a public choice type result. The fact that most APAs are 
bilateral or multilateral (and the fact that there is some element of zero-
sum to the amount of tax collected by all countries regarding a cross 
border related party transaction) suggests that the taxpayer cannot easily 
pursue an aggressively self-interested path under the public choice 
theory because fiscal "sacrifices" by the Service could be eagerly 
scooped up by the other country or countries. This is not to suggest that 
some version of public choice behavior cannot occur, just that the 
taxpayer's maneuvering is more complicated in this multi-jurisdictional 
administrative setting. 
Moreover, even if a public choice type result might be foreseeable 
under the program as it has existed thus far, public interest theory may 
provide a more accurate view of the dynamic under AP A processes for 
the future. As noted above, the public interest view refines the other two 
theories by asserting the ameliorative effect of public monitoring. The 
theory anticipates that despite the activity of interest groups, when the 
public can monitor behavior it ensures that general good and not simply 
individual good is achieved. To the extent this monitoring mitigates the 
harsh view of the administrative process, its unavailability at all in the 
APA context until now, has meant that the level of public information on 
outcomes was limited (even if "public" here is taken to be the larger 
class of active multinational corporations, policy makers, academics, and 
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tax media) and may have provided opportunity for taxpayers to at least 
vie for a public choice result behind closed doors. However, the recent 
legislation barring disclosure but requiring annual reporting means there 
will be more information available than there has been, but perhaps less 
than it could be. . . 
As discussed earlier in Part IV, the real operational impact of the 
new reporting requirement turns on what is revealed. A very generalized 
report will leave nonparticipants still unclear on precisely what rules are 
being applied. Conversely, a rich report increases the awareness in the 
tax community of the standards to which transactions will be held but 
also risks the publication of information that might be identifiable by 
country or industry. This direction could push the APA process towards 
neopluralist or public interest models as parties other than the relevant 
taxpayer become part of the process. Although the "public's" interest in 
APA results may never be high, if the broader tax community including 
nonparticipating multinationals, other taxpayers, tax media, policy 
makers, and academics are able to examine the direction of the APA 
program, they may effectively monitor APA treatments, thus achieving 
some of the goals of the public interest model.273 
The first cut observations here support the idea that the 
particularized administrative setting plays a significant role in what 
theoretical view is most descriptive. Agencies and administrative 
processes are not monolithic; moreover the typical interactions among 
an agency, interest groups, and the public may vary-even within a 
given agency and process. It is possible that different issues and facets 
operate more or less under different theories. Perhaps the most 
interesting observation from the AP A program case study is that the 
move from a domestic administrative and regulatory setting to an 
international one involving multiple jurisdictions complicates the 
interpretation of the various parties' actions in very specific ways. The 
position of the foreign governments in the APA process makes it 
difficult to classify behavior and determine who is an interest group and 
who is the bureaucracy for purposes of administrative theories. 
273. This, in effect, provides an opportunity for the Neopluralism theory to apply, if 
other taxpayers can be considered "other" interest groups. However, the post hoc nature of the 
disclosure, and the indirect benefit to such groups, counsels against placing too much weight 
on such an analogy. It may be better to view other taxpayers, comprising the taxed community 
in general as well as others aware of the Service's actions and the impact on the public fisc, as 
providing the oversight needed for public interest theory to function properly. 
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B. Functional Aspect of APA Program Design Choices 
While it is possible to sift through the genesis and results of the 
APA process for evidence of one or another underlying causal theory 
governing administrative interactions, an alternative approach in 
administrative law eschews the search for an overarching principle and 
would instead examine the AP A experience for more practical 
information on administrative design. Instead of accepting the premises 
of private party-government interactions and the dominant role of 
interest group behavior and working from there, this alternative operates 
under the view that new frameworks and formats of administrative and 
regulatory action can produce different interactions. Thus, a substantial 
emphasis is placed on what might be done differently if agencies have an 
opportunity to consider creative, context-specific approaches. The 
starting point for this functional view is the possible relationship that an 
administrative regime may construct between and among the 
government, interest groups, and public. Change in this multifaceted 
relationship is sought through revised regulatory processes that 
encourage participation, problem solving, and agency flexibility in ways 
that permit agencies to establish systems best suited to the regulatory 
problem at hand. 
One version of this approach is "collaborative governance.,,274 This 
basic model has generated a variety of regulatory devices such as 
negotiated rulemaking and special EPA permitting practices.275 Very 
briefly summarized, the suggestion is that more joint, collaborative 
rulemaking processes may be advantageous because they (I) may 
produce novel and better solutions if the less adversarial atmosphere 
allows more information to be generated and debated, and (2) the mutual 
participation in a consensus building format may improve relations 
which in and of itself is valuable but also feeds back into other stages 
and aspects of the administrative process.276 
Another version is civic republicanism. Positing that regulatory 
decisions reflect broad judgments about how competing regulatory 
values should be balanced,277 the civic republican theory argues that the 
process of regulation serves as the occasion for collective discussion and 
deliberation about both the means and ends of the regulation at issue.278 
Such deliberation, properly structured, provides a further forum for 
274. See, Freeman, supra note 1. 
275. See supra text accompanying notes 252-254. 
276. See Freeman, supra note I, at 23-24. 
277. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 12 (1990); Croley, supra note 1, at 57-62. 
278. See Croley, supra note 1, at 5. 
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refining the requirements of the general public's interest. Reliance on 
deliberation by expert administrators replaces interest group competition 
as the key to legitimate rulemaking.279 Still other paradigms for 
rethinking administrative law have emerged in the environmental arena 
including "reflexive regulation," "cooperative implementation," and 
"interactive compliance.,,28o Regardless of their precise scope or 
formulation, these theories share a common focus on the value of 
cooperation in the regulatory process and the flexibility necessary to 
achieve it. 
To really facilitate successful collaborative governance of some 
type, an administrative system requires a certain flexibility and 
discretion to consider new structures and options and retain the 
possibility of rejecting plans that fail. The government agency functions 
as an active administrative player in terms of exploring, testing, and 
developing administrative options. The agency draws parties in by 
identifying how the process can benefit them, through "cost savings, 
reduced litigation, or improved relationships.,,281 
This ground level approach to administrative and regulatory theory, 
with its rousing call for creative administrative processes still recognizes 
the core concerns of accountability and measurement of success. A 
collaborative approach does not eschew mechanisms for accountability. 
Instead, it folds that necessary feature into the heart of the theory. 
Accountability becomes one' of the administrative features for which 
creativity is possible and a range of options and structures must be 
investigated. 
Measuring the success of a new design is a perennial problem both 
in terms of deciding what factors are relevant and how they can be 
measured in a useful way. To adequately assess an approach that 
emphasizes creative, contextual regulatory processes, case studies 
remain central. In this capacity the analysis of the APA program again 
may be helpful. The connection between the APA program and a more 
collaborative regulatory model is strong. The goals thought to be 
achieved by changing the system and presumably the parties' 
relationships are very much the ones underlying the APA program.282 As 
discussed in greater detail in Parts I and III, the transfer pricing system 
appeared in crisis because among other things, it was adversarial, was 
279. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 20. 
280. Breger, supra note 1, at 325 (briefly reviewing the new frameworks). 
281. Freeman, supra note 1, at 31-32. 
282. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 135-146. The APA program's change in 
the taxpayer-Service interaction was the result of flexibility to restructure and reorganize 
relationships in the administrative process. 
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unsuited to the highly factual content, elicited limited information, and 
failed to include all of the critical parties in the initial steps. The Service 
designed the AP A program with the expectation that it could provide an 
improved forum for examining' transfer pricing problems, designing 
appropriate tax treatments, and resolving disagreements. The inclusion 
of the foreign governments in the process was a novel but ultimately 
crucial choice in creating a process with a plausible chance for success. 
Accountability has proven the most contentious issue but is itself in the 
process of being modified, though the sufficiency of the solution awaits 
judgment. 
The specific criticisms targeted at the AP A program reveal the direct 
tension between a "collaborative" model and the traditional 
rulemaking/adjudication framework. In Parts III and IV, the tension was 
captured in the description of the APA program as a hybrid by virtue of 
its departure from a clear division between rulemaking and adjudication. 
The same clash exists at the theory level because the division of tasks 
and functions into the two categories conflicts with a call for flexibility 
and creativity that could muddle such delineated roles. However, the 
blurring of roles need not subvert an administrative process. For 
example, inclusion of a range of personnel at the one and only stage of 
the APA program does not inappropriately mix administrative roles. 
Instead, it encourages broader participation and creates an atmosphere of 
joint responsibility for solving problems. A collaborative approach may, 
through its departure from traditional patterns of interaction, solve 
problems without seriously undermining the integrity of the 
administrative process. The real value of some version of collaborative 
administrative theory is that it not only permits agencies the opportunity 
to design innovative process but in fact it places intelligent creativity at 
the forefront of regulatory policy. The decision to value the qualities of 
creativity, flexibility, and innovative structure by supporting a different 
vision of administrative relations may be most appropriate where certain 
conditions exist. In particular, the existence of features such as high 
information costs, fact intensive issues, large stakes, very interdependent 
decisions, and multiple regulating entities, may outweigh the possible 
risks. Certainly uncontrolled flexibility and administrative discretion are 
not a plausible solution to the current ills of the regulatory state. What 
can be stated with assurance is that refusal to seriously consider reform 
alternatives and failure to allow some experimentation guarantees little 
improvement will be made. 
Although the APA program cannot unequivocally demonstrate the 
success and correctness of an approach that emphasizes agency 
flexibility, creativity and collaboration in rulemaking, it offers a useful 
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example of how such changes can be made to an administrative process. 
Moreover, even if specific collaborative governance routes prove 
problematic, and more attention to interest group behavior is needed, 
some aspects of the program such as creative rulemaking nonetheless 
remain a valuable alternative for confronting regulatory problems. 
CONCLUSION 
SPECIFIC PROJECT 
Returning to the primary goal of this paper-evaluating a recent 
procedural innovation in terms of its impact on both participants and 
nonparticipants-certain conclusions can be drawn. The examination of 
the APA program reveals that this new hybrid, which was created in 
response to burdens facing the tax system from transfer pricing, has been 
reasonably successful in improving the administrability of transfer 
pricing for participants, although it has introduced some problems for 
nonparticipants. A continuing research agenda would next consider the 
broader institutional issues raised by the APA program including the 
allocation of government resources (time, money, expertise), change in 
taxpayer resources devoted to transfer pricing issues, and government 
revenues from the transactions under the new procedure.283 
If the program is to continue to operate in its current format, a 
serious question emerges as to whether the transfer pricing "solution" 
has come at too high a cost. The answer to the question turns on what 
government resources are expended for how many taxpayers and issues, 
and how easily the results are translated into "cheaper" assistance for 
multinational taxpayers generally. On the one hand, it is possible that 
annual APA program reports may sufficiently offset the allocation of 
resources to the program. On the other, it may be that (1) redacted APAs 
are a necessary minimum, or (2) translation of the many fact specific 
aspects of transfer pricing into formal guidance is too difficult. However, 
even if the more pessimistic picture prevails in the long term, the 
operation of the program in the interim period may nonetheless have 
been useful. The program has drawn other countries into a process for 
examining tax issues and cases which is different from those in place to 
date. If the APA program did not specifically continue as part of the 
administrative structure, its legacy of innovation and more intense, 
multi-governmental involvement III the regulatory/administrative 
process may continue in new forms. 
283. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 181. 
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Any analysis of innovations like the APA process will be informed 
by the positive and normative theories of administrative law. The goals 
for the tax system, the questions raised, and the interpretations drawn 
regarding the new procedure reflect one's underlying administrative law 
perspective. Nonetheless, the influence is not one way. Given the current 
debate over administrative law theories outlined at the beginning of the 
paper, detailed information about the dynamics and operation of 
procedures like the APA program should help expand analysis and 
understanding of the competing and overlapping theories. Case studies 
both influence and are influenced by these trends in legal theory. 
BROADER ADMINISTRATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
Regardless of the particular theory advocated, two aspects of the 
APA program stand out as significant for general administrative reform 
efforts: (1) government discretion/flexibility, and (2) role of multi 
jurisdictional interaction. The ability of the tax system to design and 
implement this responsive program required two kinds of government 
discretion. First, it required the flexibility to create a hybrid procedure 
tailored to the problems experienced. Second, it required flexibility 
within the innovation-that is, an innovation whose actual function and 
operation relied on a degree of government discretion and flexibility. 
This is not to suggest that unfettered discretion should be the new 
mantra.284 However, there is an advantage to discretion, especially where 
it is hard to continuously modify the rules to clearly capture cases and 
catch abuse. Such authority for the Service could be effective in cabining 
taxpayer abuse and simplifying the audit process by reducing formal 
bases for conflict. Even without pursuing such an extreme direction, 
seeing the AP A program in the context of a debate over the nature and 
degree of discretion permitted in the tax system can lead us to view the 
program as a way to grant discretion in a limited setting. Moreover, 
discretion implemented in a context like the APA program poses less 
affirmative danger to taxpayers because they can walk away from the 
forum. 
The other special feature of the program-the role of cross border 
interaction-may be most critical for the wider administrative law 
community. Although international tax policy is in part based on a 
284. Despite the current barrage of criticism regarding the Service, it is by many 
standards a fairly well-functioning administrative and collection system, partly for structural 
reasons like wage withholding that limit fraud potential, and partly because of the emphasis 
on rules and regulations as opposed to de facto broader discretion and negotiation that can be 
more predominant in other countries. 
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shared commitment by countries to avoid double taxation-and thus 
requires specific, focused interactions between governments-many 
other substantive administrative regimes presumably involve 
overlapping regulation with other countries. A procedure like the AP A 
program introduces the other government(s) to a tangible regulatory 
problem in a way that may substantially change the dynamics and 
results. Even if the future of the APA program is limited in some way, 
this feature of the program (the role of the foreign governments) already 
stands as a significant innovation. 
Developing structures to link the activities of the various national 
regulatory authorities is important in the current global regulatory 
environment, which has extensive multilateral interactions but no supra 
national authority. Existing international organizations (e.g., the OECD, 
European Union, PATA) offer one type of forum. However, the APA 
model's case-by-case prospective analysis requires focused attention on 
a particular problem. Thus, the AP A program puts a little more pressure 
on countries to accomplish results. At the same time, the APA 
interactions can be more principled substantively and potentially less 
confrontational than traditional ex post competent authority proceedings 
where focus on the legal issues can be shaded by the existence of a 
completed transaction and actual tax dollars on the table. 
These characteristics of the APA process are positive--countries 
developing shared procedures which facilitate a clearer understanding of 
their respective transfer pricing approaches and lead to multilateral 
efforts to address problems like global trading. Of course, this does not 
mean that underlying issues become easy; the advantage is creating 
formats, structures and processes that provide better opportunities for 
interaction and resolution. 
Ultimately, the APA program, its history, function, and controversy 
provide a valuable context in which to consider the more general 
questions of administrative flexibility and discretion. The pressure for 
such flexibility and creativity may be even stronger in the future as 
regulatory questions commonly involve other countries with whom we 
need better ways to coordinate regulatory regimes. 
